光明觀察編者按：我們耳熟能詳的歷史，在外人聽來可能聞所未聞；外人對歷史已經達成的共識，可能讓我們大跌眼鏡。本文介紹了國際史學界對中日戰爭所作一些最新的探討。有興趣的朋友可以參考約翰-託蘭所著《日本帝國的衰亡》一書。
首發於光明觀察，轉載請註明譯者及出處；本譯文僅供參考，引用請查對原文。
夏威夷毛伊島
對於大多數美國人來說，第二次世界大戰開始於1941年12月7日，當天美國的珍珠港遭到日軍襲擊。對於歐洲人來說這場大戰則始於1939年德國入侵波蘭。然而，很少有西方人注意到在那以前，一場十分持久和殘酷的戰爭早已在中國與日本之間全面爆發。
半個世紀過去了，這場戰爭及其餘波仍然影響著中日關係。甚至過了半個世紀，這場戰爭及其餘波仍然影響著中日關係。這場衝突奪去了大約兩千萬人的生命，捲來了雙方士兵和領導人中最惡劣的那些分子。戰爭的遺物不時被發現，如去年發現的遺留在中國的毒氣罐，它們造成一死幾十人傷。日本的法院也仍就戰俘問題和戰爭勞工問題進行聽證。
然而，儘管中日戰爭在當時亞洲具有重大影響，人們對這八年發生了什麼仍然沒有定論--它的意義在哪裡，它怎麼會發生呢？
為了改變這種狀況，這個月初大約40位中國、日本和來自西方的學者齊聚一堂，討論中日戰爭這段歷史。這項課題由哈佛學者埃茲拉·沃格爾（Ezra Vogel，中文名傅高義--校者注）在2000年提出，在兩年後基於這項研究課題的第一次研討會中，人們討論了這場戰爭中的平民問題。上一周的會議是它的第二次研討會；還有兩次會議--一次聚焦文化問題，一次聚焦外交關係問題--有望在日後召開。
理解這場戰爭不僅僅是一項學術活動。近年來，日本同其鄰國存在的一些很激烈的爭議都是由歷史分歧產生的。日本政客參拜靖國神社--日本供奉戰爭犧牲人員的場所，就最明顯地表現了這一日漸潰爛的膿瘡。我們希望，通過在這些方面達成基本共識，能夠為更廣範圍內的和解提供基礎。
沃格爾解釋道，"我們希望把中國學者、日本學者和西方學者都召集在一起，看他們能否在這次戰爭中究竟發生了什麼的問題上達成共識。但願，這能對解決這個歷史問題有所幫助。學者們並不能夠解決政治問題，但是他們能向想促進和解、並解決問題的政治家們提供基本信息。
這項活動並非沒有先例。亞洲基金會（Asia Foundation）曾經贊助過一項對德國和波蘭和解的研究--這兩個國家通過嘗試合力制定一部共同的歷史教科書。我們的組織正與亞洲基金會和曼斯菲爾德基金會（Mansfield Foundation）合作，希望通過將中國、韓國和日本的新一代意見領袖（opinion leaders）請到一起，以助於改善日本與其鄰國的關係。這些努力必然會引起人們的好奇--還有懷疑--美國參與到其中的動機是什麼？
這項活動的前景很難使人樂觀--至少在我有生之年是這樣。上個星期的研討會為人們帶來了一些希望。在會場大家都彬彬有禮，沒有高聲議論，也沒有惡意攻擊。一些令人不愉快地問題，如南京發生的暴行或日本帝國軍隊使用過化學武器等事件，明顯並沒有進入討論。這些主題則由於日本方面的缺席更令人關注。臺灣學者和大陸學者謙和與尊敬地以禮相待。（這本不用多提，但在近期的很多會議中，中國大陸與會方面甚至對臺灣人到場而表示抗議。）
然而，會議仍然存在著一個嚴重的分歧。對於中國與會者來說，會議的討論基礎應是一個不容爭議的事實：中日戰爭是一場日本對中國的侵略戰爭。換句話來說，他們認為，在這項研究中任何有關史實的討論都應以建立某種道德標準為前提。一位日本與會者則對需要不斷重複"以一種政治立場開始討論"而表示失望。
這位日本歷史學者並不是一位修正主義者：他承認那場戰爭具有侵略性質。但是他又接著說，他無需對那些發生在半個世紀之前的事件負責。據這位學者觀察，很多日本人也有同感。但令他擔心的是，中國繼續在道德方面大做文章正在疏遠那些曾經同情中國立場的人們。他們會開始懷疑真正關鍵點是什麼。難道中國要永遠力爭其道德優勢地位嗎？如果真是這樣，那又是為什麼呢？
一些西方學者也表示了類似的失望。他們認為，試著用道德定格這場戰爭會遮敝歷史教訓的重要性。比如說，儘管中日戰爭造成了極大傷亡，但它對太平洋戰爭的結果作用甚微。盟軍能戰勝日本的決定性因素在於日本缺少艦隻：即使100萬皇軍並沒有被牽制在中國大陸戰場，他們也無法阻擋盟軍向日本列島挺進。中日戰爭對中國人來說是場決定生死的戰爭，但對於很多歷史學家來說，它在二戰中不過是一旁的"側幕"（ peripheral theater）而已。
那些西方學者還關注戰爭中的機動性。他們認為，一項的關鍵的問題在於，當日本軍隊的周圍環境發生變化，其設想受到挑戰而戰術失敗之時，軍方看起來並不能改變他們的計劃。然而這次會議並沒有對這個問題提供多少答案。對日本的機構缺乏靈活性作出解釋可能會幫助我們理解甚至近期出現的現象，比如日本政府沒有能力改善在近10年國家經濟轉型方面出現的失敗局面.
中國歷史學者也不願意爭論蔣介石在戰爭期間的想法。歷史學家們一直存疑，這位總司令究竟是先考慮打敗共產黨還是先擊潰日本軍隊，還有，這如何影響了他在戰爭中的部署。
對於中國人來說，這種錯誤的優先次序是不可能發生的：他們堅持認為，不論內部如何紛爭，所有的中國人都會為了整個民族的命運，在危機面前團結在一起。因此，中國大陸人士似乎比臺灣人更急於為蔣介石辯護。雖然這些民族主義者的本意是可以理解的，但是這仍然阻礙了我們客觀準確地描述這場戰爭。
"戰爭的迷霧"使人們對這場戰爭的理解變的十分困難，然而，政治的迷霧更使它成為不可能完成的任務。
布萊德·格勞斯曼是太平洋CSIS論壇（一個設在檀香山的智囊團）的研究主任。
附：原文與網址
http://www.japantimes.com/cgi-bin/geted.pl5?eo20040126bg.htm
Fog of politics obscures war
By BRAD GLOSSERMAN
MAUI, Hawaiian Islands -- For most Americans, World War II began Dec. 7, 1941, when Japanese forces attacked Pearl Harbor. Europeans date the beginning of the war to the 1939 invasion of Poland. Few Westerners appreciate the length and savagery of the Sino-Japanese war that was already in full force even by then.
More than a half century after its conclusion, that war and its aftermath continue to define relations between China and Japan. The conflict claimed an estimated 20 million lives, bringing out the very worst in soldiers and leaders in both countries. Periodically, leftovers from the war are discovered, such as the poison gas shells uncovered in China last year that killed one and sickened dozens of others. Japanese courts are still hearing cases regarding the treatment of prisoners of war and forced labor.
Yet despite the centrality of the Sino-Japanese War to contemporary Asia, there is still no agreement on what transpired during those eight years, its meaning and why it happened.
To remedy that situation, some two dozen scholars from China, Japan and the West met earlier this month to discuss the military history of the Sino-Japanese War. The project is the brainchild of Harvard scholar Ezra Vogel. The project was born in 2000; two years later the first meeting, a conference on civilian life during the war, convened. Last week's conference was the second; two more meetings, one on culture and the other on diplomatic relations, are anticipated.
Understanding the war isn't just an intellectual exercise. Some of Japan's biggest disputes with its neighbors in recent years have been generated by controversies over history. Japanese politicians' visits to Yasukuni Shrine -- where the country's war dead are memorialized -- are the most obvious manifestation of the festering sore. There are hopes that finding common ground on these issues could provide a foundation for a wider ranging reconciliation.
Vogel explained, "We want to bring together Chinese, Japanese and Western scholars to see if they could agree on what actually happened during the war. Hopefully, they can contribute to resolving the history issue. Scholars can't solve political problems, but they can provide a basic message to politicians who want to promote reconciliation and solve these problems."
The exercise isn't unprecedented. The Asia Foundation has sponsored studies of German-Polish reconciliation through those countries' attempt to craft a joint history textbook. My organization has been working with the Asia Foundation and the Mansfield Foundation to bring together young opinion leaders from China, Korea and Japan to help better ties between Japan and its neighbors. These efforts invariably are greeted with curiosity -- and skepticism -- about the motives behind U.S. involvement.
It is difficult to be optimistic about the prospects for such exercises -- at least in my lifetime. Last week's meeting provided some grounds for hope. It was very civil: no raised voices, no nasty swipes. Bitter topics such as the atrocities in Nanjing or the use of chemical weapons by Imperial Japanese troops were notable by their absence. Taiwanese and mainland scholars treated each other with courtesy and respect. (That might not be asking for much, but at many recent conferences, Chinese participants have protested when Taiwanese were even present.)
But there was a critical divergence. For the Chinese participants, the starting point for each discussion was an indisputable fact: The Sino-Japanese war was a war of aggression. In other words, there was a moral dimension to the study that had to be established before any factual components could be discussed. One Japanese participant expressed frustration with the need to reiterate that point -- "to begin each comment with a political position."
The Japanese historian wasn't a revisionist: He agreed that the war was a war of aggression. But in the next breath he complained that he wasn't responsible for events that occurred over a half century ago. More worrisome was his observation that many Japanese felt the same way -- and that China's continuing emphasis on the moral issue was alienating people who were sympathetic to the Chinese position. They are beginning to wonder what the real point is. Is China trying to permanently claim the moral high ground? If so, why?
Some of the Western historians expressed similar frustrations. For them, attempts to frame the war in moral terms obscure important historical lessons. For example, despite the extraordinarily high number of casualties, the Sino-Japanese war had little impact on the outcome of the war in the Pacific. The critical determinant in the allied victory over Japan was a shortage of ships: Even if 1 million Imperial soldiers hadn't been tied down on the Chinese mainland, they could not have stopped the allied march toward the Japanese archipelago. The Sino-Japanese war was a life or death struggle for the Chinese nation, but it is considered by most historians to be a "peripheral theater" during World War II.
Those Western historians also focused on adaptability. For them, a critical issue was the Japanese military's seeming inability to alter its plans and procedures as circumstances changed, its assumptions were challenged and its tactics failed. Few answers were provided during our meeting. Explaining that institutional inflexibility may help understand even more recent phenomenon, such as the Japanese bureaucracy's inability to come to grips with its failure to turn the country around in the last decade.
Chinese historians were also disinclined to debate Chiang Kai-shek's thinking during the war. Historians have asked whether the generalissimo put a higher priority on fighting the Communists or the Japanese, and how that affected his conduct during the war.
For the Chinese, such mistaken priorities are impossible: They insisted that whatever the internal divisions, all Chinese would come together for the sake of the nation in times of crisis. As a result, the Chinese seemed quicker to defend Chiang than did the Taiwanese. While the nationalist instinct is understandable, it's also an obstacle to an objective and accurate portrait of the war.
The "fog of war" makes that sort of understanding difficult enough. The fog of politics might make the task impossible.
Brad Glosserman is director of research at Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based think tank. He can be reached at bradgp@hawaii.rr.com
The Japan Times: Jan. 26, 2004
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