美國國防技術領先地位的相對下降，與其稀土能力的衰落是同步的。
這是一個令人震驚的故事，美國長期失敗的經濟和國家安全政策，在扼殺經濟的同時，還導致它在許多下一代武器系統上落後於中國。
與此同時，中國的進步主要源於其在稀土資源生產、精煉、材料科學、冶金、智慧財產權、研發以及商業與國防應用方面為取得世界領先地位而付出超乎尋常的努力。稀土包括元素周期表上的17種元素，它們是大多數現代技術和武器系統的關鍵成分。
美國的稀土供應鏈於1980年首次遭到破壞。美國核管理委員會和國際原子能機構修改相關法規——「第40部分：源材料的國內許可（Part 40: Domestic Licensing of Source Material）」——無意中導致美國稀土工業向中國全面轉移。
在那之前，重稀土來自鐵礦石、鈦、鋯石或磷酸鹽巖等大宗商品的含釷副產品。當時礦業公司可以提取稀土副產品，掙取一點額外利潤。可後來任何含有釷的東西都被視作潛在的核燃料來源，受到高度管控，這樁生意便斷掉了。出於成本和責任方面的考慮，這些礦業公司將稀土資源歸作尾礦，當廢物掩埋掉。
這對所有遵循美國核管理委員會或國際原子能機構法規的國家的稀土生產造成了深遠影響。中國是國際原子能機構的觀察員國，但不是其締約國。
今天，中美之間的差距仍在持續，部分原因是五角大樓、政府機構以及金融和採礦行業在開採和氧化物生產層面衡量稀土提取。數百個稀土開採項目在中國以外啟動，錯誤地讓人以為西方對中國稀土的依賴在下降。然而，大多數項目最終都失敗了。
在2012年上市的400多家稀土創業公司中，進入了生產階段的只有不到五家，達到一定產量的只有兩家，其中一家破產後在中國融資下復活，另一家在短期內失去了經營許可。
在此期間，中國從許多已宣告失敗或瀕臨失敗的項目中獲取了重要的股權和債務頭寸。一旦項目啟動生產，中國將掌握控制權。
此外，只把稀土開採和提純氧化物列入報告會扭曲政府的政策決定，因為這些材料在被精煉成金屬之前幾乎無法應用到技術或國防領域。只有中國具備精煉能力。事實上，中國以外所有的稀土礦場都將精礦或高價值氧化物運往中國，加工成稀土金屬、合金、磁鐵和其他高價值材料。
美國太專注於稀土開採而非整個稀土供應鏈，對其國家安全和經濟安全產生了負面作用，因為所有國防和技術應用都始於稀土卑金屬或其他後氧化物，而不是新採掘的礦石或氧化物。中國已經在全球範圍內鎖定了獲取稀土金屬、合金、磁鐵和大多數後氧化物的途徑。
2016年2月，美國政府問責局發布報告《稀土材料：制定綜合性手段有助於國防部更好管控供應鏈中的國家安全風險》（「Rare Earth Materials: Developing a Comprehensive Approach Could Help DoD Better Manage NationalSecurity Risks in the Supply Chain」）。據其估算，美國可能需要15年才能重建國內稀土供應鏈。
美國的決策者們幾乎都不明白這些問題的複雜性。如果告訴他們，中國只要選擇禁運這些材料，就有可能關停其他國家所有的汽車、電腦、智慧型手機和飛機裝配線，他們必然目瞪口呆。同樣的情況也可能發生在美國和北約所有依賴稀土的武器系統上。這些供應鏈是可以切斷的。因此，西方的軍事採購處於中國的控制之下。
儘管如此，美國政府報告和評估都沒有做出以上論斷，因為它們在統計上都用稀土開採量和氧化物生產量來代替包括金屬、合金、磁鐵、石榴石和其他後氧化物在內的所有稀土材料。一旦爆發危機，美國缺乏應急準備。
以上提到的材料，在美國國防後勤局中幾乎沒有儲備。美國政府在1994年至1998年間變賣了全部稀土戰略儲備。國防後勤局目前的戰略儲備只有少量稀土氧化物和鏑金屬。這種形態的材料無法供美國國防工業直接使用。政府問責局的報告指出，這些材料需要經過中國供應鏈加工才能被利用。
美國國防承包商和技術公司使用的所有稀土金屬、合金和磁鐵都可以追溯到中國：它們如果不是直接來自中國，就是間接通過日本採購或美國合金和磁鐵製造商進口。
2014年7月的美國國防部總監察長報告《國防工業基礎的稀土元素保障程序需要改進》（「Procedures to Ensure SufficientRare Earth Elements for the Defense Industrial Base Need Improvement」）指出，五角大樓無法在零部件和分包商層面有效監測稀土投入。更糟糕的是，從報告中可以清楚看出，美國國防部對無法應用於國防的稀土氧化物和國防系統所需的後氧化物不加區分，而且沒人過問這些材料的來源。
為什麼？因為美國國防部等機構評估供應安全風險時，仍然以全球稀土氧化物產量作為基礎，忽略了下遊製造業供應鏈面臨的風險。
十年來，國會議員、國防部和兩屆政府反覆收到警報，但真正了解其中風險的人還是太少。
美國決策者們堅信技術領先地位是美國最大的經濟和國家安全優勢。但由於稀土的關係，這一點已經發生了變化。因此，我所在的ThREE 諮詢公司在全球範圍內對稀土專利申請進行了調查。專利申請量可以幫助我們較準確地評估中國下一代武器系統和列入規劃的其他技術。
以下數據來自對國際稀土專利的詳盡國別檢索。時間範圍從提交第一項專利申請開始到2018年8月最後一次提交為止。檢索結果包括80,000多項專利。搜索關鍵詞包括稀土、鑭系元素、鑭、鈰、鐠、釹、鉕、釤、銪、釓、鋱、鏑、鈥、鉺、銩、鐿、鈧和釔。
中國1983年才首次提交國際稀土專利申請，而短短14年之後，中國的相關專利申請量就超過了美國以及其他所有國家。截至2018年8月，中國稀土專利申請量累積比美國多出2.3萬件。
我們通過調查還發現：自2011年以來，中國每年的稀土專利申請量都超過世界其他國家的總和。到2021年初，中國累積的稀土專利數量將超過世界其他國家的總和。中國公司可以通過專利訴訟和專利封鎖等法律策略來破壞或廢除現有的非中國專利。相對於世界其他國家，中國的專利申請還在提速，從2011年到2018年增加了250％。
在過去的40年裡，不論在製造業和工業基礎政策報告、遞交給國會的中國威脅報告或信息採集報告裡，美國國防部都從未把中國的稀土生產和稀土專利數量作為嚴肅關切的對象。
白宮最近下令撰寫的一份報告終於承認了這個問題。《美國製造與國防工業基礎和供應鏈彈性評估與強化》（「Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States」）提出，「中國對關乎美國國家安全的戰略性關鍵材料供應構成重大且不斷提升的風險。」
對於美國國防部和國防承包商而言，過去幾十年可以說一帆風順：預算越來越多，股價也越來越高。然而，中國卻利用這段時期為超越和取代西方奠定了基礎。北京一直對稀土研究給予直接或間接的資助，並實施技術轉讓策略，這些努力得到了回報。
中國的進步正在迅速改變全球力量均勢，將未來掌握在自己手中。軍事專家稱，未來的定向能武器（directed energy weapons）將改寫或控制戰局。而每種定向能武器都需要重稀土和高尖端材料科學能力。中國控制著美國獲取這些材料的渠道。這些因素導致中國目前在該領域具備優勢，這意味著中國最終將在定向能武器的研發與部署上引領全球。
這對五角大樓的專家來說是個壞消息，因為維持美國安全的核心計劃是以維持技術領先地位為基礎的。中國在五角大樓的觀察員們的眼皮底下勇敢地跨過了這道門檻，可後者卻視而不見、充耳不聞，並且顯然沒有後備計劃。
解除中國對美國經濟和國防扼制的辦法，目前已經送達參議院和聯邦政府。美國政界若再不放下內部仇怨、恢復治理，一切就都太晚了。
China Solidifies Dominance in Rare Earth Processing
America’s relative fall from defense technological leadership mirrors its decline in rare earth capabilities.
This is an appalling story of a long-running U.S. economic and national security failure that has put the nation behind China on many next-generation weapon systems while stifling the economy.
Meanwhile, China’s advances are largely built on its unparalleled commitment to leading the world in rare earth resource production, refining, material science, metallurgy, intellectual property, research and development, and commercial and defense applications. Rare earths are 17 elements on the periodic table that are now critical components in most modern technologies and weapon systems.
The U.S. rare earth supply chain was first compromised in 1980. A Nuclear Regulatory Commission and International Atomic Energy Agency change in regulations — 「Part 40: Domestic Licensing of Source Material」 — inadvertently ushered in the transfer of all aspects of U.S. rare earth industry to China.
Prior to that, heavy rare earths came from thorium-bearing byproducts of commodities such as iron ore, titanium, zircon or rock phosphate. Companies that mined these minerals could extract the rare earth byproducts and make a little extra profit. Once anything containing thorium was considered a potential source of nuclear fuel and highly regulated, that ended. Due to the costs and liabilities, these mining companies diverted these rare earth resources into their mine tailings as waste and buried them.
This had a profound impact on rare earth production in all NRC/IAEA compliant countries. China is an IAEA observer, but not a signatory to its agreements.
Today, the disparity between China and the United States continues in part because the Pentagon, government agencies, and the finance and mining industries measure the extraction of rare earths at the mining and oxide production level. Hundreds of rare earth mining projects outside of China have been initiated, giving the erroneous impression that Western rare earth dependence on China may be declining. However, most ultimately fail.
Out of more than 400 rare earth startups publicly listed in 2012, less than five reached production. Of those, only two reached significant volumes. Of those two, one is bankrupt and resurrected with Chinese financing and the other lost its operating permit for a short period.
During this time, China has taken significant equity and debt positions in many of these failed or faltering projects and will control them if they begin production.
Also, reporting solely on mined rare earths or purified oxides distorts government policy decisions because these materials have no significant technology or defense application until they are refined into metals. Only China has the capacity to do that. In fact, every non-Chinese rare earth mine ships its concentrates, or high-value oxides, to China for processing into rare earth metals, alloys, magnets and other high-value materials.
Preoccupation with rare earth mining instead of the entire rare earth supply chain undermines national and economic security because all defense and technology applications begin with base rare earth metals or other post-oxide materials, not freshly unearthed ore or oxides. China has a global lock on access to rare earth metals, alloys, magnets and most other post-oxide materials.
Meanwhile, a February 2016 Government Accountability Office report, 「Rare Earth Materials: Developing a Comprehensive Approach Could Help DoD Better Manage National Security Risks in the Supply Chain,」 estimated it could take the United States 15 years to rebuild a domestic rare earth supply chain.
Few if any U.S. policymakers understand these subtleties. Most would be stunned to learn that China could shut down nearly every automobile, computer, smartphone and aircraft assembly line outside of China if they chose to embargo these materials. The same applies to all rare-earth dependent U.S. and NATO weapon systems. These supply chains can be cut. Western military procurement thus is under Chinese control.
Despite this, government reports and assessments have not made these determinations because they accept statistics on rare earth mining and oxide production as a proxy for metals, alloys, magnets, garnets and other post-oxide rare earth materials. There is no contingency in case of a crisis.
Most of these named materials are not stockpiled by the Defense Logistics Agency. The U.S. government sold off its entire strategic reserve of rare earths between 1994 and 1998. The agency’s strategic reserve now holds only small amounts of rare earth oxides and dysprosium metal. None are in a form that can be directly utilized by our defense industry. The GAO reported that these materials would need to pass through a Chinese supply chain in order to be utilized.
All rare earth metals, alloys and magnets used by U.S. defense contractors and technology firms can be traced back to China: directly or indirectly through Japanese sourcing or via U.S. alloy and magnet fabricators.
According to a July 2014 Defense Department Inspector General report, 「Procedures to Ensure Sufficient Rare Earth Elements for the Defense Industrial Base Need Improvement,」 the Pentagon is incapable of properly monitoring rare earth inputs at the component and subcontractor level. Worse yet, it was clear from the report that no one in the Pentagon differentiates between rare earth oxides — with no defense applications — and the post-oxides materials needed for the defense systems — and none bother to ask where these materials come from.
Why? Because the Pentagon and others continue to evaluate U.S. national security supply risk on the basis of global rare earth oxide production. Risks to the downstream manufacturing supply chain are simply ignored.
After 10 years of raising the alarm on this issue with members of Congress, the Defense Department and two administrations, too few understand the risks we are facing.
U.S. policymakers believe that technology leadership is the country’s greatest strength, both economically and for national security. But this is no longer true as it relates to rare earths. Therefore, ThREE Consulting commissioned a worldwide rare earth patent filings survey. Patent filings are a reasonable proxy of potential next-generation weapon systems and other technology that could be in China’s pipeline.
The data were derived from an exhaustive international rare earth patent search by country of origin. The search dates were unbounded: from the first filed patent to the last filings of August 2018. The data set includes over 80,000 patents. Search terms were rare earth(s), lanthanide(s), lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium, promethium, samarium, europium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, holmium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium, scandium and yttrium.
China’s first international rare earth patent filing was in 1983, and just 14 years later, China surpassed the United States and every other nation in total patents filed as shown in the chart. As of August 2018, China has accumulated 23,000 more rare earth patent filings than the United States.
Here are some other findings: China has filed more rare earth patents than the rest of the world combined every year since 2011. By early 2021, China will have accumulated more rare earth patents than the rest of the world combined. Chinese companies can use patent-trolling and patent-ring-fencing legal strategies to undermine or nullify existing non-Chinese patents. China’s rate of filings is accelerating relative to the rest of the world — increasing 250 percent from 2011 to 2018.
At no time over the last 40 years was China’s rare earth production, or its growing number of rare earth patents, listed as an issue of serious concern by the Pentagon in any of its past manufacturing and industrial base policy reports, reports to Congress on China threats, or acquisition reports.
Finally, a recent report ordered by the White House acknowledged the problem. 「Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States,」 stated that 「China represents a significant and growing risk to the supply of materials deemed strategic and critical to U.S. national security.」
For the Pentagon and defense contractors the last few decades have been good: ever larger budgets and soaring stock prices. China, however, used this time to set the groundwork to overtake and displace the West. Beijing’s commitment to direct and indirect funding of rare earth research and a forced technology-transfer strategy has paid off.
China’s advances are quickly altering the global balance of power, and its future will be in its hands. For example, directed energy weapons will alter or control military outcomes in the future, according to military experts. However, every single directed-energy weapon also requires heavy rare earths and highly advanced material science capabilities. China controls U.S. access to these materials. All of this plays into China’s current strengths in these fields, suggesting that the nation will eventually lead the world in the development and deployment of direct energy weapons.
This is bad news for Pentagon experts whose central plan for continued U.S. security was based on continued technology leadership. China has boldly crossed this threshold in plain view of the Pentagon’s classic three-monkey observation team. And apparently, there is no backup plan.
Solutions to overcoming China’s stranglehold over the economy and national defense are circulating in the Senate and exist within the administration. It’s past time to stop the rancor inside the Beltway and get back to governing.
本文首發於微信公眾號：撲克投資家。文章內容屬作者個人觀點，不代表和訊網立場。投資者據此操作，風險請自擔。
（責任編輯：季麗亞 HN003）