2019版巴菲特股東信英文版原文，以下為中英對照版，Google輔助翻譯，已審校完畢。如有錯漏，歡迎留言。
在本年度股東信中，巴菲特依次提到了如下信息：
1、抱怨了新GAAP規則不科學，導致財務報表中的利潤數字可能發生「狂野的波動」，但實際上所有業務都在健康、穩健增長；
2、不再聚焦帳面價值，並闡述了3點原因；
3、2018年初的管理層變動，取得很好的效果；
4、介紹了伯克希爾的五個小樹林體系：①控股公司；②持有股權的投資（5-10%）；③與其他公司分享控制權的公司；④現金等價物；⑤保險公司。
5、未來計劃回購伯克希爾股份，如果股價低於內在價值；
6、非保險業務：2018年初減稅法案，提升了內在價值；
7、伯克希爾四個資金來源：①信貸（集中在重資產公司，不過度舉債）；②股權，收益投資獲取複利，不分紅；③保險公司浮存金（免息，甚至有收益）；④遞延所得稅；
致伯克希爾哈撒韋公司股東：
Berkshire earned $4.0 billion in 2018 utilizing generally accepted accounting principles (commonly called 「GAAP」). The components of that figure are $24.8 billion in operating earnings, a $3.0 billion non-cash loss from an impairment of intangible assets (arising almost entirely from our equity interest in Kraft Heinz), $2.8 billion in realized capital gains from the sale of investment securities and a $20.6 billion loss from a reduction in the amount of unrealized capital gains that existed in our investment holdings.
2018年伯克希爾利潤為40億美元（GAAP下）。
包括24.8億美元的運營利潤、30億美元的非現金形式的無形資產減記（主要來自卡夫亨氏）、28億美元的資本利得（來自出售可投資證券）、206億美元的虧損（來自投資組合的未實現資本損失）。
A new GAAP rule requires us to include that last item in earnings. As I emphasized in the 2017 annual report, neither Berkshire’s Vice Chairman, Charlie Munger, nor I believe that rule to be sensible. Rather, both of us have consistently thought that at Berkshire this mark-to-market change would produce what I described as 「wild and capricious swings in our bottom line.」
GAAP新規要求將未實現的投資組合資本損益計入利潤統計中。 正如我在2017年年度報告中強調的那樣，我和伯克希爾副董事長芒格都表示反對。 相反，我們倆都一直認為，在伯克希爾，這種按市價計價的變化會令伯克希爾的利潤發生狂野且反覆無常的波動。
The accuracy of that prediction can be suggested by our quarterly results during 2018. In the first and fourth quarters, we reported GAAP losses of $1.1 billion and $25.4 billion respectively. In the second and third quarters, we reported profits of $12 billion and $18.5 billion. In complete contrast to these gyrations, the many businesses that Berkshire owns delivered consistent and satisfactory operating earnings in all quarters. For the year, those earnings exceeded their 2016 high of $17.6 billion by 41%.
2018年的季報證明了以這一點。第一和第四季度，我們分別錄得11億和254億美元損失（GAAP下）。 而第二和第三季度，我們又錄得120億美元和185億美元利潤。 與此形成鮮明對比的是，伯克希爾旗下各家公司在去年所有季度都擁有持續且令人滿意的營業利潤，超過2016年利潤高峰176億美元的幅度高達41%。
Wide swings in our quarterly GAAP earnings will inevitably continue. That’s because our huge equity portfolio – valued at nearly $173 billion at the end of 2018 – will often experience one-day price fluctuations of $2 billion or more, all of which the new rule says must be dropped immediately to our bottom line. Indeed, in the fourth quarter, a period of high volatility in stock prices, we experienced several days with a 「profit」 or 「loss」 of more than $4 billion.
我們季度GAAP收益的大幅波動將不可避免地繼續下去。 那是因為我們的巨額股權投資組合 - 在2018年底價值接近1730億美元 - 通常會出現一天超過20億美元的波動。而這些按照新的GAAP規則必須立即計入利潤。 的確，在四季度，股價高位震蕩的時期，我們經歷了「盈利」或「虧損」超過40億美元的幾天。
Our advice? Focus on operating earnings, paying little attention to gains or losses of any variety. My saying that in no way diminishes the importance of our investments to Berkshire. Over time, Charlie and I expect them to deliver substantial gains, albeit with highly irregular timing.
我們的建議？ 專注於營業利潤，不要關注收益或損失。 但這並不意味這我們將削弱投資對伯克希爾投資的重要性。我和查理始終希望投資能為我們帶來可觀的收益，儘管它擁有高度不確定性。
**********
Long-time readers of our annual reports will have spotted the different way in which I opened this letter. For nearly three decades, the initial paragraph featured the percentage change in Berkshire’s per-share book value. It’s now time to abandon that practice.
我們的老讀者會發現今年的股東信發生了變化。 過去三十年，我們總是會在開頭提到伯克希爾每股帳面價值的變化。現在是時候放棄這種做法了。
The fact is that the annual change in Berkshire’s book value – which makes its farewell appearance on page 2 – is a metric that has lost the relevance it once had. Three circumstances have made that so. First, Berkshire has gradually morphed from a company whose assets are concentrated in marketable stocks into one whose major value resides in operating businesses. Charlie and I expect that reshaping to continue in an irregular manner. Second, while our equity holdings are valued at market prices, accounting rules require our collection of operating companies to be included in book value at an amount far below their current value, a mismark that has grown in recent years. Third, it is likely that – over time – Berkshire will be a significant repurchaser of its shares, transactions that will take place at prices above book value but below our estimate of intrinsic value. The math of such purchases is simple: Each transaction makes per-share intrinsic value go up, while per-share book value goes down. That combination causes the book-value scorecard to become increasingly out of touch with economic reality.
事實上每股帳面價值已經失去了相關性，有三大原因導致了這一現象。首先，伯克希爾逐漸從資產集中在可銷售股票的公司，轉變為主要價值在於經營業務的公司。其次，雖然我們持有的股權按市場價格計算，但會計規則要求我們用帳面價值來記錄我們旗下公司的價值，而這遠低於當前市價。第三，未來伯克希爾很可能將回購股票，交易價格將高於帳面價值、但低於我們估計的內生價值。回購將令每股內生價值上升、每股帳面價值下降，將導致帳面價值越來越與經濟現實脫節。
In future tabulations of our financial results, we expect to focus on Berkshire’s market price. Markets can be extremely capricious: Just look at the 54-year history laid out on page 2. Over time, however, Berkshire’s stock price will provide the best measure of business performance.
在未來的財務業績表中，我們期望關注伯克希爾的市場價格。 市場可以非常反覆無常：只要看看第2頁列出的54年歷史。然而，隨著時間的推移，伯克希爾的股價才是反應我們經營業績的最佳指標。
**********
Before moving on, I want to give you some good news – really good news – that is not reflected in our financial statements. It concerns the management changes we made in early 2018, when Ajit Jain was put in charge of all insurance activities and Greg Abel was given authority over all other operations. These moves were overdue. Berkshire is now far better managed than when I alone was supervising operations. Ajit and Greg have rare talents, and Berkshire blood flows through their veins.
在繼續之前，我想給你一些好消息 - 真正的好消息 - 這些都沒有反映在我們的財報中。2018年初管理層發生變動，Ajit Jain負責保險業務，Greg Abel負責其他所有業務。事實證明這個變化早就應該推進了。伯克希爾現在的管理得比我獨自管理時要好得多。 阿吉特和格雷格擁有難得的天賦，同時也擁有伯克希爾的基因和價值觀。
Now let’s take a look at what you own.
現在讓我們來看看你擁有的東西。
專注於森林 - 忘記樹木
Investors who evaluate Berkshire sometimes obsess on the details of our many and diverse businesses – our economic 「trees,」 so to speak. Analysis of that type can be mind-numbing, given that we own a vast array of specimens, ranging from twigs to redwoods. A few of our trees are diseased and unlikely to be around a decade from now. Many others, though, are destined to grow in size and beauty.
評估伯克希爾的投資者有時會對我們眾多不同業務的細節——我們的「每一棵樹」都仔細研究。考慮到我們擁有大量的投資標的，就如同在森林中有種類繁多的樹種一樣，這種分析的結果可能會讓人頭腦麻木。我們的一些樹木會生病，但是病期不會超過十年。與此同時，還有大量其他樹木在茁壯成長。
Fortunately, it’s not necessary to evaluate each tree individually to make a rough estimate of Berkshire’s intrinsic business value. That’s because our forest contains five 「groves」 of major importance, each of which can be appraised, with reasonable accuracy, in its entirety. Four of those groves are differentiated clusters of businesses and financial assets that are easy to understand. The fifth – our huge and diverse insurance operation – delivers great value to Berkshire in a less obvious manner, one I will explain later in this letter.
幸運的是，投資者沒有必要單獨評估每棵樹，並以此來估算伯克希爾內在的商業價值。那是因為我們的森林包含五個重要的「小樹林」，每個小樹林都可以以合理的準確度進行評估。其中四個是易於理解的差異化企業和金融資產集群。第五個——我們龐大而多樣化的保險業務——以不太明顯的方式為伯克希爾提供了巨大的價值。
Before we look more closely at the first four groves, let me remind you of our prime goal in the deployment of your capital: to buy ably-managed businesses, in whole or part, that possess favorable and durable economic characteristics. We also need to make these purchases at sensible prices.
在我們更仔細地研究前四個樹林之前，讓我提醒一下您在資本配置中的首要目標：購買具有良好和持久發展特徵公司的股票——全倉或者分散買都可以。當然，我們在購買這些股票的時候，還要以合理的價格來購買。
Sometimes we can buy control of companies that meet our tests. Far more often, we find the attributes we seek in publicly-traded businesses, in which we normally acquire a 5% to 10% interest. Our two-pronged approach to huge-scale capital allocation is rare in corporate America and, at times, gives us an important advantage.
有時我們可以買下符合條件公司的控制權，但是我們更通常的做法是，在公司公開交易的股份中，我們買下5%到10%的股份。我們這種雙管齊下的投資策略在美國很少見，但這種策略也給我們帶來了重要優勢。
In recent years, the sensible course for us to follow has been clear: Many stocks have offered far more for our money than we could obtain by purchasing businesses in their entirety. That disparity led us to buy about $43 billion of marketable equities last year, while selling only $19 billion. Charlie and I believe the companies in which we invested offered excellent value, far exceeding that available in takeover transactions.
近年來，我們遵循的這一明智之路已經獲得了很明確的收益：許多我們分散購買的股票為我們提供的利益比我們買下整個公司獲得的利益要大得多。這種差異化的交易策略，讓我們在去年買入了約430億美元公開發售的股票，但是我們僅僅拋了190億美元的股票。我們相信，我們投資的公司為我們提供了極好的價值，遠遠超過了收購這些公司帶來的價值。
Despite our recent additions to marketable equities, the most valuable grove in Berkshire’s forest remains the many dozens of non-insurance businesses that Berkshire controls (usually with 100% ownership and never with less than 80%). Those subsidiaries earned $16.8 billion last year. When we say 「earned,」 moreover, we are describing what remains after all income taxes, interest payments, managerial compensation (whether cash or stock-based), restructuring expenses, depreciation, amortization and home-office overhead.
除了在股票投資上或以之外，伯克希爾森林體系中最有價值的一個小樹林依然是數十個伯克希爾控股的非保險公司（我們在這些公司的股份通常是100%，沒有低於80%的）。這些子公司在去年為我們貢獻了168億美元的淨利潤（在扣除各種稅費之後）。
That brand of earnings is a far cry from that frequently touted by Wall Street bankers and corporate CEOs. Too often, their presentations feature 「adjusted EBITDA,」 a measure that redefines 「earnings」 to exclude a variety of all-too-real costs.
這一定義與華爾街銀行家和一些CEO們常常兜售的概念相去甚遠。他們通常會使用「調整後的EBITDA」，這種方法把一些應當計入的成本排除在外。
For example, managements sometimes assert that their company’s stock-based compensation shouldn’t be counted as an expense. (What else could it be – a gift from shareholders?) And restructuring expenses? Well, maybelast year’s exact rearrangement won’t recur. But restructurings of one sort or another are common in business – Berkshire has gone down that road dozens of times, and our shareholders have always borne the costs of doing so.
例如，管理層有時會斷言他們的股票激勵不應該算作費用。 （還能算做什麼 -來自股東的 禮物 ？）重組費用？ 也許去年的重組不會再發生。 但是，這各種重組非常常見 - 伯克希爾已經走了幾十次這條路，我們的股東一直承擔著這樣做的代價。
Abraham Lincoln once posed the question: 「If you call a dog’s tail a leg, how many legs does it have?」 and then answered his own query: 「Four, because calling a tail a leg doesn’t make it one.」 Abe would have felt lonely on Wall Street.
亞伯拉罕·林肯（Abraham Lincoln）曾提出過這樣一個問題：「如果你把狗的尾巴稱為腿，它有多少條腿？」然後回答了他自己的疑問：「四條，因為把尾巴稱為一條腿並不能使他真正成為一條腿。」
Charlie and I do contend that our acquisition-related amortization expenses of $1.4 billion (detailed on page K-84) are not a true economic cost. We add back such amortization 「costs」 to GAAP earnings when we are evaluating both private businesses and marketable stocks.
我們認為，伯克希爾與收購相關的14億美元的攤銷費用並不是真正的經濟成本。當我們評估私營企業和公開發售股票時，我們將這部分攤銷「成本」加回到GAAP下的收益中。
In contrast, Berkshire’s $8.4 billion depreciation charge understates our true economic cost. In fact, we need to spend more than this sum annually to simply remain competitive in our many operations. Beyond those 「maintenance」 capital expenditures, we spend large sums in pursuit of growth. Overall, Berkshire invested a record $14.5 billion last year in plant, equipment and other fixed assets, with 89% of that spent in America.
伯克希爾的84億美元折舊費低估了我們的真實經濟成本。事實上，我們需要每年花費超過這筆金額，以便在我們的許多業務中保持競爭力。除此之外「維護」資本支出，我們花費大量資金追求增長。總體而言，伯克希爾去年在工廠，設備和其他固定資產方面的投資達到創紀錄的145億美元，其中89%用於美國。
Berkshire’s runner-up grove by value is its collection of equities, typically involving a 5% to 10% ownership position in a very large company. As noted earlier, our equity investments were worth nearly $173 billion at yearend, an amount far above their cost. If the portfolio had been sold at its yearend valuation, federal income tax of about $14.7 billion would have been payable on the gain. In all likelihood, we will hold most of these stocks for a long time. Eventually, however, gains generate taxes at whatever rate prevails at the time of sale.
按價值計算，排在第二名的小樹林是我們的股權投資，我們通常投在那些大公司5%至10%的股權。我們的股權投資在年底時價值接近1730億美元，遠高於其成本。如果我們將這些投資按照年底的估值售，那麼將繳納約147億美元的聯邦所得稅。不過，我們很有可能將長時間持有其中大部分的股票。
Our investees paid us dividends of $3.8 billion last year, a sum that will increase in 2019. Far more important than the dividends, though, are the huge earnings that are annually retained by these companies. Consider, as anindicator, these figures that cover only our five largest holdings.
去年，我們還獲得了這些投資標的38億美元的分紅，這筆款項將在2019年增加。我們在此公布我們從持有最多價值股票的五家公司獲得的分紅情況：
（1）根據目前的年率。
（2）基於2018年的收益減去已支付的普通和優先股息。
GAAP – which dictates the earnings we report – does not allow us to include the retained earnings of investees in our financial accounts. But those earnings are of enormous value to us: Over the years, earnings retained by our investees (viewed as a group) have eventually delivered capital gains to Berkshire that totaled more than one dollar for each dollar these companies reinvested for us.
GAAP - 它決定了我們報告的收益 - 不允許我們包括的留存收益投資對象在我們的財務帳戶中。 但這些收益對我們來說具有巨大價值：多年來，收益保持不變。我們的被投資者（被視為一個集團）最終為伯克希爾提供了不止一筆資金。這些公司為我們再投資的每一美元的美元。
All of our major holdings enjoy excellent economics, and most use a portion of their retained earnings to repurchase their shares. We very much like that: If Charlie and I think an investee’s stock is underpriced, we rejoice when management employs some of its earnings to increase Berkshire’s ownership percentage.
我們投資的主要股票都有出色的經濟收益，而且大部分公司都使用部分留存收益來回購股票。我們非常喜歡這樣：如果我們認為被投資公司的股票價格被低估，那麼當管理層將其部分收益用於增加伯克希爾的所有權比例時，我們感到高興。
Here’s one example drawn from the table above: Berkshire’s holdings of American Express have remained unchanged over the past eight years. Meanwhile, our ownership increased from 12.6% to 17.9% because of repurchases made by the company. Last year, Berkshire’s portion of the $6.9 billion earned by American Express was $1.2 billion, about 96% of the $1.3 billion we paid for our stake in the company. When earnings increase and shares outstanding decrease, owners – over time – usually do well.
以上是從上表中得出的一個例子：伯克希爾持有的美國運通股份過去八年中沒有變化。 同時，由於公司回購，我們的所有權從12.6％增加到17.9％。 去年，伯克希爾公司在美國運通公司獲得12億美元收益，約佔我們為運通股權支付的13億美元的96％。 當利潤增加、在外流通股減少，這通常是件好事。
A third category of Berkshire’s business ownership is a quartet of companies in which we share control with other parties. Our portion of the after-tax operating earnings of these businesses – 26.7% of Kraft Heinz, 50% of Berkadia and Electric Transmission Texas, and 38.6% of Pilot Flying J – totaled about $1.3 billion in 2018.
第三類則是伯克希爾公司與其他方共享控制權的公司。我們在這些業務中的部分稅後利潤——包括卡夫亨氏的26.7%，Berkadia和德國電力傳輸的50%，以及Pilot Flying J的38.6%——在2018年總計約13億美元。
In our fourth grove, Berkshire held $112 billion at yearend in U.S. Treasury bills and other cash equivalents, and another $20 billion in miscellaneous fixed-income instruments. We consider a portion of that stash to be untouchable, having pledged to always hold at least $20 billion in cash equivalents to guard against external calamities. We have also promised to avoid any activities that could threaten our maintaining that buffer.
在我們森林體系的第四部分，伯克希爾在年底持有1120億美元的美國國庫券和其他現金等價物，以及另外200億美元的各類固定收益工具。我們認為這部分資金平時是不會輕易動的，我們承諾始終持有至少200億美元的現金等價物以防範各類意外。
Berkshire will forever remain a financial fortress. In managing, I will make expensive mistakes of commission and will also miss many opportunities, some of which should have been obvious to me. At times, our stock will tumble as investors flee from equities. But I will never risk getting caught short of cash.
有時，隨著投資者逃離股市，我們的股票將會下挫。但我永遠不會冒現金短缺的風險。
In the years ahead, we hope to move much of our excess liquidity into businesses that Berkshire will permanently own. The immediate prospects for that, however, are not good: Prices are sky-high for businesses possessing decent long-term prospects.
在未來幾年，我們希望將大部分過剩流動資金轉移到伯克希爾將永久擁有的業務中。然而，眼前可能並不是好的時機：那些擁有良好長期前景的企業股票價格現在是天價。
That disappointing reality means that 2019 will likely see us again expanding our holdings of marketable equities. We continue, nevertheless, to hope for an elephant-sized acquisition. Even at our ages of 88 and 95 – I’m the young one – that prospect is what causes my heart and Charlie’s to beat faster. (Just writing about the possibility of a huge purchase has caused my pulse rate to soar.)
這意味著，在2019年，我們將擴大公開市場交易股票投資的規模，但同時也會考慮對大公司的收購。
My expectation of more stock purchases is not a market call. Charlie and I have no idea as to how stocks will behave next week or next year. Predictions of that sort have never been a part of our activities. Our thinking, rather, is focused on calculating whether a portion of an attractive business is worth more than its market price.
我對更多投資股票的預期不是市場需求。我們並不知道下周或明年的股票表現會如何。我們也從未進行過這種預測。相反，我們的想法是專注於計算有吸引力的公司股票價格是否比市場價格更高。
**********
I believe Berkshire’s intrinsic value can be approximated by summing the values of our four asset-laden groves and then subtracting an appropriate amount for taxes eventually payable on the sale of marketable securities.
我相信伯克希爾的內在價值可以通過加總我們上述4個資產端的森林、減去稅費得出。
You may ask whether an allowance should not also be made for the major tax costs Berkshire would incur if we were to sell certain of our wholly-owned businesses. Forget that thought: It would be foolish for us to sell any of our wonderful companies even if no tax would be payable on its sale. Truly good businesses are exceptionally hard to find. Selling any you are lucky enough to own makes no sense at all.
您可能會問，如果我們出售全資子公司時發生巨額稅費支出，是不是應該進行補貼。 忘記這個想法：我們賣掉任何一個很棒的公司都是愚蠢的，即使不需要繳納稅款。 真正優秀的企業非常難找。 出售任何你有幸擁有的東西毫無意義。
The interest cost on all of our debt has been deducted as an expense in calculating the earnings at Berkshire’s non-insurance businesses. Beyond that, much of our ownership of the first four groves is financed by funds generated from Berkshire’s fifth grove – a collection of exceptional insurance companies. We call those funds 「float,」 a source of financing that we expect to be cost-free – or maybe even better than that – over time. We will explain the characteristics of float later in this letter.
我們在計算伯克希爾非保險業務的成本時，已將所有債務的利息成本扣除。 除此之外，我們對前四個樹林的大部分所有權的資金，都來自伯克希爾的第五個小樹林 - 一系列優秀的保險公司。 我們將這些資金稱為「浮存金」，這是一種成本幾乎為零、甚至擁有收益的資金來源。
Finally, a point of key and lasting importance: Berkshire’s value is maximized by our having assembled the five groves into a single entity. This arrangement allows us to seamlessly and objectively allocate major amounts of capital, eliminate enterprise risk, avoid insularity, fund assets at exceptionally low cost, occasionally take advantage of tax efficiencies, and minimize overhead.
最後，重要的一點：伯克希爾的價值最大化是由這五個小樹林結合成一個有機整體。 這種安排使我們能夠無縫地分配大量資金資本，消除企業風險，避免孤立，以極低的成本獲取資金購買資產。
At Berkshire, the whole is greater – considerably greater – than the sum of the parts.
在伯克希爾，整體比部分的總和更大 - 相當大。
回購和報告
Earlier I mentioned that Berkshire will from time to time be repurchasing its own stock. Assuming that we buy at a discount to Berkshire’s intrinsic value – which certainly will be our intention – repurchases will benefit both those shareholders leaving the company and those who stay.
早些時候我提到伯克希爾將不時回購自己的股票。 假設我們回購的價格低於伯克希爾的內在價值 - 這當然是我們的意圖 - 回購將使離開公司和留下來的股東都獲得收益。
True, the upside from repurchases is very slight for those who are leaving. That’s because careful buying by us will minimize any impact on Berkshire’s stock price. Nevertheless, there is some benefit to sellers in having an extra buyer in the market.
誠然，回購的好處對於那些離開的股東來說非常輕微。 那是因為我們將謹慎回購，以儘量減少對伯克希爾股票價格的影響。 然而，這總歸會吸引更多的買入者。
For continuing shareholders, the advantage is obvious: If the market prices a departing partner’s interest at, say, 90¢ on the dollar, continuing shareholders reap an increase in per-share intrinsic value with every repurchase by the company. Obviously, repurchases should be price-sensitive: Blindly buying an overpriced stock is valuedestructive, a fact lost on many promotional or ever-optimistic CEOs.
對於繼續持有的股東而言，優點顯而易見：如果市場價格發生扭曲，1美元價值只值90分，這時候如果公司回購，每股內在價值將會提升，繼續持有的股東將會從中受益。 顯然回購應該是對價格敏感的：在過高股價盲目買入是對股票價值的破壞，這一點被很多樂觀的CEO們忽視了。
When a company says that it contemplates repurchases, it’s vital that all shareholder-partners be given the information they need to make an intelligent estimate of value. Providing that information is what Charlie and I try to do in this report. We do not want a partner to sell shares back to the company because he or she has been misled or inadequately informed.
重要的是，當一家公司表示它打算進行回購時，所有股東都應有權知曉其所需信息，以便對價值進行明智的估算。 提供這些信息是查理和我嘗試的在這份報告中所做的。 我們不希望股東賣出股票，僅僅以為他被誤導或並不充分知情。
Some sellers, however, may disagree with our calculation of value and others may have found investments that they consider more attractive than Berkshire shares. Some of that second group will be right: There are unquestionably many stocks that will deliver far greater gains than ours.
然而，一些賣家可能不同意我們的價值計算，而其他賣家可能已經找到了他們認為比伯克希爾股票更有吸引力的投資。 當然，的確有許多股票將比伯克希爾能帶來更大的收益。
In addition, certain shareholders will simply decide it’s time for them or their families to become net consumers rather than continuing to build capital. Charlie and I have no current interest in joining that group. Perhaps we will become big spenders in our old age.
此外，某些股東認為是時候不需要再積累資本，而是可以成為一個純消費者。 查理和我目前沒有興趣加入這個隊伍。 當我們年老的時候可能需要非常大的開支。
**********
For 54 years our managerial decisions at Berkshire have been made from the viewpoint of the shareholders who are staying, not those who are leaving. Consequently, Charlie and I have never focused on current-quarter results.
54年來，我們在伯克希爾的管理決策都是從繼續持有股份的角度、而不是從即將離場的角度出發。 因此，查理和我 從未專注於當前季度的財報。
Berkshire, in fact, may be the only company in the Fortune 500 that does not prepare monthly earnings reports or balance sheets. I, of course, regularly view the monthly financial reports of most subsidiaries. But Charlie and I learn of Berkshire’s overall earnings and financial position only on a quarterly basis.
事實上，伯克希爾可能是財富500強中唯一一家沒有編制月度盈利報告或資產負債表的公司。 當然，我經常查看大多數子公司的月度財務報告。 但查理和我僅按季度了解伯克希爾的整體收益和財務狀況。
Furthermore, Berkshire has no company-wide budget (though many of our subsidiaries find one useful). Our lack of such an instrument means that the parent company has never had a quarterly 「number」 to hit. Shunning the use of this bogey sends an important message to our many managers, reinforcing the culture we prize.
此外，伯克希爾沒有公司範圍的預算（儘管我們的許多子公司都發現預算很有用）。 這意味著母公司 從未有過季度「數字」。
Over the years, Charlie and I have seen all sorts of bad corporate behavior, both accounting and operational, induced by the desire of management to meet Wall Street expectations. What starts as an 「innocent」 fudge in order to not disappoint 「the Street」 – say, trade-loading at quarter-end, turning a blind eye to rising insurance losses, or drawing down a 「cookie-jar」 reserve – can become the first step toward full-fledged fraud. Playing with the numbers 「just this once」 may well be the CEO’s intent; it’s seldom the end result. And if it’s okay for the boss to cheat a little, it’s easy for subordinates to rationalize similar behavior.
多年來，查理和我見過各種不良的公司行為，包括會計和運營，來源於管理層希望迎合華爾街的期望。 很多CEO最初會想玩弄數字遊戲「就這一次」，但最終並非如此。另外如果老闆可以做一些小的欺騙行為，那員工仿效就變得天經地義了。
At Berkshire, our audience is neither analysts nor commentators: Charlie and I are working for our shareholder-partners. The numbers that flow up to us will be the ones we send on to you.
在伯克希爾，我們的觀眾既不是分析師也不是評論員：查理和我一直為我們的股東工作。呈現給我們的財務數字也將是最終呈現給你們的。
非保險業務 - 從棒棒糖到機車
Let’s now look further at Berkshire’s most valuable grove – our collection of non-insurance businesses –keeping in mind that we do not wish to unnecessarily hand our competitors information that might be useful to them. Additional details about individual operations can be found on pages K-5 – K-22 and pages K-40 – K-51.
讓我們現在進一步了解伯克希爾最有價值的小樹林 - 我們的非保險業務 -請記住，我們不希望不必要地向競爭對手提供可能對他們有用的信息。
Viewed as a group, these businesses earned pre-tax income in 2018 of $20.8 billion, a 24% increase over 2017. Acquisitions we made in 2018 delivered only a trivial amount of that gain.
作為一個整體，這些業務2018年的稅前收入為208億美元，比上年增長24％。我們在2018年進行的收購只貢獻了微不足道的收益。
I will stick with pre-tax figures in this discussion. But our after-tax gain in 2018 from these businesses was far greater – 47% – thanks in large part to the cut in the corporate tax rate that became effective at the beginning of that year. Let’s look at why the impact was so dramatic.
在這次討論中，我會堅持稅前數字。 但是，這些業務在2018年的稅後利潤的增長大得多 - 47％ -在很大程度上因為年初生效的減稅措施。 讓我們來看看為什麼影響如此戲劇性。
Begin with an economic reality: Like it or not, the U.S. Government 「owns」 an interest in Berkshire’s earnings of a size determined by Congress. In effect, our country’s Treasury Department holds a special class of our stock – call this holding the AA shares – that receives large 「dividends」 (that is, tax payments) from Berkshire. In 2017, as in many years before, the corporate tax rate was 35%, which meant that the Treasury was doing very well with its AA shares. Indeed, the Treasury’s 「stock,」 which was paying nothing when we took over in 1965, had evolved into a holding that delivered billions of dollars annually to the federal government.
從經濟現實開始：無論喜歡與否，美國政府「擁有」對伯克希爾的一部分股權，而這規模由國會決定。 實際上，我們國家的財政部持有我們的特殊種類股票「AA股」，從伯克希爾獲得大量「股息」（即納稅）。 在2017年，與多年前一樣，企業稅率為35％，這意味著財政部從它的AA股中收穫頗豐。
Last year, however, 40% of the government’s 「ownership」 (14/35ths) was returned to Berkshire – free of charge – when the corporate tax rate was reduced to 21%. Consequently, our 「A」 and 「B」 shareholders received a major boost in the earnings attributable to their shares
然而去年，當企業所得稅降低至21%，相當於政府所擁有的這部分「股權」的40%無償歸還給了伯克希爾。 因此，我們的A股和B股股東獲得了大幅收益 。
This happening materially increased the intrinsic value of the Berkshire shares you and I own. The same dynamic, moreover, enhanced the intrinsic value of almost all of the stocks Berkshire holds.
這實質上增加了伯克希爾股票的內在價值，同時也增加了幾乎所有伯克希爾擁有股票的內在價值。
Those are the headlines. But there are other factors to consider that tempered our gain. For example, the tax benefits garnered by our large utility operation get passed along to its customers. Meanwhile, the tax rate applicable to the substantial dividends we receive from domestic corporations is little changed at about 13%. (This lower rate has long been logical because our investees have already paid tax on the earnings that they pay to us.) Overall, however, the new law made our businesses and the stocks we own considerably more valuable.
這些是最重要的，還有其他一些因素可以削弱了我們的收益。 例如，我們運營的大型公用設施將稅收優惠傳導給了消費者。同時，大額分紅稅率稅率幾乎沒有變化，約為13％。 （這個較低的稅率長期以來是合乎邏輯的，因為我們投資的公司已經為給我們的分紅繳納過一遍稅款。）但總的來說，新的稅法使我們的企業和我們擁有的股票更有價值。
Which suggests that we return to the performance of our non-insurance businesses. Our two towering redwoods in this grove are BNSF and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (90.9% owned). Combined, they earned $9.3 billion before tax last year, up 6% from 2017. You can read more about these businesses on pages K-5 – K-10 and pages K-40 – K-45.
我們非保險業務中最突出的當屬BNSF和Berkshire Hathaway Energy（擁有90.9％股權）。 他們去年稅前收入為93億美元，比2017年增長了6％。
Our next five non-insurance subsidiaries, as ranked by earnings (but presented here alphabetically), Clayton Homes, International Metalworking, Lubrizol, Marmon and Precision Castparts, had aggregate pre-tax income in 2018 of $6.4 billion, up from the $5.5 billion these companies earned in 2017.
接下來收入排名前五的非保險子公司（以下按字母順序排列）為：Clayton Homes，International Metalworking，Lubrizol，Marmon和Precision Castparts，2018年的稅前收入合計64億美元，2017年這一數字是55億美元。
The next five, similarly ranked and listed (Forest River, Johns Manville, MiTek, Shaw and TTI) earned $2.4 billion pre-tax last year, up from $2.1 billion in 2017.
接下來的五個：Forest River，Johns Manville，MiTek，Shaw和TTI 去年稅前收入為24億美元，高於2017年的21億美元。
The remaining non-insurance businesses that Berkshire owns – and there are many – had pre-tax income of $3.6 billion in 2018 vs. $3.3 billion in 2017.
其餘非保險業務2018年稅前收入為為36億美元，2017年為33億美元。
保險，「浮存金」和伯克希爾的資金
Our property/casualty (「P/C」) insurance business – our fifth grove – has been the engine propelling Berkshire’s growth since 1967, the year we acquired National Indemnity and its sister company, National Fire & Marine, for $8.6 million. Today, National Indemnity is the largest property/casualty company in the world as measured by net worth.
我們的財產/人壽（「P / C」）保險業務 - 我們的第五個樹林 - 自1967年以來一直是推動伯克希爾增長的引擎，那一年我們以860萬美元收購國民保險公司及其姊妹公司National Fire＆Marine。 時至今日，國民保險是世界上淨值最大的P / C公司。
One reason we were attracted to the P/C business was the industry’s business model: P/C insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as claims arising from exposure to asbestos, or severe workplace accidents, payments can stretch over many decades.
我們被P / C業務吸引的一個原因是該行業的商業模式：P / C保險公司先收到保費、後支付賠償。在極端情況下，例如因接觸石棉而引起的索賠，或嚴重的工傷事故，付款可以持續數十年。
This collect-now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums – money we call 「float」 – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their own benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how it has grown, as the following table shows:
這種「先收後付」的商業模式使得保險公司持有大量資金——這些資金我們稱為「浮存金」。 與此同時，保險公司可以將這筆資金用於投資而獲得收益。儘管保單和索賠此消彼長，但浮存金的規模通常保持穩定。 因此，隨著我們業務的增長，浮存金也在增長。 下表展示了我們浮存金規模的增長：
包括因人壽，年金和健康保險業務而產生的浮存金
We may in time experience a decline in float. If so, the decline will be very gradual – at the outside no more than 3% in any year. The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can never be subject to immediate or nearterm demands for sums that are of significance to our cash resources. That structure is by design and is a key component in the unequaled financial strength of our insurance companies. That strength will never be compromised.
我們的浮存金有可能會出現短期下降。但下降將是 非常緩慢的 - 一年不會超過3％。 保險合約的本質是，確保我們不會在短期內支付巨額資金，以避免威脅到我們的現金流。這一結構需要經過精心設計，是保險公司保有財務實力的關鍵。
If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, our insurance operation registers an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income the float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it.
如果我們的保費超過我們需要支付的費用和賠償，我們的保險業務就會產生一筆承保利潤。 當獲得這樣的利潤時，我們就可以享受使用免費資金 - 而且，更好的是，通過持有它獲得收益 。
Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous indeed that it sometimes causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. That loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. Competitive dynamics almost guarantee that the insurance industry, despite the float income all its companies enjoy, will continue its dismal record of earning subnormal returns on tangible net worth as compared to other American businesses.
不幸的是，所有保險公司都希望獲得這一結果，因而產生了激烈的競爭。有時會導致整個P / C行業遭受巨大的承保損失。保險公司不得不為保有浮存金而付出代價。儘管其所有公司都享有浮存金收益，但仍激烈的競爭使得美國的保險業相比其他行業，擁有慘澹的淨資產收益率。
Nevertheless, I like our own prospects. Berkshire’s unrivaled financial strength allows us far more flexibility in investing our float than that generally available to P/C companies. The many alternatives available to us are always an advantage and occasionally offer major opportunities. When other insurers are constrained, our choices expand.
不過，我對我們自己的前景充滿信心。 伯克希爾無與倫比的財務實力使我們在投資浮存金方面比其他保險公司擁有更大的靈活性。
Moreover, our P/C companies have an excellent underwriting record. Berkshire has now operated at an underwriting profit for 15 of the past 16 years, the exception being 2017, when our pre-tax loss was $3.2 billion. For the entire 16-year span, our pre-tax gain totaled $27 billion, of which $2 billion was recorded in 2018.
此外，我們的P / C公司有很好的承保記錄。 伯克希爾的保險業務在過去16年中有15年擁有承保利潤，例外是2017年，當時我們的稅前虧損為32億美元。 整個16年的時間裡，我們的稅前收益總計270億美元，其中20億美元是在2018年錄得的。
That record is no accident: Disciplined risk evaluation is the daily focus of our insurance managers, who know that the benefits of float can be drowned by poor underwriting results. All insurers give that message lip service. At Berkshire it is a religion, Old Testament style.
這一記錄並非偶然：風險評估是我們保險經理的日常關注點，他們知道一旦發生糟糕的承保結果，浮存金所能帶來的好處將蕩然無存。 所有保險公司都會口頭傳達這一點。但在伯克希爾，這是一種宗教，宛如舊約。
文章來源：:見聞美股
轉載請註明