2. The development of the machinery andprocedures of economic planning
As we know, the NEP was notcharacterized merely by open development of commodity relations, possibilitiesof activity (within certain limits) granted to individual and privatecapitalist enterprises, and 「financial autonomy」 for stateowned enterprises. Togetherwith these orientations and these measures, others were adopted which wereaimed at countering the danger that development might take place along an「ordinary capitalist road.」 To this end, organs were set up to coordinate thedifferent branches of economic activity and to work out plans.
The existence and functioning ofthese organs was not at all sufficient to eliminate the dangers of capitalist development, dangers that could be removedonly by the application of an appropriate political line, but they did create, withinthe NEP framework, some of the preliminary conditions for progress by the Sovieteconomy along the socialist road, and this was why Lenin ascribed greatimportance to their establishment.
The principal function of theplanning organs was political. They prepared and accompanied the government’sinterventions in the process of reproducing and transforming the material and social conditions of production. Theseorgans served as the fulcrum of a specific form of political practice, namely,planning. In a class-divided society like that of the NEP (and the one thatsucceeded it), planning has a class content. It is affected by class struggles andaffects the way that these struggles proceed. The interventions determined byplanning are of a juridico-political nature. They take place amid thecontradictions of social reproduction. They mobilize in a concentrated way thepolitical and ideological forces of the ruling power in order to lead the processes of production in a certain direction and toalter their distinctive features, and so the forms of the processes ofappropriation and distribution.
For 「planning」 to take place itis necessary that the interventions in production and reproduction actuallyhave an effect, and that they be coordinated as regards their guidingprinciples. Suchcoordination is the purpose aimed at, but it is far from alwaysachieved. Inthe absence of adequate real coordination, the direction actually given to the socialprocess of production and reproduction may differ from what is 「desired」 by thepolitical leadership. From the political standpoint, however, what is decisiveis the realprocess, not whatis imagined.
The political interventionsconnected with planning do not directly modify the nature of the immediateproduction relations, but only the conditions for their expanded reproduction.The place of the agents of production in relation to each other and to themeans of production is only indirectly modified by planning—for example, when itfavors the expansion of a particular form of production (to which certain means ofproduction are allocated by right of priority) while paralyzing another form,which it cuts off from some or all of the material means of production (or eventhe labor power) that it needs for its reproduction. A real upheaval in therelative positions of the agents of production always results, however, fromclass struggle, from the activity of the producers, and the changing of theactual conditions of production.
The political interventionsconnected with planning, and which affect the reproduction of social relations, may becarried out either directly or indirectly. One of the forms of indirect intervention (which was typical of the NEPbut did not disappear along with it) is that which operates in the sphere ofmoney and prices. For example, an evolution of the 「terms of trade」 to thedisadvantage of agriculture (by a fall in the prices of its products relativeto those of industrial goods) brings about a transfer of values to industry and the statesector, and so accelerates the expanded reproduction of the means of productionat the disposal of this sector, and of the production relations characteristic of this sector.
Even when the Soviet governmentintervenes in the reproduction of social relations within the setting of aplan, the fact of these interventions cannot be directly equated with progressalong the socialistroad: it alldepends on the type of change in social relations induced by the interventions.Contrary to what has often been stated, all planning is notnecessarily socialist: it can and often does, accompany various forms of statecapitalism. The socialist character of planning depends, therefore, primarily onthe classcharacter of the ruling power, but also on the content of the plans, the intentionthey express to create the conditions for increasing control by theworking people over social reproduction.
The planning organs wereestablished at the beginning of the NEP. Their increasing activity in thesecond half of the 1920s resulted from the actual conditions under which theSoviet economy was functioning at that time. These conditions exerted anespecially strong influence when the period of restoration of industry (thereactivation of inherited equipment) drew to a close and the reconstructionperiod began (at the end of 1925).
From that moment, indeed, thequestion of the allocation of accumulated capital arose in acute form. Thisallocation would decide which industries would be given priority developmentand also the technology they would employ. It thus had a bearing on the division of labor.
When capital circulates 「freely」between the various branches of production, the question of 「priorities」 and ofthe 「technical」 forms assumed by economic development is 「settled」 by theoverall and differential action exerted by class struggles on levels anddifferences of wages, by the striving for the maximum rate of profit, by thetendency for this rate to be equalized between the different branches, and bythe relations of strength between the various industrial and financial groups.Under the pressure of these forces, accumulated capital is distributed in adetermined way between the different branches, and invested in techniques whichare also determined, in accordance with the capital available to thecapitalists and with their estimates of future prospects. The nonrealization ofthese estimates, which is inevitable given the very conditions under whichcapitalist expanded reproduction then takes place, determines the form assumedby economic crises.
The existence of a state-ownedindustrial sector constitutes a considerable obstacle to the reproduction ofthis mode of distribution of capital between the different branches, but it isnot an absolute obstacle. The various industries comprising the state sectorcan be left 「free」 to borrow, either from one or more investment banks or on a「finance market.」1 Furthermore,they can fix their prices, which to some degree determines their power tofinance themselves or to repay loans. This type of accumulation was notentirely ruled out during the first years of the NEP: the khozraschet of industrial and banking enterprisesfacilitated it.
Nevertheless, the centralizationof the industrial sector, the substantial size of the principal existingenterprises (and, even more, of those that the Bolshevik Party wished todevelop), and fear (lest 「market anarchy」 and economic crises should return)formed major obstacles, in the 1920s, to this form of accumulation.
Above all, the political will of theSoviet government to build socialism was irreconcilable with a form ofaccumulation that implied 「autonomous」 development of the various industriesand reproduction of capitalist forms of management. The existence of astate-owned industrial sector, together with the intention to build socialism,thus determined the setting-up of planning organs (with the allocation ofaccumulation funds as one of their tasks) and the extension of the activity ofthese organs.
In the 「war communism」 period2 the Soviet government had tried to guideproduction in accordance with the priorities dictated by the civil war. At thattime the VSNKh functioned mainly as the organ responsible for centralizeddirection of current operations. When the NEP began, a new organ appeared—thestate planning commission, or Gosplan, which was responsible primarily for thepreparation of long-term and middle-term plans. In addition, some other organswere given planning tasks during the NEP.
I. The VSNKh3
Though the VSNKh was chieflyconcerned with current operational plans under 「war communism,」 a resolution ofthe Ninth Party Congress (1920) entrusted it with the preparing of a 「singleproduction plan for Soviet Russia as a whole and for the Soviet republicsallied with Russia.」 This plan was to cover 「the next historical period.」4
At the start of the NEP the roleof the VSNKh tended to diminish, owing partly to the creation of Gosplan,5 but also to the development of the financialautonomy of enterprises and the role played by Gosbank and Narkomfin.
From 1925 on the problem ofindustrialization arose ever more sharply, and the role of the VSNKh increasedagain. This organ now intervened to a substantial degree in the drawing up ofvarious plans, and established an administrative structure aimed at preparingplans for the economy as a whole, including agriculture and transport.Actually, owing to its close links with the leaders of industry, the VSNKh alsogave expression to what they wanted—the development of the industrial sectorsunder their authority. The enlargement of the 「planning」 activities of theVSNKh is thus to be seen as connected with the increasing role that the leadersof industry tended to play from 1925 on. This enlargement caused conflict withGosplan and contributed to rendering more confused the discussions that tookplace concerning problems of industrialization. Something will be said aboutthis later.
II. Gosplan
Gosplan (the State PlanningCommission) was, in principle, the organ responsible for drawing up plans.Established on February 22, 1921, it succeeded Goselro, which had worked out aplan for electrification.6 It was not an organ for taking decisions. Like the VSNKh,its task was merely to prepare drafts which were submitted to the organs of government,which alone had the power to take decisions and put them into effect. This situation was expressedin the subordination of Gosplan to the Council of People’s Commissars(Sovnarkom) and the Council for Labor and Defense.
During the NEP period, Gosplan’sactivity often followed lines contradictory to that of the VSNKh. Whereas thelatter body was closely linked with the leaders of industry, the Gosplanexperts were more concerned with the problems of agriculture and of overalleconomic equilibrium, which meant that they were closer in interest to thefinancial organs— Gosbank and Narkomfin.
At the outset, Gosplan had onlyabout forty members, mostly economists and statisticians, seven or eight ofwhom were Party members; the rest were bourgeois specialists.7 At the beginning of 1927, Gosplan’s staffnumbered 500, many of whom were former Mensheviks, but decisive responsibilitywas in the hands of Party members, notably Krzhizhanovsky, who had headedGoselro.8
During the second half of 1925,Gosplan worked out the first annual plan for the national economy. This planhad no binding power, as was shown by the name given to it: 「control figures.」Covering the year 1925–1926, it was actually a modest document of about 100pages intended to guide the various People’s Commissariats in drawing up theirown operational programs. The Presidium of Gosplan itself emphasized theapproximate nature of the document it had produced: when it was drawn up, agreat deal of needed information was lacking.
The control figures for1926–1927 were already more soundly based than the first set, but, as before,they were not obligatory. However this time, when the CLD (which had supremeoversight of economic decisions) ratified the control figures, it announcedthat if the operational plans of an administrative organ conformed to theforecasts given in the control figures, there would be no need to obtain theCLD’s ratification of these plans.
The control figures for1927–1928 made up a detailed document of 500 pages. They had been compiled inclose collaboration with the sectoral and regional planning organizations. Adecree of June 8, 1927, strengthened, in principle, the predominant role ofGosplan in the drawing up of plans, and a decision of the CC in August 1927provided that thenceforth the control figures, once ratified, were toconstitute actualdirectives for the elaboration of operational plans and of the state budget.9 From that time on, operational plans were drawn up alongwith the control figures.10
These facts show that the NEP,although involving development of commodity and money relations and increasedfinancial autonomy for state enterprises, entailed no renunciation of endeavorsto secure centralized and planned direction of the economy. On the contrary, animportant aspect of the NEP record was the establishment of planning organswhich, in principle, made possible better coordination of the development ofthe different branches of the economy.
The uncertainties of thepolitical line decided on by the Bolshevik Party at the end of 1925—at the verymoment when the problem of the scope of the industrialization process to belaunched, and of the forms it should take, was coming on to the agenda—favoreda proliferation of these organs. They drew up 「draft plans」 that wereprofoundly contradictory—acting, in fact, as 「supports」 for different socialforces and political tendencies which were then dividing the Party. As exampleswe can take the existence within Gosplan of an industrial section which in 1926drew up a particularly generous investment plan, and the creation within theVSNKh of a special organ, Osvok, which became, in practice, independent of theVSNKh, and served for a certain period as a support for the 「unitedopposition.」11
III. Osvok
Osvok (Osoboye soveshchanie povosstanovleniyu osnovnogo kapitala, 「special commission for the restoration offixed capital」) was created by the Presidium of the VSNKh in March 1925. Atonce it set about preparing its own version of a five-year plan, and formed sections andcommittees for the purpose. Under the chairmanship of P. I. Pyatakov (one ofthe leaders of the 「united opposition,」 who was to be expelled from the Partyin 1927 but was readmitted after a few months of exile), Osvok acted quiteindependently of the VSNKh, and had numerous ex-Menshevik economists, as wellas non-Party engineers and scientists working for it.12
In the absence, however, of anyeffective participation by the masses in the working out of the plans, and of afirmly defined political line (the lack of which was revealed by the scopeassumed by the economic controversies of the period and the rapid and divergentchanges of content in the resolutions adopted by the Party’s leading organs), the documents emanating fromGosplan, the VSNKh, and the other organs responsible for preparing them set targetsthat were unrealistic and often mutually incompatible. In them were reflectedthe increasingly contradictory and ill-analyzed tendencies prevailing in theBolshevik Party.
Under these conditions, theeconomic plans produced did not enable more effective control to be establishedover the contradictions: on the contrary, given their mistaken orientations andincoherences, the attempts that were made to 「apply」 these plans at all costsmerely aggravated the contradictions. In this sense, too, as we shall see, thecrisis that opened in 1927–1928 was not an economic crisis but a political one—the result of inadequacies and incoherences which were themselves the outcomeof extremely complex class struggles.
This situation was especiallyreflected in the frequent 「revision」 of the industrial programs, 「revision」that was obviously bound up with changes in the economic and politicalconjuncture and the way in which this was seen by the Party. This aspect willbe illustrated by an examination of the forecasts for industrial investment inthe year 1926–1927 and the Party’s decisions on the matter.13
These 「revisions」 aggravated theeconomic imbalances, and caused the resulting shortages to fall more and moreheavily upon the peasantry. This was one of the forms assumed, in practice, bythe increasing abandonment, from 1926 on, of the requirements of the NEP. The「general crisis」 of theNEP was brought about by this abandonment andthe resulting aggravated contradictions.
This abandonment and the formsit assumed call for explanation. In order to arrive at such an explanation weneed to analyze the entire set of social relations and class contradictionsthat developed during the 1920s. Given the decisive role played by thepeasantry, this analysis must begin with the position in the countryside.
Notes
1. This market is largelyconstituted by state enterprises which are in a position to grant loans to eachother, or to subscribe to bonds issued by one or more of their number. DuringNEP these possibilities were available to the state enterprises.
2. See volume I of the presentwork, pp. 152 ff.
3. The book by FriedrichPollock, DiePlanwirtschaftlichen Versuche in der Sowjetunion 1917–1927, first published in 1929 and republishedin 1971 in Frankfurt, gives a very good account of the planning organs of theNEP period and what they did.
4. Ibid., pp. 233–234.
5. See volume I of the presentwork, p. 153.
6. See volume I of the presentwork.
7. Pollock,Die Planwirtschaftlichen Versuche, p. 236.
8. Planovoye Khozvaistvo, no. 10 (1925), p. 9; Plenum ByudzhetnoyKomissii Ts.I.K. SSSR, p. 400; and Carr and Davies, Foundations, vol. I, p. 2, pp. 802–803.
9. For the control figures forthese years see Planovoye Khozyaistvo, no. 11 (1929), pp. 167-168; Sobranie Zakonov, no. 37 (1927), art. 373; K.P.S.S. v rezolyutsiyakh, vol. 2, pp. 252 ff.
10. From 1931 the documentprepared in this way became, once it had been ratified, what was called 「theannual plan」 (see Dobb, Soviet Economic Development, p. 324).
11. See below, Part 4 of thisvolume.
12. Carr and Davies, Foundations, vol. I, p. 2, pp. 844–845.
13. See below, p. 386.