This article is reproduced from wecat: 顧氏造船廠廠長
Logo of Yunnan Airlines and China Eastern Airlines
On November 21, 2004, 7 in the morning 45 points, baotou, Inner Mongolia in the second half the airport (because the name was too soil, now renamed the east river in baotou airport), one of China Eastern airlines (cea) in yunnan province regional jet bombardier CRJ - 200 type (civil aviation registered number 2 B - 3072200 years on November 19, factory, the fuselage serial number 7697, flying to the total length of 4611 hours, 3560 landing, age 2 years, or a new machine. The B-3072, originally owned by Yunnan Airlines, was already owned by China Eastern Airlines at that time, but the reorganization of assets between China Eastern Airlines and Yunnan Airlines had not been completed, so the B-3072 still retained the painting of "China Yunnan Airlines" at that time) was being prepared before taking off. Flight MU5210 from Baotou Two-and-a-half Li Airport to Shanghai Hongqiao International Airport is ready for flight. There were three crew members, two flight attendants, a security officer and 47 passengers (38 male and nine female, including one Indonesian).
The actual total weight of the aircraft was 23,175 kg, and there was no overload condition within the permissible maximum take-off weight of 24,040 kg.
B-3072 CRJ200 regional jet
Wang Pin, the captain of flight MU5210, was 33 years old at that time. He graduated from the Driving department of Civil Aviation Flight College of China in May 1994, and his driving license was approved for Boeing 737 and Bombardier CRJ-200, with a total flight time of 6,851 hours and 34 minutes. He completed the modification of CRJ-200 in December 2001, and flew on THE CRJ-200 for 1,980 hours and 36 minutes. He was driving in the left seat.
Yang Guang, 37, graduated from the Third Flight Academy of the Air Force in July 1989 and has a driving license for Boeing 737 and Bombardier CRJ-200 with a total flight time of 6,001 hours and 39 minutes. He completed the modification of the CRJ-200 in June 2004 and flew 169 hours and 44 minutes on the CRJ-200. He sat in the middle observer seat that day.
Yi Qinwei, a 26-year-old co-pilot, graduated from the Driving department of The Civil Aviation Flight Academy of China in September 2001. His driving license was a Bombardier CRJ-200, with a total flight time of 1,299 hours and 51 minutes. In January 2003, he completed the modification of the CRJ-200 and flew 979 hours and 57 minutes on the CRJ-200. He sat in the right pilot seat.
Top left: Captain Wang Ping top right: Second captain Yang Guang bottom left: security officer Jiang Chaohong bottom right: Chief steward Huang Chongyan
Huang Chongyan, the chief steward at the time, was 27 years old. He joined the cabin department of China Eastern Airlines Yunnan In April 1997, with a total flight time of 9,138 hours and 54 minutes. Shi Meilian, a 22-year-old flight attendant, joined the cabin department of China Eastern Airlines in Yunnan in July 2002. The flight lasted 2,636 hours and 57 minutes. Security officer Jiang Zhaohong was 35 years old at the time. He joined the cabin department of China Eastern Airlines In Yunnan in March 1999, and the total flight time was 9,670 hours and 25 minutes.
The licenses of all members of the crew and cabin crew are within the prescribed period of validity, and they all take a rest in accordance with the regulations 24 hours before the flight mission. They have not taken any illegal drugs or alcoholic drinks.
Baotou Airport Terminal, photo: Floating clouds
Unit 7 45 points when boarding, in accordance with the prescribed procedures for internal checklist, but according to crew memories: because the machine is one of the passengers of Shanghai after China group Chen Suyang has repeatedly urged the take-off in advance (he was anxious to get back to Shanghai for a emergency meeting to another: at that time management is not standard, regional jet flight management after a long distances, similar units and other passengers often here will apply to the control tower, air timetables which does not comply with the rules; However, Shanghai Fuhua Group later denied That Chen Suyang urged the crew to take off earlier), the crew did not do routine winding inspection. There is no deicing, snow, frost work (the baotou in November has been covered with snow).
At 8:10 a.m., the cabin door was closed. At 8:11 a.m., the crew applied to the control tower of Baotou Airport for clearance.
At 8:14, Baotou Tower control issued a release permit to the crew of Flight MU5210: "5210 will be released to Hongqiao, Shanghai, airway as planned, ground calm, minus 7℃, modified NH 1027, visibility 4 km, take off using runway 13, squawk 0035."
MU5210 unit: "Clear, clear Shanghai Hongqiao, airway as planned, ground calm wind, minus 7℃, modified SEA pressure 1027, visibility 4 km, take off using runway 13, squawk 0035."
At 8:15 a.m., the crew of Flight MU5210, with the permission of the tower, started the two GE CF34-3B1 turbofan engines of B-3072. Three minutes later, the crew asked the tower for permission to slide out.
MU5210 unit: "5210 apply for launch."
Baotou Tower: 5210, ready to push out, please taxi to runway 13.
...
MU5210: "Tower, 5210 request runway."
Baotou tower: "5210, cleared to approach the runway."
MU5210 unit: "5210 clear."
It then took the crew more than a minute to complete the pre-take-off checklist
MU5210: "Tower, 5210 is ready, request takeoff."
Baotou tower: "5210, cleared for take-off."
It was 8:21 a.m., nine minutes before the scheduled departure time, and it was hard to say whether Mr. Chen's prodding had any effect. According to the division of labor, the pilot Wang Pin controls the plane, the co-pilot Yi Qinwei is responsible for the throttle and monitoring instruments, and the second captain Yang Guang is responsible for ground liaison.
Wang Pin: "take off thrust."
Yi Qinwei: "set up, check."
Wang Pin: "80." (8:21.55 SEC)
...
Wang Pin: "V1. Carry round." (8:22 minutes and 12 seconds, 148 knots per hour) Then Wang took the pole back and then the front wheel lifted off the ground. At that time, the airspeed of the plane was 150 knots, and the thrust of the left and right engines N1 was 87.6 percent. Main wheel off after 3 seconds, airspeed 161 knots, heading 132°, elevation 6.2°.
...
Wang Pin: "V2."
Yi Qinwei: "is climbing rate."
Wang Pin: "retract landing gear. Yi -"
However, only 2 seconds after the main wheel was off the ground, the plane appeared abnormal conditions. The steering wheel reached 30.3° to the right, the plane's left slope 9.6°, pitch Angle 12.6°, and Angle of attack 10.2°. Then the plane appeared stall shake pole warning, air speed 165 knots, left slope 19.3°, radio altitude 22.5 feet, pitch Angle 13.2°, and Angle of attack 9.9°.
Yang Guang: "How is this? !"
Wang Pin: "live with live with!" At the same time, he pressed the steering wheel to the right to 32.5° and pushed the rudder foot to the right to 2.88°.
Yang Guang: "Can't fly!"
Wang Pin: "Ah -" at the same time, he will further push pedals to 4.75 °, and the gas to the largest (left, right, engine thrust was increased to 95.4% and 94.8% respectively), but the effect is not good, after 3.5 seconds off the ground, the plane working audible warning of the push rod, push rod device to start working, stick by to 0.22 ° and 5.75 ° steering wheel to the right to remain at 32.5 °, the plane was airspeed 166 knots, pitching Angle 15.5 °, increased from 12.7 ° Angle of attack to 14.6 ° and started in the general interval change of left slope of 29.8 °, heading 121.5 °. The plane began to drift.
Yang Guang: "What's the matter? ! What can I do? !"
Wang Pin: "first don't move, first don't move stem!"
After 5.5 seconds off the ground, Wang Begins to return to steering wheel and rudder, and continuously press the steering wheel to the left and push the rudder to the left. But then the putter stopped working, and the pitch Angle remained at 18°, the Angle of attack decreased to 10.5°, the left slope continued to increase to 48.6°, and then the left slope began to decrease. The flight began to swing from side to side, and the crew was gradually moving
Yang Guang: "Direction! Direction!"
Wang Pin continue to press the plate to the left quickly, push the left rudder. Reduce left slope to 17.1°, steering wheel to 14.3°, rudder to 11.72° and pitch Angle to 18.2°.
Wang Pin: "Collect oil! Receiving!"
Yi Qinwei: "Good, good." (After the oil is collected, the thrust of the left and right engines is recharged to 88.4% and 86.3%, respectively.)
At this time, baotou Tower found that MU5210 flight posture is wrong, and then called the crew via the emergency frequency: "5210, Baotou call." But the crew, busy with the emergency, did not answer.
Eight seconds after take-off, the captain continued to press the steering wheel to 32.5° and the left rudder pedal to 8.63°, causing the aircraft to roll quickly to the right. The right slope reached 68.6° in an instant, with an average roll rate of 39° per second. The putter then started up for a second time, which lasted three seconds and reduced the aircraft's elevation Angle from 21.2° to 0.9°, and the Angle of attack from 21° to 3.7°. The captain rolled to the right, pushed the right rudder and the plane began to roll to the left. The plane was flying at 169 knots. After three seconds, the plane reached the highest altitude it could reach -- 180 feet.
Thirteen seconds after takeoff, the putter started working for a third time and worked for 1.5 seconds. The Angle of pitch and Angle of attack decreased again, but the plane began to lose altitude and continued to roll to the left at an average roll rate of 32.5° per second. The left slope reached a maximum of 62.8°.
Wang Pin: "Come on! Come on!"
Yi Qinwei: "Good!"
(After the refueling gate, the thrust of the left and right engines was reduced to 98.2 percent and 98.1 percent, respectively, at nearly full speed.)
Wang Pin: "What? What? Why is that? What is it? !"
Between 14.5 and 16 seconds after take-off, the captain used a small right rudder to reduce the right disk from 32.3° to 23.8°, the left slope from 62.8° to 44°, and the pitch Angle from 10.4° to 3.9°, but he was already exhausted and could not see the sky coming back.
Wang Pin: "What thing? !!!!!!!!"
Yang Guang: "Keep calm!"
"The SINK RATE is high! SINK RATE!"
"PULL UP! PULL UP!"
Wang Pin (to co-pilot) : "Tell you to keep up!"
Yi Qinwei: "No way! I can't pull it up!"
Fifteen seconds after takeoff, the putter worked for the fourth and final time, but to no avail.
From 16 to 19 seconds, the captain was still trying to save the plane. He kept pressing 31.9° to the right, but the left rudder pedal increased rapidly from 9.69° to 20.3°. During this time, the pitch Angle increased rapidly from 3.9° to -9.8°, and the left slope increased rapidly from 44° to 89.6°, leaving the plane almost perpendicular to the horizon. The plane was hopelessly in such a position that it quickly went down to Baotou Nanhai Park, not far from the airport.
Wang Pin: "Why? Why?"
Then a panicked scream from the cockpit voice recorder became the last recorded voice from the Bombardier CRJ-200 regional jet of Yunnan Eastern Airlines Flight MU5210 B-3072.
At 8 and 22 minutes and 35 seconds, eastern yunnan company MU5210 flight no. B - 3072 bombardier CRJ - 200 type regional jet crashed a head in baotou in the second half the airport runway 13 end from the ground 800 meters, 260 meters the left side of the center of runway extension cord in the south China sea park (coordinates 040 ° 33 '02', north latitude longitude 110 ° 01 '01 "), the plane fell to the ground after the collapse of tank rupture, fuel leak and burst into flames, including the body parts of the crashed into the south China sea park lake, debris range is about 70 meters long 100 meters wide.
Baotou air crash process diagram
An eyewitness, Wang Yongqiang, said he was watching a winter swim in a park when he saw smoke rising from the tail of a passenger plane after it took off from a nearby airport, shook for a few times, and then plunged into a lake.
During the crash, the steel scaffolding of the Nanhai Park bumper car playground was destroyed, and ticket booths, trestle and parts of the cruise ship dock were destroyed. All 53 people on board were killed, with no survivors, as well as an old park worker who stayed behind at the cruise ship dock and a person who was swimming in a lake during the winter. Bringing the death toll from the first class crash to 55.
At 8:22:53, the Baotou Airport tower was still calling flight MU5210: "5210, Baotou call."
But it was impossible for the crew to answer.
After confirming that the plane was lost, the Baotou Airport activated the emergency rescue plan at 8:23, and notified the airport fire station, the airport company and the airport ambulance station. From 8:24 to 8:32, the dispatching office of Baotou Airport reported the situation to the duty room of Baotou municipal government, the civil aviation authority and the 120 emergency center and 119 Fire brigade of Baotou city. At 8:29 a.m., the first batch of firefighters arrived at the crash site, followed by armed police officers, medical workers and vehicles to seal off the scene and extinguish the fire.
A big fire at the crash site
It was a sea of fire and smoke. Firefighters were immediately divided into 3 groups, one group with foam guns to extinguish the lake caused by aviation fuel fire, one group with water guns to extinguish the buildings on the shore and fire cruise ship, the other group while searching for and rescue, while recovering the bodies of victims.
Fire brigade officers and soldiers recovering the bodies of victims
Heard from 11.21 baotou air crash happened, the Civil Aviation Administration of China defines the accident of especially big accident (accident) of accident investigation team immediately, in the afternoon arrived in baotou in accident investigation, and according to the relevant provisions of the international civil aviation organization convention notification (aircraft manufacturing country) Canada's transportation safety board (engine manufacturer's country) and the authorized representative of the national transportation safety board sent to take part in the investigation of the accidents.
According to the crash site investigation, the collision between the left wing tip of the aircraft and the ceiling of the Bumper car playground of Nanhai Park was the first impact point, and the debris of the aircraft was scattered in the fan-shaped area with an Angle of 30° along the crash direction. The collision at the first impact point resulted in the fracture of the left wing tip and fuel leakage and fire. After that, the plane passed between lamp posts 8.4 meters apart and a two-story building on the right, and grounded at a left slope of nearly 90°. The left wing of the plane broke off completely. A 2-by-3.5-meter crater was carved out of the ground, surrounded by parts of the left wing, the fuselage tail section and the left side of the main landing gear.
The area between the street lights and the building was the last area the plane passed through
The crater left by the first impact
Tail debris
Part of fuselage
Divers prepare to go into the water to retrieve the wreckage of the plane
The wreckage of the plane's right wing
At 94.9 meters from the first impact point, two fiberglass cruise ships were hit, scattering pieces of the plane's left engine, nose landing gear and fuselage, most of which showed signs of fire. The lakeside cruise ship ticket booth and part of the lake pier trestle were damaged. In the water in front of the trestle, wreckage of the right wing, the middle part of the cabin and the cockpit were found intact (with the right main landing gear). The tail section of the fuselage (with the right engine) was found in the water on the side of the trestle. The vertical tail, horizontal tail, flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder were also found in the area.
The voice recorder was found
Accident investigation team through the study of the aerodynamic performance of CRJ - 200 aircraft, the wing pollutants, unit operation and disposal were analyzed, and that is the cause of the accident, the accident aircraft aerodynamic characteristics in the process of taking off, the plane stalled protection system did not give any warning wing suddenly stall, to cause the plane nonprescriptive rapid roll, and eventually crash.
The team examined the wing debris and found a number of contaminants on it, including ice accumulation, snow accumulation and frosting. Apparently, the crew did not defrost or defrost before takeoff.
The accident investigation team believes that frosty weather conditions existed when the plane spent the night at Baotou Airport. At that time, the local weather in Baotou was in the frost period. November 20 was the day before the departure, and the weather in Baotou Airport was clear and cloudless, with calm wind and visibility of 3-6 km. The weather was haze.
"On the morning of November 21, 2004, while carrying out routine external inspection on the aircraft, the flight crew touched the wing with their hands and found water vapor on the wing," said a ground staff assigned by CeA Yunnan To release the flight at Baotou Airport. But there was no external inspection of the aircraft between the morning routine inspection and the departure of two or three hours, much less any deicing operation.
Unit may be think of the sun during the day can make wings may leave some frost melt, but baotou airport on the day of the sunrise time of 7 31 points, eight 15 points, the plane from the gate position when sliding out, according to the field observation a few days after the accident, this time the sun does not direct to the plane parked position, so if you have any cream on the wings, not because of the sun melt.
The plane takes off in a taxi and phase normal operation, the operation of the lift from the ground wheel is normal, after the plane off the ground roll a large slope nonprescriptive quickly plane abnormal state is in the stall protection system did not give any warning in advance, although units quickly to take the pressure plate, pedal rudder correction action to control, but not in accordance with the operation of the unit with recovery unit to the desired state, slope instead continued to increase, the unit feel confused and stressful, add unit from beginning to end have no can determine exactly what happened.
As the plane had just taken off from the ground, its altitude was low, its slope was large, its change was fast, and its control response was abnormal, the voice recording analysis made the crew highly nervous at this time. Unit in the case of an emergency, the attention is likely to be highly focused on how to gain control of the aircraft state as soon as possible, and to followed by the stall warning and stall, unaware of the push rod, not judge the aircraft stall, especially stall did not determine the stalled because of the wings, so measures of pressure plate, rudder unit did not have any effect. The correct way to control the stall of the wing should be to make the thrust rod smaller Angle of attack, so that the aircraft out of the stall, so that the wing power to restore normal, eliminate the lift imbalance generated by the rolling moment, and aileron to restore the function, effective control roll. But because the altitude was too low, the crew instinctively tried to control the plane's altitude by pulling back the lever. This operation led to an increase in the Angle of pitch and Angle of attack, and a confrontation with the putter, which caused the plane to stall again. This is because CEA Yunnan did not provide the response training for the non-mandatory rolling caused by early stall, and the crew lacked the judgment and disposal ability for this situation.
Relatives of the victims paid their respects at the crash site
China Eastern Airlines company has certain leadership and management responsibility for this accident, and China Eastern Yunnan Airlines company has weak links in daily safety management. The investigation concluded that the accident was a liability accident. According to the investigation results, the Civil Aviation Administration of China and China Eastern Airlines imposed party discipline and administrative sanctions on the 12 people responsible for the accident.
At that time, he was an electrical engineer at the Kunming Maintenance Base of China Eastern Airlines. He was mainly responsible for the accident. Administrative demotion shall be imposed.
At that time, He was the manager of the flight Department of China Eastern Airlines Yunnan, and he was mainly responsible for the accident. He shall be given administrative dismissal and probation within the Party for one year.
At that time, he was the general manager of the aircraft Department of China Eastern Airlines Yunnan, and he was mainly responsible for the accident. Administrative dismissal and serious disciplinary warning shall be imposed.
At that time, He was the head of the aircraft technical management department of China Eastern Airlines Yunnan, and he was mainly responsible for the accident. Administrative demotion and serious disciplinary warning shall be given.
At that time, he was the deputy general manager of China Eastern Airlines Yunnan, and he assumed important leadership responsibility for the accident. Give administrative demerit record punishment.
At that time, he was the deputy general manager of China Eastern Airlines Yunnan, and he was responsible for the accident. Administrative demotion and serious disciplinary warning shall be given.
At the time, he was the deputy general manager of China Eastern Airlines Co., Ltd. and assumed leadership responsibility for the accident. Give administrative demerit record punishment.
At that time, he was the deputy general manager of China Eastern Airlines Co., Ltd. and assumed important leadership responsibility for the accident. To give administrative demerits and intra-party warnings.
At that time, he was the general manager of China Eastern Airlines Co., Ltd. and assumed important leadership responsibility for the accident. To give administrative demerits and intra-party warnings.
At that time, he was the chairman of China Eastern Airlines Co., Ltd. and had important leadership responsibility for the accident. Administrative disciplinary warning shall be imposed.
Finally, the investigation team put forward six safety Suggestions for baotou air disaster:
1. Airlines should attach great importance to the work of preventing ice, snow and frost pollution, and strengthen the management of operation in cold weather. Make clear the responsibilities and working procedures of prevention/deicing, snow and frost for the crew, maintenance, dispatch, duty and other departments, and strictly implement the inspection system for aircraft pollutants.
2. The airline company shall strengthen the training of flight, maintenance, dispatch and service support personnel on the knowledge of aircraft anti-pollution, especially anti-ice, snow and frost.
3. Airlines shall timely change the contents of relevant manuals in accordance with the newly issued airworthiness instructions. For aircraft without wing leading edge devices (such as CRJ-200), the captain or the person designated by the captain shall check the frost, ice and snow accumulation on the wing leading edge by hand.
4. Airlines shall study the characteristics of high-performance aircraft without wing leading edge devices, including CRJ-200 passenger aircraft, which are highly sensitive to pollution, improve the operating standard of this aircraft in cold weather conditions and increase the safety margin of the aircraft.
5. Bombardier shall add training on the identification and correction method of non-command roll due to stall and the control method after the putter works to the flight instruction manual and training courses of the aircraft, so as to improve the crew's judgment on stall and correction ability of the aircraft; Airlines should then improve the corresponding pilot training program.
6. Airlines and Bombardier should strengthen safety information reporting and timely report the unsafe information of CRJ-200 passenger planes in operation to CAAC so as to take targeted measures to avoid repetitive problems.
B-3072 performance data
Model: CRJ - 200
Designer: Bombardier Aircraft Co
Crew: 2 crew + 50 crew members
Length: 26.77 m
Wingspan: 21.21 m
Height: 6.22 m
Empty weight: 13,740 kg
Maximum take-off weight: 24040kg
Engines: Two GE CF34-3B1 turbofan engines with a single thrust of 41 kn
Maximum practical lift: 12,496 meters
Maximum cruising speed: 860 km/h
Maximum load range: 3,713 km
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