《Marketing Science》為市場營銷領域頂級期刊，是世界商學院前100名研究能力評估參考的24種頂級期刊之一（由美國德克薩斯大學達拉斯分校發布，簡稱UTD24），同時，《Marketing Science》也是《金融時報》遴選出的商學院頂級45學術期刊之一（簡稱FTTop 45），作為《金融時報》每年的商學院評級標準，用以衡量各商學院的研究質量。
備註：僅用於學術交流，原文版權歸原作者和原發表刊物所有
WhichHealthy Eating Nudges Work Best? A Meta-Analysis of Field Experiments
作者：Romain Cadario , Pierre Chandon
Abstract：We examine the effectiveness infield settings of seven healthy eating nudges, classified according to whetherthey are (1) cognitively oriented, such as 「descriptive nutritional labeling,」「evaluative nutritional labeling,」 or 「visibility enhancements」; (2)affectively oriented, such as 「hedonic enhancements or 「healthy eating calls」;or (3) behaviorally oriented, such as 「convenience enhancements」 or 「sizeenhancements.」 Our multivariate, three-level meta-analysis of 299 effect sizes,controlling for eating behavior, population, and study characteristics, yieldsa standardized mean difference (Cohen’s d) of 0.23 (equivalent to −124kcal/day). Effect sizes increase as the focus of the nudges shifts fromcognition (d = 0.12, −64 kcal) to affect (d = 0.24, −129 kcal) to behavior (d =0.39, −209 kcal). Interventions are more effective at reducing unhealthy eatingthan increasing healthy eating or reducing total eating. Effect sizes arelarger in the United States than in other countries, in restaurants or cafeteriasthan in grocery stores, and in studies including a control group. Effect sizesare similar for food selection versus consumption and for children versusadults and are independent of study duration. Compared with the typical nudgestudy (d = 0.12), one implementing the best nudge scenario can expect a sixfoldincrease in effectiveness (to d = 0.74) with half the result of switching fromcognitively oriented to behaviorally oriented nudges.
中文翻譯：我們檢查了七個健康飲食微調在田間環境中的有效性，根據它們是否按以下條件分類：（1）認知取向，例如「描述性營養標籤」，「評價性營養標籤」或「可見度提高」；（2）以情感為導向，例如「享樂增強或「健康飲食要求」；或（3）以行為為導向，例如「便利性增強」或「規模增強」。我們對299種效應量進行了多變量，三級薈萃分析，控制了飲食行為，人群和研究特徵，得出的標準化平均差（Cohen d）為0.23（相當於-124 kcal /天）。隨著微動焦點從認知（d = 0.12，-64 kcal）轉變為影響（d = 0.24，-129 kcal）到行為（d = 0.39，-209 kcal），效應大小會增加。幹預措施在減少不健康飲食方面比增加健康飲食或減少總飲食更為有效。在美國，效果大小比其他國家大，在飯店或自助餐廳中比在雜貨店中大，在包括對照組的研究中也是如此。食物選擇與食用，兒童與成人的效應大小相似，並且與研究持續時間無關。與典型的輕推研究（d = 0.12）相比，實施最佳輕推方案的人可以預期其有效性提高六倍（至d = 0.74），而從認知導向的輕推到行為導向的輕推的結果只有一半。
2. 「最大的失敗者」的啟示：減肥計劃中的社交互動Inspirationfrom the 「Biggest Loser」: Social Interactions in a Weight Loss Program
作者：Kosuke Uetake , Nathan Yang
Abstract：We investigate the role ofheterogeneous peer effects in encouraging healthy lifestyles. Our analysisrevolves around one of the largest and most extensive databases about weightloss that track individual participants』 meeting attendance and progress in alarge national weight loss program. The main finding is that, although weightloss among average-performing peers has a negative effect on an individual’sweight loss, the corresponding effect for the top performer among peers ispositive. Furthermore, we show that our results are robust to potential issuesrelated to selection into meetings, endogenous peer outcomes, individualunobserved heterogeneity, lagged dependent variables, and contextual effects.Ultimately, these results provide guidance about how the weight loss programshould identify role models.
中文翻譯：我們調查異質同伴效應在鼓勵健康生活方式中的作用。我們的分析圍繞著有關減肥的最大，最廣泛的資料庫之一進行，該資料庫跟蹤單個參與者的會議出席率和大型國家減肥計劃的進展。主要發現是，儘管平均表現良好的同齡人的體重減輕對個人的體重減輕有負面影響，但對同齡人中表現最好的人的相應影響卻是積極的。此外，我們表明，我們的結果對於與會議選擇，內生同伴結局，個體未觀察到的異質性，滯後因變量和上下文效應有關的潛在問題具有魯棒性。最終，這些結果為減肥計劃如何確定榜樣提供了指導。
3. 了解同伴教育者的外聯活動在減少性傳播感染方面的有效性：Understandingthe Effectiveness of Peer Educator Outreach on Reducing Sexually TransmittedInfections: The Role of Prevention vs. Early Detection作者：Sam Hui , Parthasarathy Krishnamurthy, Shiv Kumar, Hareesha B.Siddegowda, Prachi Patel
Abstract：In an effort to reduce sexuallytransmitted infections (STI) in developing countries, health organizationsoften recruit former sex workers as 「peer educators」 to counsel current sexworkers. Although peer educator outreach (PEO) programs have generally beenshown to reduce STI, it is not clear whether such efficacy is primarily drivenby 「prevention」 (reducing the infection rate of STI through safe-sex education)or 「detection」 (educating sex workers about STI symptoms so that they will seekprompt treatment if/when infected). Such differentiation is not only ofacademic interest, but also has important practical implications on resourcemanagement. We develop an integrated Bayesian model to disentangle the role ofprevention versus detection in PEO programs. Our results show that PEO programsappear to be not effective in preventing STI, but they do facilitate earlierdetection by enhancing sex workers』 knowledge and ability to recognize STIsymptoms. Simulations based on our model suggest that increasing PEO efforts by10% from the current level would increase clinic visits by 1.0%, therebyreducing STI prevalence by around 3.0%. Further, we conducted a randomizedcontrolled field experiment that provides directionally consistent evidencethat PEO visits are effective in increasing clinic visits among sex workers.
中文翻譯：為了減少發展中國家的性傳播感染，衛生組織經常招募前性工作者作為「同伴教育者」，為當前的性工作者提供諮詢。雖然一般都顯示出同伴教育者推廣計劃（PEO）可以減少性傳播感染，但尚不清楚這種功效主要是由「預防」（通過安全性教育降低STI的感染率）還是「檢測」（性教育）驅動的工作者了解性傳播感染的症狀，以便在感染後立即尋求治療）。這種差異化不僅具有學術意義，而且對資源管理也具有重要的實際意義。我們開發了集成的貝葉斯模型，以消除預防與檢測在PEO計劃中的作用。我們的結果表明，PEO程序似乎無法有效預防性傳播感染，但通過增強性工作者的知識和認識性傳播感染症狀的能力，它們確實有助於早期發現。根據我們的模型進行的模擬表明，將PEO的工作量從當前水平增加10％將使診所就診次數增加1.0％，從而將STI患病率降低約3.0％。此外，我們進行了一項隨機控制的現場實驗，該實驗提供了方向一致的證據，表明PEO訪視可以有效地增加性工作者的門診率。
4. 「讓陽光進來」：行業支付披露對醫師處方行為的影響「Letthe Sunshine In」: The Impact of Industry Payment Disclosure on PhysicianPrescription Behavior作者：Tong Guo , Srinivasaraghavan Sriram , Puneet Manchanda
Abstract：U.S. pharmaceutical companiesfrequently pay doctors to promote their drugs. This has raised concerns aboutconflict of interest, which policy makers have attempted to address byintroducing payment disclosure laws. However, it is unclear if such disclosurehas an effect on physician prescription behavior. We use individual-levelclaims data from a major provider of health insurance in the United States andemploy a difference-in-differences research design to study the effect of thepayment disclosure law introduced in Massachusetts in June 2009. The researchdesign exploits the fact that, although physicians operating in Massachusettswere impacted by the legislation, their counterparts in the neighboring statesof Connecticut, New York, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island were not. In order tokeep the groups of physicians comparable, we restrict our analysis tophysicians in the counties that are on the border of these states. We find thatthe Massachusetts disclosure law resulted in a decline in prescriptions in allthree drug classes studied: statins, antidepressants, and antipsychotics. Ourfindings are robust to alternative control groups, time periods and estimationmethods. We also show that the effect is highly heterogeneous across physiciangroups. Finally, we explore potential mechanisms driving these results.
中文翻譯：美國製藥公司經常向醫生付費以推廣他們的藥物。這引起了人們對利益衝突的擔憂，決策者試圖通過引入支付披露法律來解決這一問題。但是，尚不清楚這種公開是否對醫師處方行為有影響。我們使用來自美國主要健康保險提供商的個人級別索賠數據，並採用差異研究設計來研究2009年6月在麻薩諸塞州引入的支付披露法律的效力。該研究利用了這一事實儘管在麻薩諸塞州經營的醫師受到法律的影響，但在鄰近的康乃狄克州，紐約，新罕布夏州和羅德島州的醫師卻沒有受到法律的影響。為了使醫生群體具有可比性，我們將分析限制在與這些州接壤的縣中的醫生進行。我們發現，麻薩諸塞州的披露法導致所研究的所有三種藥物（他汀類藥物，抗抑鬱藥和抗精神病藥）的處方數量下降。我們的發現對於替代控制組，時間段和估計方法是可靠的。我們還表明，不同醫師群體之間的效果高度不同。最後，我們探討了驅動這些結果的潛在機制。
5. 由於缺席而引人注目：不確定性下的診斷專家測試Conspicuousby Its Absence: Diagnostic Expert Testing Under Uncertainty
作者：Tinglong Dai , Shubhranshu Singh
Abstract：We study the problem a diagnosticexpert (e.g., a physician) faces when offering a diagnosis to a client (e.g., apatient) that may be based only on the expert’s own diagnostic ability orsupplemented by a diagnostic test—conventional and artificial intelligence (AI)tools alike—revealing the client’s true condition. The expert’s diagnosticability (or type) is private information. The expert is impurely altruistic inthat the expert cares about both the client’s utility and the expert’s ownreputational payoff that depends on the peer perception of the expert’sdiagnostic ability. The decision of whether to perform the test, which iscostly for the client, provides the expert with an opportunity to influencethat perception. We show a unique separating equilibrium exists in which thehigh-type expert does not resort to diagnostic testing and offers a diagnosis basedonly on the expert’s own diagnostic ability, whereas the low-type expertperforms the test. Furthermore, we establish that high-type expert may skipnecessary diagnostic tests to separate them from the low-type expert.Interestingly, the effect of reputational payoff on undertesting isnonmonotonic, and the desire to appear of high type leads to undertesting onlywhen the reputational payoff is intermediate. Our results also suggest a morealtruistic expert may be more likely to engage in undertesting. Furthermore,efforts to encourage testing by providing financial incentives or by raisingmalpractice lawsuit concerns may, surprisingly, help fuel undertesting in theequilibrium. Our paper sheds new light on barriers to the adoption of AI toolsaimed at enhancing physicians』 diagnostic decision making.
中文翻譯：我們研究診斷專家（例如醫師）在向客戶（例如患者）提供診斷時可能會遇到的問題，該診斷可能僅基於專家自身的診斷能力或由診斷測試（傳統和人工智慧（ AI）工具之類的工具-揭示客戶的真實狀況。專家的診斷能力（或類型）是私人信息。專家不友善，因為專家既關心客戶的效用，也關心專家自身的聲譽收益，這取決於同行對專家診斷能力的看法。對於客戶而言，是否進行測試的決定是昂貴的，這為專家提供了影響這種看法的機會。我們顯示出存在一個獨特的分離平衡，高級專家不求助於診斷測試，僅根據專家自身的診斷能力提供診斷，而低級專家進行測試。此外，我們確定高級專家可以跳過必要的診斷測試，以將其與低級專家分開。有趣的是，聲譽收益對測驗不足的影響是非單調的，只有在聲譽收益處於中間水平時，出現高類型的渴望才會導致測驗不足。我們的結果還表明，一個更利他的專家可能更可能參與低估。此外，令人驚訝的是，通過提供經濟誘因或通過提起瀆職訴訟來鼓勵測試的努力可能會助長均衡狀態下的測試不足。我們的論文為旨在增強醫師診斷決策能力的AI工具的採用開闢了新的障礙。
StrategicResearch and Development Investment Decisions in the Pharmaceutical Industry
作者：Anita Rao
Abstract：Do pharmaceutical firms respond tothe actions of their competitors in research and development, and if so, howmuch? Answering this question has implications for policies aimed atincentivizing drug development, such as greater exclusivity protections and afaster Food and Drug Administration approval process. Although such policieslead to quicker realization of profits and/or more time to earn profits, theyalso intensify competition, thereby reducing per-firm profits. Which effectdominates depends on the degree of competition. To this end, I estimate adynamic investment model using Phase 3 data. Solving the new equilibrium, Ifind that even though an expedited process and longer periods of marketexclusivity increase competitive intensity, it could prompt increased entryinto Phase 3, thereby encouraging innovation.
中文翻譯：製藥公司是否響應競爭對手在研發方面的行為？如果是，那麼多少？回答這個問題對旨在鼓勵藥物開發的政策有影響，例如更大程度的排他性保護和更快的食品藥品監督管理局批准程序。儘管這樣的政策可以更快地實現利潤和/或獲得利潤的時間更多，但它們也會加劇競爭，從而降低企業的利潤。哪種效果佔主導地位取決於競爭程度。為此，我使用第3階段數據估算了動態投資模型。解決新的平衡問題，我發現，儘管加快了流程並延長了市場獨佔時間，這可以提高競爭強度，但它可能會促使進入第三階段的人數增加，從而鼓勵創新。
Advertisingin Health Insurance Markets
作者：Bradley T. Shapiro
Abstract：The effects of television advertisingin the market for health insurance are of distinct interest to both firms andregulators. Regulators are concerned about firms potentially using ads to「cream skim,」 or attract an advantageous risk pool, as well as the potentialfor firms to use misinformation to take advantage of the elderly. Firms areinterested in using advertising to acquire potentially highly profitableseniors. Meanwhile, health insurance is a useful setting to study themechanisms through which advertising could work. Using the discontinuity inadvertising exposure created by the borders of television markets, this studyestimates the effects of advertising on consumer choice in health insurance.Television advertising has a small effect on brand enrollments, makingadvertising a relatively expensive means of acquiring customers. Heterogeneouseffects point to advertising being more effective in less healthy counties,which runs opposite to the concern of cream skimming. Leveraging the unilateralcessation of advertising by United-Healthcare, evidence is provided that thesmall advertising effect is not explained by a prisoner’s dilemma equilibrium.An analysis of longer-run effects of advertising shows that advertising effectsare short lived, further decreasing the potential of advertising to createlong-run value to the firm.
中文翻譯：電視廣告在健康保險市場中的作用對公司和監管機構都非常感興趣。監管者擔心企業可能使用廣告「撇脂」或吸引有利的風險池，以及企業利用錯誤信息利用老年人的潛力。公司對利用廣告來獲取潛在的高利潤的老年人感興趣。同時，健康保險是研究廣告運作機制的有用環境。利用電視市場邊界造成的廣告曝光的不連續性，本研究估計了廣告對健康保險中消費者選擇的影響。電視廣告對品牌註冊的影響很小，這使得廣告成為獲取客戶的相對昂貴的手段。異類效應表明廣告在健康狀況較差的縣/地區更有效，這與脫脂奶油的關注相反。利用聯合醫療保健公司單方面停止廣告的做法，有證據表明，囚犯的兩難平衡不能解釋這種小的廣告效果。對廣告的長期效果的分析表明，廣告效果是短暫的，進一步降低了廣告為企業創造長期價值的潛力。
The Impact of Hospital Advertising on Patient Demand and Health Outcomes
作者：Tongil 「TI」 Kim , Diwas KC
Abstract：Does hospital advertising influencepatient choice and health outcomes? We examine more than 220,000 individualpatient-level visits over 24 months in Massachusetts to answer this question.We find that patients are positively influenced by hospital advertising; seeinga television advertisement for a given hospital makes a patient more likely toselect that hospital. We also observe significant heterogeneity in patientresponse depending on insurance status, medical conditions, and demographicfactors, like age, gender, and race. For example, patients with morerestrictive forms of insurance are less sensitive to advertisements. Our demandmodel allows us to study the impact of a ban on hospital advertising, which hasbeen recently considered by policy makers. We find that banning hospitaladvertising can hurt patient health outcomes through increased hospitalreadmissions. This is because hospital advertisements drive patients tohigher-quality hospitals, which tend to advertise more and have lowerreadmission rates. However, we do not find a significant change in the overallmortality rate.
中文翻譯：醫院廣告會影響患者的選擇和健康結果嗎？我們在麻薩諸塞州的24個月內檢查了超過220,000位患者級別的個人就診，以回答這個問題。我們發現患者受到醫院廣告的積極影響；看到給定醫院的電視廣告會使患者更有可能選擇該醫院。我們還觀察到患者反應的顯著異質性，具體取決於保險狀況，醫療狀況和人口統計因素，例如年齡，性別和種族。例如，具有更多限制性形式的保險的患者對廣告不太敏感。我們的需求模型使我們能夠研究禁令對醫院廣告的影響，政策制定者最近已經考慮過這一禁令。我們發現，禁止醫院廣告會通過增加住院率而損害患者的健康狀況。這是因為醫院的廣告驅使患者前往更高質量的醫院，後者往往會做更多廣告，並且再入院率較低。但是，我們沒有發現總體死亡率有顯著變化。
9. 醫療保健行業的質量信息披露和患者重新分配：Quality Information Disclosure and Patient Reallocation in the Healthcare Industry:Evidence from Cardiac Surgery Report Cards
作者：Tae Jung Yoon
Abstract：In a healthcare industry withcapacity constraints, the best healthcare providers are often congested afterquality information disclosure. This congestion can lead to the reallocation ofurgent patients to low-quality healthcare providers. The reallocation can havea detrimental impact on the overall patient survival rate if sicker patientsbenefit more from the best providers. This paper provides the first empiricalevidence regarding this problem in the context of the publication of cardiacsurgery report cards. I find that these report cards can have a negative impacton positive assortative matching between patients and surgeons because of areallocation of high-risk patients to low-quality surgeons. Despite the qualityimprovement in response to these report cards, such patient reallocation canstill be a problem, conditional on the improved quality, and, thus, should notbe ignored.
中文翻譯：在具有容量限制的醫療保健行業中，最好的醫療保健提供者通常在質量信息洩露後就變得擁擠。這種擁塞可能導致緊急患者重新分配給低質量的醫療保健提供者。如果患病的患者從最佳醫療提供者那裡獲得更多收益，那麼重新分配會對患者的總體存活率產生不利影響。本文在心臟手術報告卡的發布中提供了有關該問題的第一批經驗證據。我發現這些報告卡可能會對高風險患者重新分配給低質量的外科醫生，從而對患者和外科醫生之間的積極分類匹配產生負面影響。儘管響應這些報告卡的質量有所提高，但這種患者的重新分配仍然是一個問題，取決於質量的提高，因此不應忽略。
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