美東時間2019年2月23日早8點（北京時間23日晚9點），巴菲特旗下伯克希爾-哈撒韋公司（Berkshire Hathaway）發表一年一度的致股東信。雪球用戶@價值博士於北京時間凌晨兩點翻譯完畢，以下為完整內容中英文對照版。
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希爾哈撒韋公司股東：
Berkshire earned $4.0 billion in 2018 utilizing generally accepted accounting principles (commonly called 「GAAP」). The components of that figure are $24.8 billion in operating earnings, a $3.0 billion non-cash loss from an impairment of intangible assets (arising almost entirely from our equity interest in Kraft Heinz), $2.8 billion in realized capital gains from the sale of investment securities and a $20.6 billion loss from a reduction in the amount of unrealized capital gains that existed in our investment holdings.
基於公認會計原則（通常稱為「GAAP」），伯克希爾在2018年獲得了40億美元的收益。 該數字的組成部分為營業利潤248億美元，無形資產減值產生的30億美元非現金損失（幾乎完全來自我們對卡夫亨氏的股權），28億美元的出售投資證券實現的資本收益以及我們投資控股中存在的未實現資本收益減少損失206億美元。
A new GAAP rule requires us to include that last item in earnings. As I emphasized in the 2017 annual report, neither Berkshire’s Vice Chairman, Charlie Munger, nor I believe that rule to be sensible. Rather, both of us have consistently thought that at Berkshire this mark-to-market change would produce what I described as 「wild and capricious swings in our bottom line.」
新的GAAP規則要求我們在收入中包含上述最後一項。 正如我在2017年年度報告中強調的那樣，伯克希爾的副主席查理芒格和我都不相信這條規則是明智的。 相反，我們倆都一直認為，在伯克希爾，這種按市價計價的變化會產生我所說的「淨利潤的瘋狂而反覆無常的波動」。
The accuracy of that prediction can be suggested by our quarterly results during 2018. In the first and fourth quarters, we reported GAAP losses of $1.1 billion and $25.4 billion respectively. In the second and third quarters, we reported profits of $12 billion and $18.5 billion. In complete contrast to these gyrations, the many businesses that Berkshire owns delivered consistent and satisfactory operating earnings in all quarters. For the year, those earnings exceeded their 2016 high of $17.6 billion by 41%.
我們在2018年的季度業績表明了該預測的準確性。在第一和第四季度，我們分別報告了11億美元和254億美元的GAAP損失。在第二和第三季度，我們則報告了120億美元和185億美元的GAAP收益。與這些波動形成鮮明對比的是，伯克希爾擁有的眾多業務在各個方面都實現了持續和令人滿意的營業收益。 今年的營業利潤超過2016年的176億美元高點約41％。
Wide swings in our quarterly GAAP earnings will inevitably continue. That’s because our huge equity portfolio – valued at nearly $173 billion at the end of 2018 – will often experience one-day price fluctuations of $2 billion or more, all of which the new rule says must be dropped immediately to our bottom line. Indeed, in the fourth quarter, a period of high volatility in stock prices, we experienced several days with a 「profit」 or 「loss」 of more than $4 billion.
季度GAAP收益大幅波動將不可避免地繼續下去。 這是因為我們龐大的股票投資組合 - 在2018年底價值接近1730億美元 - 通常一天的價格波動將會高達20億美元或更多的，新規則將使其立即影響到我們的淨利潤。事實上，在第四季度，股票價格高位震蕩的時期，我們經歷了幾個單日「利潤」或「損失」超過40億美元的日子。
Our advice? Focus on operating earnings, paying little attention to gains or losses of any variety. My saying that in no way diminishes the importance of our investments to Berkshire. Over time, Charlie and I expect them to deliver substantial gains, albeit with highly irregular timing.
我們的建議？專注於營業利潤，減少關注任何品種的浮動損益。我這樣說並非是否定伯克希爾這些投資的重要性。隨著時間的推移，查理和我預計他們將獲得可觀的收益，儘管時間非常不規律。
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Long-time readers of our annual reports will have spotted the different way in which I opened this letter. For nearly three decades, the initial paragraph featured the percentage change in Berkshire’s per-share book value. It’s now time to abandon that practice.
我們年度報告的長期讀者會發現我打開這封信的不同方式。 近三十年來，最初的段落描述了伯克希爾每股帳面價值的百分比變化。 現在是放棄這種做法的時候了。
The fact is that the annual change in Berkshire’s book value – which makes its farewell appearance on page 2 – is a metric that has lost the relevance it once had. Three circumstances have made that so. First, Berkshire has gradually morphed from a company whose assets are concentrated in marketable stocks into one whose major value resides in operating businesses. Charlie and I expect that reshaping to continue in an irregular manner. Second, while our equity holdings are valued at market prices, accounting rules require our collection of operating companies to be included in book value at an amount far below their current value, a mismark that has grown in recent years. Third, it is likely that – over time – Berkshire will be a significant repurchaser of its shares, transactions that will take place at prices above book value but below our estimate of intrinsic value. The math of such purchases is simple: Each transaction makes per-share intrinsic value go up, while per-share book value goes down. That combination causes the book-value scorecard to become increasingly out of touch with economic reality.
事實上，伯克希爾帳面價值的年度變化 - 這是其在第2頁上的告別演出 - 是一個失去其曾經擁有的相關性的指標。有三種因素使得如此。首先，伯克希爾逐漸從一個資產集中在可銷售股票的公司轉變為其主要價值在於經營業務的公司。查理和我預計這一轉型將會以不定期的方式繼續下去。其次，雖然我們持有的股權按市場價格計算，但會計規則要求我們記錄在公司帳面價值中的部分遠低於這些經營公司的當前價值，這一差異在近年來日趨增長。第三，很可能 - 隨著時間的推移 - 伯克希爾將成為其股票的重要回購者，交易將以高於帳面價值但低於我們估計的內在價值的價格發生。回購的數學影響很簡單：每筆回購交易都會使公司每股內在價值上升，但是每股帳面價值卻會因此下降。上述因素的共同作用將導致帳面價值記分卡越來越與我們的經濟現實脫節。
In future tabulations of our financial results, we expect to focus on Berkshire’s market price. Markets can be extremely capricious: Just look at the 54-year history laid out on page 2. Over time, however, Berkshire’s stock price will provide the best measure of business performance.
在未來的財務報告中，我們期望聚焦於伯克希爾的市場價格。 市場可能非常反覆無常：只需看看第2頁列出的54年歷史。然而，隨著時間的推移，伯克希爾的股價將提供最佳的業績衡量標準。
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Before moving on, I want to give you some good news – really good news – that is not reflected in our financial statements. It concerns the management changes we made in early 2018, when Ajit Jain was put in charge of all insurance activities and Greg Abel was given authority over all other operations. These moves were overdue. Berkshire is now far better managed than when I alone was supervising operations. Ajit and Greg have rare talents, and Berkshire blood flows through their veins.
在繼續之前，我想給你一些好消息 - 真正的好消息 - 這些都沒有反映在我們的財務報表中。 它涉及我們在2018年初所做的管理變革，當時Ajit Jain負責所有保險活動，而Greg Abel則獲得了所有其他業務的權力。 這些行動早就應該實施了。 伯克希爾現在管理得比我獨自監督運營時要好得多。 阿吉特和格雷格擁有罕見的天賦，伯克希爾的血液流經他們的血管。
Now let’s take a look at what you own.
現在讓我們來看看你擁有的東西。
Focus on the Forest – Forget the Trees專注於森林 - 忘記樹木
Investors who evaluate Berkshire sometimes obsess on the details of our many and diverse businesses – our economic 「trees,」 so to speak. Analysis of that type can be mind-numbing, given that we own a vast array of specimens, ranging from twigs to redwoods. A few of our trees are diseased and unlikely to be around a decade from now. Many others, though, are destined to grow in size and beauty.
評估伯克希爾的投資者有時會對我們眾多不同業務的細節 - 我們的經濟「樹木」有所顧忌。 考慮到我們擁有大量的標本，從樹枝到紅木，對這種類型的分析可能是令人頭腦麻木的。 我們的一些樹木病了，可能在今後十年逐漸死去。 然而，許多其他樹木註定會在規模和美麗兩方面茁壯成長。
Fortunately, it’s not necessary to evaluate each tree individually to make a rough estimate of Berkshire’s intrinsic business value. That’s because our forest contains five 「groves」 of major importance, each of which can be appraised, with reasonable accuracy, in its entirety. Four of those groves are differentiated clusters of businesses and financial assets that are easy to understand. The fifth – our huge and diverse insurance operation – delivers great value to Berkshire in a less obvious manner, one I will explain later in this letter.
幸運的是，沒有必要單獨評估每棵樹以粗略估計伯克希爾的內在商業價值。 那是因為我們的森林包含五個重要的「樹林」，每個樹林都可以以合理的準確度進行評估。 其中四個是易於理解的差異化企業和金融資產集群。 第五個 - 我們龐大而多樣化的保險業務 - 以不太明顯的方式為伯克希爾提供了巨大的價值，我將在本函後面解釋。
Before we look more closely at the first four groves, let me remind you of our prime goal in the deployment of your capital: to buy ably-managed businesses, in whole or part, that possess favorable and durable economic characteristics. We also need to make these purchases at sensible prices.
在我們更仔細地研究前四個樹林之前，讓我提醒一下您在資本配置中的首要目標：購買全部或部分具有良好和持久經濟特徵且由有能力的管理層經營管理的企業。我們還需要以合理的價格購買這些企業。
Sometimes we can buy control of companies that meet our tests. Far more often, we find the attributes we seek in publicly-traded businesses, in which we normally acquire a 5% to 10% interest. Our two-pronged approach to huge-scale capital allocation is rare in corporate America and, at times, gives us an important advantage.
有時我們會購買符合我們要求的公司的控制權。 更常見的是，我們在公開交易的公司中發現符合我們要求的公司，這時我們通常會購買5％到10％的股權。 我們雙管齊下的大規模資本配置方法在美國企業中很少見，但這給我們帶來了重要的優勢。
In recent years, the sensible course for us to follow has been clear: Many stocks have offered far more for our money than we could obtain by purchasing businesses in their entirety. That disparity led us to buy about $43 billion of marketable equities last year, while selling only $19 billion. Charlie and I believe the companies in which we invested offered excellent value, far exceeding that available in takeover transactions.
近年來，我們要遵循的合理做法是明確的：許多股票為我們的資金提供了遠超通過購買整個企業所獲得利益。這導致我們在去年購買了約430億美元的可銷售股票，而僅售出190億美元。查理和我相信我們所投資的公司提供了極好的價值，遠遠超過了整體收購交易的價值。
Despite our recent additions to marketable equities, the most valuable grove in Berkshire’s forest remains the many dozens of non-insurance businesses that Berkshire controls (usually with 100% ownership and never with less than 80%). Those subsidiaries earned $16.8 billion last year. When we say 「earned,」 moreover, we are describing what remains after all income taxes, interest payments, managerial compensation (whether cash or stock-based), restructuring expenses, depreciation, amortization and home-office overhead.
儘管我們最近增加了許多可出售的股票，伯克希爾森林中最有價值的樹林仍然是伯克希爾控制的許多非保險業務（通常擁有100％的所有權，從不低於80％）。這些子公司去年為我們賺了168億美元。此外，當我們說「賺」時，我們描述的是扣除所得稅，利息支付，管理費用（無論是現金還是期權），重組費用，折舊，攤銷等費用之後的淨利潤。
That brand of earnings is a far cry from that frequently touted by Wall Street bankers and corporate CEOs. Too often, their presentations feature 「adjusted EBITDA,」 a measure that redefines 「earnings」 to exclude a variety of all-too-real costs.
我們的淨利潤與華爾街銀行家和企業執行長經常吹捧的淨利潤相去甚遠。很多時候，他們的演示文稿都是在用「調整後的EBITDA」來重新定義「淨利潤」，這樣做可以排除各種實際成本。
For example, managements sometimes assert that their company’s stock-based compensation shouldn’t be counted as an expense. (What else could it be – a gift from shareholders?) And restructuring expenses? Well, maybe last year’s exact rearrangement won’t recur. But restructurings of one sort or another are common in business – Berkshire has gone down that road dozens of times, and our shareholders have always borne the costs of doing so.
例如，管理層有時會聲稱其公司的股票薪酬不應計入費用。 （還有什麼可能 - 來自股東的禮物？）重組費用也不用？ 好吧，也許跟去年完全一樣的重組不會再發生。 但是，這種或那種重組在企業中很常見 - 伯克希爾已經實施過幾十次這樣的重組，我們的股東一直承擔著這樣做的代價。
Abraham Lincoln once posed the question: 「If you call a dog’s tail a leg, how many legs does it have?」 and then answered his own query: 「Four, because calling a tail a leg doesn’t make it one.」 Abe would have felt lonely on Wall Street.
亞伯拉罕·林肯曾經提出這樣一個問題：「如果你把狗的尾巴稱為腿，它有多少條腿？」然後他給出了自己的答案：「四條腿，因為稱尾巴為一條腿並不能使它成為一條腿。」他在華爾街將會感到孤獨。
Charlie and I do contend that our acquisition-related amortization expenses of $1.4 billion (detailed on page K-84) are not a true economic cost. We add back such amortization 「costs」 to GAAP earnings when we are evaluating both private businesses and marketable stocks.
查理和我確實認為，我們與收購相關的14億美元的攤銷費用（詳見第K-84頁）並不是真正的經濟成本。 因此當我們評估私營企業和可銷售股票時，我們會將這種攤銷「成本」加回到GAAP收益中。
In contrast, Berkshire’s $8.4 billion depreciation charge understates our true economic cost. In fact, we need to spend more than this sum annually to simply remain competitive in our many operations. Beyond those 「maintenance」 capital expenditures, we spend large sums in pursuit of growth. Overall, Berkshire invested a record $14.5 billion last year in plant, equipment and other fixed assets, with 89% of that spent in America.
相比之下，伯克希爾的84億美元折舊費低估了我們的真實經濟成本。 事實上，我們需要每年花費超過這筆金額才能在我們的許多業務中保持競爭力。 除了那些「維護」資本支出之外，我們還花費大量資金來追求增長。 總體而言，伯克希爾去年在工廠，設備和其他固定資產方面的投資達到創紀錄的145億美元，其中89％用於美國。
Berkshire’s runner-up grove by value is its collection of equities, typically involving a 5% to 10% ownership position in a very large company. As noted earlier, our equity investments were worth nearly $173 billion at yearend, an amount far above their cost. If the portfolio had been sold at its yearend valuation, federal income tax of about $14.7 billion would have been payable on the gain. In all likelihood, we will hold most of these stocks for a long time. Eventually, however, gains generate taxes at whatever rate prevails at the time of sale.
按價值計算，伯克希爾第二重要的樹林是我們的股票組合，這通常涉及一些大型公司5％至10％的股權。 如前所述，我們的股權投資在年底時價值接近1730億美元，遠高於其成本。 如果我們在年終將整個投資組合出售，則將需要支付約147億美元的聯邦所得稅。 很有可能，我們將持有這些股票中的大部分很長一段時間。 然而，最終，收益在出售時都需要以屆時的稅率繳納稅收。
Our investees paid us dividends of $3.8 billion last year, a sum that will increase in 2019. Far more important than the dividends, though, are the huge earnings that are annually retained by these companies. Consider, as an indicator, these figures that cover only our five largest holdings.
我們所投資的公司去年向我們支付了38億美元的紅利，這筆款項將在2019年繼續增加。但是，比股息更重要的是這些公司每年保留的巨額收益。下面我們來看看我們最大五個持股的保留收益數據。
Yearend Company Ownership
American Express 17.9%
Apple 5.4%
Bank of America 9.5%
Coca-Cola 9.4%
Wells Fargo 9.8%
Berkshire’s Share in $ millions of Dividends(1)
$ 237
$745
$551
$624
$809
Total $2,966
Retained Earnings(2)
$ 997
2,502
2,096
(21)
1,263
Total $6,837
(1) Based on current annual rate.
(2) Based on 2018 earnings minus common and preferred dividends paid.
GAAP – which dictates the earnings we report – does not allow us to include the retained earnings of investees in our financial accounts. But those earnings are of enormous value to us: Over the years, earnings retained by our investees (viewed as a group) have eventually delivered capital gains to Berkshire that totaled more than one dollar for each dollar these companies reinvested for us.
GAAP - 它決定了我們報告的淨利潤 - 不允許我們將被投資方的留存收益包括在我們的財務報表中。 但這些留存收益對我們來說具有巨大的價值：多年來，我們的被投資者（被視為一個集團）保留的收益最終為伯克希爾帶來了資本收益，這些公司為我們再投資的每一美元都賺取了總計超過一美元的資本增值。
All of our major holdings enjoy excellent economics, and most use a portion of their retained earnings to repurchase their shares. We very much like that: If Charlie and I think an investee’s stock is underpriced, we rejoice when management employs some of its earnings to increase Berkshire’s ownership percentage.
我們所有的主要股票都擁有出色的經濟效益，而且大部分都使用部分留存收益來回購股票。 我們非常喜歡這樣：如果查理和我認為被投資公司的股票價格被低估，那麼當管理層將其部分收益用於增加伯克希爾的所有權比例時，我們感到高興。
Here’s one example drawn from the table above: Berkshire’s holdings of American Express have remained unchanged over the past eight years. Meanwhile, our ownership increased from 12.6% to 17.9% because of repurchases made by the company. Last year, Berkshire’s portion of the $6.9 billion earned by American Express was $1.2 billion, about 96% of the $1.3 billion we paid for our stake in the company. When earnings increase and shares outstanding decrease, owners – over time – usually do well.
以下是上表中的一個例子：伯克希爾持有的美國運通在過去八年中保持不變。 同時，由於公司的回購，我們的所有權從12.6％增加到17.9％。 去年，伯克希爾公司在美國運通公司賺取的69億美元中所佔的份額為12億美元，約佔我們為公司股權支付的13億美元中的96％。 當收益增加和股票發行量減少時，股東 - 隨著時間的推移 - 通常收益也會很好。
A third category of Berkshire’s business ownership is a quartet of companies in which we share control with other parties. Our portion of the after-tax operating earnings of these businesses – 26.7% of Kraft Heinz, 50% of Berkadia and Electric Transmission Texas, and 38.6% of Pilot Flying J – totaled about $1.3 billion in 2018.
第三類伯克希爾公司的業務是我們與其他方共享控制權的四方公司。 我們在這些業務中的稅後營業利潤享有的金額為— Kraft Heinz的26.7％，Berkadia和德州電力傳輸的50％，以及飛行員J的38.6％ — 在2018年總計約13億美元。
In our fourth grove, Berkshire held $112 billion at yearend in U.S. Treasury bills and other cash equivalents, and another $20 billion in miscellaneous fixed-income instruments. We consider a portion of that stash to be untouchable, having pledged to always hold at least $20 billion in cash equivalents to guard against external calamities. We have also promised to avoid any activities that could threaten our maintaining that buffer.
在我們的第四個樹林，伯克希爾在年底持有1120億美元的美國國庫券和其他現金等價物，以及另外200億美元的雜項固定收益工具。 我們認為該樹林的一部分是不可動用的，比如已承諾始終持有至少200億美元的現金等價物以防範外部災難。我們還承諾避免任何可能威脅我們保持緩衝的活動。
Berkshire will forever remain a financial fortress. In managing, I will make expensive mistakes of commission and will also miss many opportunities, some of which should have been obvious to me. At times, our stock will tumble as investors flee from equities. But I will never risk getting caught short of cash.
伯克希爾將永遠是一個金融堡壘。 在管理方面，我會犯下昂貴的交易錯誤，也會錯過很多機會，其中一些對我來說應該是顯而易見的。 有時，隨著投資者逃離股票，我們的股票將會下挫。 但我永遠不會冒現金短缺的風險。
In the years ahead, we hope to move much of our excess liquidity into businesses that Berkshire will permanently own. The immediate prospects for that, however, are not good: Prices are sky-high for businesses possessing decent long-term prospects.
在未來幾年，我們希望將大部分過剩流動資金轉移到伯克希爾將永久擁有的業務中。 然而，眼前的前景並不樂觀：對於擁有良好長期前景的企業來說，價格是天價。
That disappointing reality means that 2019 will likely see us again expanding our holdings of marketable equities. We continue, nevertheless, to hope for an elephant-sized acquisition. Even at our ages of 88 and 95 – I’m the young one – that prospect is what causes my heart and Charlie’s to beat faster. (Just writing about the possibility of a huge purchase has caused my pulse rate to soar.)
令人失望的現實意味著2019年可能會再次擴大我們持有的可出售股票。 不過，我們繼續希望進行大象收購。 即使在我們88歲和95歲的年齡 - 我是更年輕的 - 這種前景正是導致我和查理的心跳加快的原因。 （只是寫下大量購買的可能性就已經導致我的脈搏飆升。）
My expectation of more stock purchases is not a market call. Charlie and I have no idea as to how stocks will behave next week or next year. Predictions of that sort have never been a part of our activities. Our thinking, rather, is focused on calculating whether a portion of an attractive business is worth more than its market price.
我購買更多股票的期望並不是號召大家入市。 查理和我不知道下周或明年的股票表現如何。 這種預測從未成為我們投資活動的一部分。 相反，我們的想法是專注於計算有吸引力的業務的價值是否比市場價格更高。
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I believe Berkshire’s intrinsic value can be approximated by summing the values of our four asset-laden groves and then subtracting an appropriate amount for taxes eventually payable on the sale of marketable securities.
我相信伯克希爾的內在價值可以通過將我們四個資產樹林的價值相加，然後減去最終出售有價證券的所得稅款來估算。
You may ask whether an allowance should not also be made for the major tax costs Berkshire would incur if we were to sell certain of our wholly-owned businesses. Forget that thought: It would be foolish for us to sell any of our wonderful companies even if no tax would be payable on its sale. Truly good businesses are exceptionally hard to find. Selling any you are lucky enough to own makes no sense at all.
您可能會問，如果我們出售某些全資企業，Berkshire也將承擔稅務成本而且不能獲得補貼？ 忘記這個想法：即使不繳納任何稅款，我們出售任何一家出色的公司也是愚蠢的。 真正好的企業非常難找。 出售任何你有幸擁有的東西都是毫無理由的。
The interest cost on all of our debt has been deducted as an expense in calculating the earnings at Berkshire’s non-insurance businesses. Beyond that, much of our ownership of the first four groves is financed by funds generated from Berkshire’s fifth grove – a collection of exceptional insurance companies. We call those funds 「float,」 a source of financing that we expect to be cost-free – or maybe even better than that – over time. We will explain the characteristics of float later in this letter.
在計算伯克希爾非保險業務的收益時，我們所有債務的利息成本已被作為費用扣除。除此之外，我們購買前四個樹林的大部分所有權所需要的資金都來自伯克希爾第五個樹林 - 一系列特殊保險公司。 我們將這些資金稱為「浮存金」，這是我們期望隨著時間的推移無成本 - 或者甚至可能更好 - 的融資來源。 我們將在本函後面解釋浮存金的特徵。
Finally, a point of key and lasting importance: Berkshire’s value is maximized by our having assembled the five groves into a single entity. This arrangement allows us to seamlessly and objectively allocate major amounts of capital, eliminate enterprise risk, avoid insularity, fund assets at exceptionally low cost, occasionally take advantage of tax efficiencies, and minimize overhead.
最後，一個關鍵點在於：我們通過將五個樹林組合成一個單一實體而將伯克希爾的價值最大化。 這種安排使我們能夠無縫，客觀地分配大量資金，消除企業風險，避免孤立，以極低的成本為收購資產提供資金，偶爾利用稅收效率，並最大限度地減少管理費用。
At Berkshire, the whole is greater – considerably greater – than the sum of the parts.
在伯克希爾，整體比部分的總和更大，可以說大很多。
Repurchases and Reporting回購和報告
Earlier I mentioned that Berkshire will from time to time be repurchasing its own stock. Assuming that we buy at a discount to Berkshire’s intrinsic value – which certainly will be our intention – repurchases will benefit both those shareholders leaving the company and those who stay.
早些時候我提到伯克希爾將不時回購自己的股票。假設我們以低於伯克希爾的內在價值購買 - 這當然是我們的意圖 - 回購將使離開公司的股東和留下的股東都能受益。
True, the upside from repurchases is very slight for those who are leaving. That’s because careful buying by us will minimize any impact on Berkshire’s stock price. Nevertheless, there is some benefit to sellers in having an extra buyer in the market.
誠然，回購的好處對於那些離開的人來說非常輕微。這是因為我們的謹慎購買將最大限度地減少對伯克希爾股票價格的影響。然而，賣方在市場上有額外買家總歸是有一些好處的。
For continuing shareholders, the advantage is obvious: If the market prices a departing partner’s interest at, say, 90 on the dollar, continuing shareholders reap an increase in per-share intrinsic value with every repurchase by the company. Obviously, repurchases should be price-sensitive: Blindly buying an overpriced stock is value- destructive, a fact lost on many promotional or ever-optimistic CEOs.
對於繼續持有的股東而言，優勢顯而易見：如果市場將離開股東的每一美元定價為90美分，那麼繼續持有的股東在每次回購時都會獲得每股內在價值的增加。顯然，回購應該是對價格敏感的：盲目購買定價過高的股票具有價值破壞性，然而這卻是發生在許多樂觀CEO身上的事實。
When a company says that it contemplates repurchases, it’s vital that all shareholder-partners be given the information they need to make an intelligent estimate of value. Providing that information is what Charlie and I try to do in this report. We do not want a partner to sell shares back to the company because he or she has been misled or inadequately informed.
當一家公司表示它打算進行回購時，為所有股東提供他們所需的信息以進行明智的價值估算至關重要。提供這些信息是查理和我在本報告中嘗試做的事情。我們不希望合伙人將股票出售給公司，因為他或她被誤導或未充分了解情況。
Some sellers, however, may disagree with our calculation of value and others may have found investments that they consider more attractive than Berkshire shares. Some of that second group will be right: There are unquestionably many stocks that will deliver far greater gains than ours.
然而，一些賣家可能不同意我們的價值計算，而其他賣家可能已經發現他們認為比伯克希爾股票更具吸引力的投資。第二組中的一些是正確的：毫無疑問，許多股票將比我們的股票帶來更大的收益。
In addition, certain shareholders will simply decide it’s time for them or their families to become net consumers rather than continuing to build capital. Charlie and I have no current interest in joining that group. Perhaps we will become big spenders in our old age.
此外，某些股東決定是時候讓他們或他們的家庭成為淨消費者而不是繼續積累資本。查理和我目前沒有興趣加入這個團體。或許在我們晚年我們會成為大賣家。
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For 54 years our managerial decisions at Berkshire have been made from the viewpoint of the shareholders who are staying, not those who are leaving. Consequently, Charlie and I have never focused on current-quarter results.
54年來，我們在伯克希爾的管理決策都是從留下來的股東的角度出發的，而不是那些離開的人。 因此，查理和我從未專注於當前季度的結果。
Berkshire, in fact, may be the only company in the Fortune 500 that does not prepare monthly earnings reports or balance sheets. I, of course, regularly view the monthly financial reports of most subsidiaries. But Charlie and I learn of Berkshire’s overall earnings and financial position only on a quarterly basis.
事實上，伯克希爾可能是財富500強中唯一一家沒有編制月度盈利報告或資產負債表的公司。 當然，我經常查看大多數子公司的月度財務報告。 但查理和我只在每季度了解一下伯克希爾的整體收益和財務狀況。
Furthermore, Berkshire has no company-wide budget (though many of our subsidiaries find one useful). Our lack of such an instrument means that the parent company has never had a quarterly 「number」 to hit. Shunning the use of this bogey sends an important message to our many managers, reinforcing the culture we prize.
此外，伯克希爾沒有公司範圍的預算（儘管我們的許多子公司都發現預算是有用）。我們缺乏這樣的工具意味著母公司從未有過季度「數字」目標。避免使用這個向我們的眾多經理髮出了重要信息，強化我們所尊崇的文化。
Over the years, Charlie and I have seen all sorts of bad corporate behavior, both accounting and operational, induced by the desire of management to meet Wall Street expectations. What starts as an 「innocent」 fudge in order to not disappoint 「the Street」 – say, trade-loading at quarter-end, turning a blind eye to rising insurance losses, or drawing down a 「cookie-jar」 reserve – can become the first step toward full-fledged fraud. Playing with the numbers 「just this once」 may well be the CEO’s intent; it’s seldom the end result. And if it’s okay for the boss to cheat a little, it’s easy for subordinates to rationalize similar behavior.
多年來，查理和我看到過了各種財務及運營方面的不良企業行為，這些都是由管理層為滿足華爾街預期所引發的。這些都是從為了不讓「華爾街」失望而進行「無罪的」篡改開始的 - 比如說，在季末的渠道壓貨，對保險損失上升視而不見，或者提取「餅乾罐」儲備 - 可能會變成邁向全面欺詐的第一步。只玩一次這樣的數字遊戲或許是CEO初衷，但最終結果很少是這樣。如果老闆可以稍微作弊，那麼下屬很容易認為類似的行為是合理的。
At Berkshire, our audience is neither analysts nor commentators: Charlie and I are working for our shareholder-partners. The numbers that flow up to us will be the ones we send on to you.
在伯克希爾，我們的觀眾既不是分析師也不是評論員：查理和我正在為我們的股東合作夥伴工作。匯報給我們的數字將是我們發送給您的數字。
Non-Insurance Operations – From Lollipops to Locomotives非保險業務 - 從棒棒糖到機車
Let’s now look further at Berkshire’s most valuable grove – our collection of non-insurance businesses – keeping in mind that we do not wish to unnecessarily hand our competitors information that might be useful to them. Additional details about individual operations can be found on pages K-5 – K-22 and pages K-40 – K-51.
現在讓我們進一步了解一下伯克希爾最有價值的樹林 - 我們非保險業務的集合 - 請記住，我們不希望向競爭對手提供可能對他們有用的信息。有關各個業務的更多詳細信息，請參見第K-5至K-22頁和K-40至K-51頁。
Viewed as a group, these businesses earned pre-tax income in 2018 of $20.8 billion, a 24% increase over 2017. Acquisitions we made in 2018 delivered only a trivial amount of that gain.
作為一個集團，這些企業在2018年的稅前淨利潤為208億美元，比2017年增長24％。我們在2018年的收購只帶來了微不足道的收益。
I will stick with pre-tax figures in this discussion. But our after-tax gain in 2018 from these businesses was far greater – 47% – thanks in large part to the cut in the corporate tax rate that became effective at the beginning of that year. Let’s look at why the impact was so dramatic.
在此的討論中，我會堅持用稅前數字。 但是，我們2018年從這些業務中獲得的稅後收益的漲幅要遠高於稅前，高達47％ - 這在很大程度上要歸功於年初生效的公司稅率消減。讓我們來看看為什麼影響如此戲劇性。
Begin with an economic reality: Like it or not, the U.S. Government 「owns」 an interest in Berkshire’s earnings of a size determined by Congress. In effect, our country’s Treasury Department holds a special class of our stock – call this holding the AA shares – that receives large 「dividends」 (that is, tax payments) from Berkshire. In 2017, as in many years before, the corporate tax rate was 35%, which meant that the Treasury was doing very well with its AA shares. Indeed, the Treasury’s 「stock,」 which was paying nothing when we took over in 1965, had evolved into a holding that delivered billions of dollars annually to the federal government.
從經濟現實開始：無論喜歡與否，美國政府「擁有」伯克希爾的一部分權益，其比例由國會決定。 實際上，我們國家的財政部持有我們一種特殊類別的股票 - 稱之為持有AA股票 - 並從伯克希爾獲得大量「股息」（即稅收）。 2017年，與多年前一樣，企業稅率為35％，這意味著財政部的AA股表現非常好。 事實上，財政部在我們1965年接手伯克希爾時沒有支付任何費用的「股票」，在過去幾十年裡已經發展成為每年向聯邦政府提供數十億美元的控股權。
Last year, however, 40% of the government’s 「ownership」 (14/35ths) was returned to Berkshire – free of charge – when the corporate tax rate was reduced to 21%. Consequently, our 「A」 and 「B」 shareholders received a major boost in the earnings attributable to their shares.
然而，去年，當公司稅率降至21％時，40％的政府「所有權」（14/35）被免費退還給伯克希爾。 因此，我們的「A」和「B」股東的股票收益大幅增加。
This happening materially increased the intrinsic value of the Berkshire shares you and I own. The same dynamic, moreover, enhanced the intrinsic value of almost all of the stocks Berkshire holds.
這種情況實質上增加了你和我擁有的伯克希爾股票的內在價值。此外，同樣的因素還增加了伯克希爾幾乎所有持股的內在價值。
Those are the headlines. But there are other factors to consider that tempered our gain. For example, the tax benefits garnered by our large utility operation get passed along to its customers. Meanwhile, the tax rate applicable to the substantial dividends we receive from domestic corporations is little changed at about 13%. (This lower rate has long been logical because our investees have already paid tax on the earnings that they pay to us.) Overall, however, the new law made our businesses and the stocks we own considerably more valuable.
這些是關鍵因素。但還有其他一些因素使得我們的收益受到不利影響。例如，我們的大型公用事業運營所帶來的稅收優惠需要傳遞給客戶。同時，適用於我們從國內公司獲得的大量股息的稅率幾乎沒有變化，約為13％。 （這種較低的利率一直是合乎邏輯的，因為我們的被投資者已經為他們向我們支付股息的利潤交過稅了。）但總的來說，新法律使我們的業務和我們擁有的股票更有價值。
Which suggests that we return to the performance of our non-insurance businesses. Our two towering redwoods in this grove are BNSF and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (90.9% owned). Combined, they earned $9.3 billion before tax last year, up 6% from 2017. You can read more about these businesses on pages K-5 – K-10 and pages K-40 – K-45.
這表明我們恢復了非保險業務的表現。我們在這個樹林裡的兩個高聳的紅杉是BNSF和Berkshire Hathaway Energy（擁有90.9％）。合併之後，他們去年的稅前利潤為93億美元，比2017年增長了6％。您可以在K-5-K-10頁和K-40-K-45頁上閱讀更多關於這些業務的信息。
Our next five non-insurance subsidiaries, as ranked by earnings (but presented here alphabetically), Clayton Homes, International Metalworking, Lubrizol, Marmon and Precision Castparts, had aggregate pre-tax income in 2018 of $6.4 billion, up from the $5.5 billion these companies earned in 2017.
我們接下來的按收益排名靠前的五家非保險子公司（這裡按字母順序排列）分別為：Clayton Homes，International Metalworking，Lubrizol，Marmon和Precision Castparts，他們在2018年的稅前利潤總額為64億美元，高於在2017年獲得的55億美元。
The next five, similarly ranked and listed (Forest River, Johns Manville, MiTek, Shaw and TTI) earned $2.4 billion pre-tax last year, up from $2.1 billion in 2017.
再接下來的五家公司（Forest River，Johns Manville，MiTek，Shaw和TTI）去年的稅前利潤為24億美元，高於2017年的21億美元。
The remaining non-insurance businesses that Berkshire owns – and there are many – had pre-tax income of $3.6 billion in 2018 vs. $3.3 billion in 2017.
伯克希爾擁有的剩餘非保險業務 - 有許多 - 在2018年的稅前利潤為36億美元，而2017年為33億美元。
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【因雪球文字不可超過20000字，因此全文發表在挖優狗網站，詳見文末連結地址。】
The Annual Meeting年會
Berkshire’s 2019 annual meeting will take place on Saturday, May 4th. If you are thinking about attending – and Charlie and I hope you come – check out the details on pages A-2 – A-3. They describe the same schedule we』ve followed for some years.
伯克希爾2019年年會將於5月4日星期六舉行。 如果您正考慮參加 - 而查理和我希望您的到來 - 請查看第A-2頁 - A-3頁上的詳細信息。 他們描述了我們多年來遵循的相同時間表。
If you can’t join us in Omaha, attend via Yahoo’s webcast. Andy Serwer and his Yahoo associates do an outstanding job, both in covering the entire meeting and interviewing many Berkshire managers, celebrities, financial experts and shareholders from the U.S. and abroad. The world’s knowledge of what goes on in Omaha the first Saturday of every May has grown dramatically since Yahoo came on board. Its coverage begins at 8:45 a.m. CDT and provides Mandarin translation.
如果您不能加入我們的奧馬哈，請通過雅虎的網絡直播參加。 Andy Serwer和他的雅虎員工在報導整個會議和採訪美國和國外的許多伯克希爾經理，名人，金融專家和股東方面做得非常出色。 自雅虎加入以來，世界對每年五月第一個星期六在奧馬哈發生的事情的了解已經大大增加。 它的報導始於CDT時間上午8:45，並提供普通話翻譯。
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For 54 years, Charlie and I have loved our jobs. Daily, we do what we find interesting, working with people we like and trust. And now our new management structure has made our lives even more enjoyable.
54年來，查理和我都喜歡我們的工作。 每天，我們做我們感興趣的事情，與我們喜歡和信任的人合作。 現在，我們新的管理結構使我們的生活更加愉快。
With the whole ensemble – that is, with Ajit and Greg running operations, a great collection of businesses, a Niagara of cash-generation, a cadre of talented managers and a rock-solid culture – your company is in good shape for whatever the future brings.
整個公司 - 也就是說，在Ajit和Greg的運營下，大量優秀的業務，充裕的現金流狀況，一批才華橫溢的管理者和堅如磐石的文化 - 您的公司無論未來如何都處在一個良好狀態之中。
February 23, 2019 Warren E. Buffett Chairman of the Board
2019年2月23日Warren E. Buffett董事會主席
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