海德格爾論圖型

說明：

1、 <>內為譯者為了通順補充的：

2、腳註中無具體說明，則是原文中有的注，譯者注會標出：

3、譯文中有關原文參考了王慶節《康德與形上學》與李秋零《純粹理性批判<第一版>》的譯文

4、文章出處：

The  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  and Continental  Philosophy Heidegger’s  Interpretation  of

Transcendental  Imagination

作者是Daniel  Dahlstrom.文章收錄在The Cambridge Companion to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason 中

圖型化的綜合

海德格爾試圖通過轉向《純粹理性批判》的「核心」，即「圖式法」這一章，來強調他關於先驗想像力的統一功能的觀點（89/60;113/77）。康德釐清先驗圖式是一種「中介表象」，它的任務是使得知性範疇能夠運用於感性經驗之上（A138/B177）。考慮到這點，海德格爾認為在一般的意義上，概念通過圖像化或影像化的過程來統攝感性經驗，從而完成這一任務。海德格爾宣稱，儘管無<明顯>證據，康德是在三個意義上來使用「Bild」（圖像或影像）這個術語：1、作為某些存在物最直接的外觀——例如，紐約的天際線；2、某個存在物的現成的映像外觀——例如，一張天際線的照片；3、一個不再現成的東西的後象外觀，此時它是對映像的再現；或者，一個正要製作的存在物的前象外觀，總之它具有一般性，它是某物的外觀之一般——例如：記憶中的一張本土天際線的照片。[1]一個影像可以在第三種意義上被認為是圖像化了某一個概念，這顯示了事物在一般意義上是如何顯現的，「由一統攝了多」（94/64）。當天際線的影像是作為在一般意義上如何顯現的一個實例時，我們才對它感興趣；或者，更確切的是，它們是如何根據我們關於天際線的概念來顯現的。天際線的圖像是通過有所規整的「在先的描畫」才稱為可能的，這種有所規整的描畫不是單純地把天際線的所有特徵列舉出來，進行登錄（Verzeichnis）而是對「天際線」這樣的東西所意指的東西之整體進行「標明」(Auszeichnen)（95/65）。在這種解釋中，一個概念就是表象得以可能的規則；換句話說，它結合規則對表象進行在先的描畫，這種描畫是包含許多可能的（95/65）。一個概念要說徹底，它必須在削弱的意義上來被給予於感覺。一個概念既不提供即時的直觀表象，嚴格說來也不提供任何一種自由流動的心理內容。遠在事物本身被領會之前，概念的統一功能就是說在我們沒有直接觀看某物時，規整出事物的前像（Vorblick）。表象被規整的過程就是表象被概念化的過程 (95/65)。這種特定的發生方式則是想像力的功勞。如海德格爾所說，想像力產生的圖型就是指令它自身運用在事物的顯像上的規則（wie sie sich ... in den darstellenden Anblick hineindiktiert）。就像康德本人提到的，圖型雖然是想像力的產物，但並不是說它是（某物）具體的圖像，而是代表想像力是如何產生與之相關圖像的。

 

「（V）這樣，關於想像力為一個概念提供其圖像的普遍做法的表象，我稱為該概念的圖型。」（A140/B179）」[2]

 

認知需要概念<的作用>，但是概念在認知過程中的作用則要歸功於它們各自的、由想像力創造出來的圖型。對於一個經驗概念（例如一幢房子）或者一個數學概念（例如一個三角形）來說，圖型的規則就是在這些相關概念的許多可能的例示中，精確地產生出與概念相對應的圖像。為了把這種圖像從其他含義上的圖像區分開來，海德格爾重新把它命名為「圖型-圖像」。一個「圖型-圖像」必定不同於任何的一個經驗性的，<比如說>房子的圖像（Anblick），同樣也不同於此圖像的複製品(Abbild)(對三角形的概念來說，細節上會有所變化)。事實上，海德格爾認為，只有圖型才能產生出某種前像式的、規定性的圖像，來使得我們有可能辨認出一幢房子的外觀或者說一個三角形的類型。康德稱一個概念<發揮作用時>即刻就指向它對應的圖型，用海德格爾的解釋來說，康德持如此看法的原因是顯而易見的。[3]一個概念與它的圖型緊密聯結在一起是可以想像或者說可以預想的事。[4]

 

康德稱「一個純粹知性概念的圖型是某種永遠不能被帶入任何圖像的東西」（A142/B181），在這裡與規則V出現了矛盾。海德格爾在此聲明中提出，「圖像」指的是對經驗概念和數學概念而言的圖型-圖像。他對自己的解釋的進行了一些辯護。誠然，當康德試圖把先驗的圖型同其他圖型區分開時，這種斷言緊跟著他對經驗概念和數學概念的圖型的註解中來。但是，康德的斷言是無條件的，先驗的圖型無法被帶入任何一個圖像（in garkeinBild）。然而，如果在這種斷言受到攻擊的話，海德格爾的解釋優勢在於可以消除康德明顯矛盾的地方，並維持了想像力、圖像、純粹概念的圖型之間的聯繫。

 

但是純粹概念的想像力創造出來的是何種圖型-圖像呢？在這裡引出康德對「純粹圖像」的說法，具體說來，「一般意義上，感官的一切對象的純粹圖像都是時間」（A142/B182; A320/B377），海德格爾聲稱，時間作為純粹圖像，是一種「圖型-圖像」。在認識過程中，純粹概念的圖型代表「任何一種可能的、規則作用於其上的外觀」的集合（104/71）。鑑於先驗還原的結論：範疇必然地指向時間，問題中的<對象的>外觀只有可能是時間的外觀，或者說時間的圖像。海德格爾因此把純粹概念的圖型論嵌入進時間的規則（hineinregeln)中，並且這種規則同樣也是由圖型來提供的。時間不僅僅是純粹知性概念之圖型的圖像，時間也是其唯一的純粹外觀可能性(104/71)[5]。通過這種方式，海德格爾解釋康德先驗圖型論的觀點是「圖型無非就是按照規則的先天時間規定」(A 145/B 184)以及。就這點而論，（圖型是）「純粹先天想像力的一個產物」。

 

海德格爾對先驗圖型的註解，就像總體上他對超越論分析中的想像力的解釋一樣，是從實在論的理論立足點（存在物是現成的）展開的。為了處理這些存在物，主體必須以合適的方式來面向它們，使得<與存在物的>相遇有可能在先發生。「這種轉過來面向本身必須是某種前像式的、具有奉獻特性的持有活動（90/61）。」通過對「bilden」（指圖像、照相，或者形式）這個詞上玩文字遊戲，海德格爾把先驗想像力的任務理解為形成一種使這種相遇可能的、純粹的預覽（而且在這個意義上，或許可以稱之為相遇的「視域」）。「純粹想像力形成一個圖型，為先驗的視域提供一個在先的理解（「圖像」）」，這種圖像是在感知某些事物最初時產生的，但是它本身並不是任何一個特定對象的圖像。

[1]海德格爾還把複製品——例如一張照片——同複製物區分開。他還在總體上的觀察下進一步認為：自從一個腦海中的影像可以被認作是某個東西的外觀開始，那麼這個影像可以把過去、現在、將來，甚至是不存在的東西表現出來。

[2]這裡參考了李秋零的譯文：《康德著作全集<第四卷>》，李秋零譯，北京：中國人民大學出版社，2005年：第94頁——譯者注。

[3]在這裡，海德格爾概括了康德對於經驗性的概念的說法：「die- ser beziehtsich jederzeit unmittelbar auf das Schema der Einbildungskraft」 (A 141/B 180)。

[4]為了保證概念與直觀對認知的綜合作用的必要性，海德格爾主張事實上沒有圖型的概念是盲目的，就是說，只有圖型化的概念才具有經驗性的作用：「概念在任何時候都與圖型關聯」（98/67）以及「所有概念性的表像活動，本質上就是圖型化」（101/69）。

[5]參考王慶節的譯文：海德格爾《康德與形上學疑難》，王慶節譯，上海：上海譯文出版社，2011：第99頁。——譯者注

譯文原文：

SYNTHESIZING BY WAY OF SCHEMATIZING

Heidegger attempts to drive home his thesis about theunifying function of transcendental imagination by turning next to theSchematism chapter, the 「core」of the Critique (89/60; 113/77). Kant makes it clear that the task of atranscendental schema, as a 「mediating representation,」 is to provide acategory with a sensory character (A 138/B 177). With this task in mind,Heidegger considers ordinary senses of accomplishing this by picturing or imaginingwhat something falling under the concept looks like. Heidegger claims, albeitwithout documentation, that Kant uses the term Bild (「image」 or 「picture」) inthree senses of 「look」 (Anblick): the immediate look of some entity – forexample, the New York skyline; a look in the sense of a copy – for example, aphoto of that skyline; and the look of something in general – for example, thatphoto as a picture of an urban skyline.[1] Apicture can be said to picture a concept in this third sense, showing 「howsomething appears 『in general』, in the one aspect that holds for many」 (94/64).We are interested in the look of this skyline only as an instance of howskylines in general look – or, better, how they have to look according to ourconcept of skyline. What counts as a possible picture of a skyline serves as an「advance sketch」 of how skylines look as a rule, not as a list of features butas a means of outlining and highlighting what is generally meant by 「skyline」(95/65).

 

On this interpretation, a concept is the rule for apossible look; equivalently, it sketches in advance that aspect of any possiblelook that accords with the rule (95/65). To be a concept at all, it must berendered sensory in this attenuated sense. A concept affords neither animmediate intuitive look nor any free-floating mental content as such. Far frombeing something grasped in itself, a conceptual unity serves as a preview (Vorblick)that rules or governs only as long as we do not look directly at it. 「Therepresenting of the process of the rule-governedness [Regelung] as such is thegenuinely conceptual representing」 (96//65). The specific way this takes placeis the work of the imagination. A schema, produced by the imagination, represents how, as Heidegger puts it,the rule dictates itself onto the look that presents itself (wie sie sich ... in den darstellenden Anblickhineindiktiert). As Kant himself notes, the schema, though a product of theimagination, is not itself an image but instead represents how the imaginationproduces the relevant image.

 

(V) Now this representation of a general procedure of theimagination for providing a concept with its image is what I call the schemafor this concept. (A 140/B 179f)

 

Cognition requires conception but concepts can only play arole in cognition thanks to their respective schemata, products of theimagination. The schema for an empirical concept (for example, a house) or amathematical concept (for example, a triangle) is a rule for producing an imageprecisely as a possible instance – one of potentially many – of the relevant concept.To distinguish this sense of 「image」 from others, Heidegger designates it a「schema-image.」 A schema-image is necessarily different from any arbitraryempirical look (Anblick) of a house as well as from any image or copy (Abbild)of that look (and mutatis mutandis for the mathematical concept of triangle).Indeed, only a schema, Heidegger submits, produces the sort of prefigured,regulated look that makes it possible to identify that look of a house or thataspect of a triangle at all. Kant claims that a concept immediately refers to aschema and, on Heidegger’s interpretation, it is apparent in what sense he doesso.[2] Aconcept refers to its schema as – can be imagined or envisioned. [3]

 

Kant appears to contradict (V) when he claims that 「theschema of a pure concept of the understanding can never be brought to any imageat all」 (A 142/B 181). In this claim, Heidegger submits, 「image」 refers to schema-imagesfor empirical and mathematical concepts. He provides little defense of thisinterpretative move. To be sure, the assertion comes on the heels of glosses ofschemata for empirical and mathematical concepts as Kant attempts todistinguish transcendental schemata from those other schemata. Still, Kant’sassertion is unqualified: the transcendental schema can never be brought 「to any image at all」 (in garkeinBild). Yet ifforced in this respect, Heidegger’s interpretation has the advantage ofremoving the apparent contradiction in Kant’s account and preserving a clearconnection among imagination, images, and schemata for pure concepts.

 

But then what sort of schema-image is produced by theimagination for pure concepts? Drawing on Kant’s talk of a 「pure image」 and, inparticular, of time as 「thepure image of all objects of the senses in general」 (A 142/B 182; A 320/B377), Heidegger contends that time, as that pure image, is the schema-image. Aschema of a pure concept of the understanding represents unities 「as rules imposingthemselves onto any possible look」 (104/71). Given the transcendental deduction’s conclusion that thecategories refer necessarily to time, the look in question can only be the lookor image of time. Heidegger accordingly reasons that the schematism of pureconcepts inserts into time the rules (hineinregeln)provided by them. Not only is time the pure schema-imagecorresponding to the schemata of pure concepts, but time as such (that is, theschema-image produced by the schematism) presents the only possible pure view ofthem (104/71). In this way, Heidegger explicatesKant’s contention that the transcendental schemata are 「nothing but determinationsof time a priori according to rules」 (A 145/B 184)and, as such, a 「transcendental product of the imagination」 (A 142/B 181).

 

Heidegger’s gloss on transcendental schemata, like hisinterpretation of the imagination in the Transcendental Analytic generally,proceeds from the realist standpoint that entities are already on hand. Inorder for those entities to be taken up, the subject must turn toward them inthe appropriate way, making the encounter possible in advance. 「The turning-towardmust be, in itself, a way of holding up to oneself what might present itself atall, by pre-forming [or modeling: vorbildendes] it」 (90/61). Playing on theword 「bilden」 (which can mean imagining, picturing, and/or forming), Heidegger construes the work ofthe transcendental imagination as that of forming the pure preview that makes theencounter possible (and, in that sense, may be called the 「horizon」 for theencounter). 「The pure imagination, forming a schema, provides in advance a view(「picture」) of the horizon of transcendence,」 a view that is initially formedin the process of perceiving something but is not itself the view of anyparticular object (91f/62; 105/71f).34

[1] Heidegger also distinguishes a reproduction (Nachbild) – for example,a photograph – from a copy (Abbild)(93f/63f). He also makes the generalobservation that since an image of something can mean the look of it, the imagecan mean the look of something present, past, present, future, or non-existent(92f/63).

[2] Here, Heidegger generalizes what Kant says of an empirical concept:「die- ser bezieht sich jederzeit unmittelbar auf dasSchema der Einbildungskraft」 (A 141/B 180).

[3] In keeping with the necessity of the synthesis of a concept withintuition for cognition, Heidegger contends in effect that concepts withoutsche- mata are blind – that is, only schematized concepts function epistemi-cally: 「What logic calls a concept is grounded in the schema」 (98/67) and 「Allconceptual representing is essentially schematism」 (101/69).