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在「排乾沼澤」行動中，最起碼的互信比什麼都重要，這種互信應建立在坦率的溝通和專業的判斷基礎之上，中美關係固然已「回不到過去」，但仍可在對話、合作與管控方面有新的作為，仍可達致符合雙方和國際社會共同利益的某種程度的平衡，「回不到過去」不應成為放棄未來的理由。
本文作者系盤古智庫學術委員會副秘書長、高級研究員安剛，文章來源於「中美聚焦」。
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「排乾沼澤」，是仍未放棄扭轉大選敗局的美國總統川普的專屬政治詞彙。四年前他剛上臺時向自己的支持者承諾要「排乾華盛頓的政治沼澤」，意即清除那裡盤根錯節的利益集團影響，清除政治腐敗，打破建制派構築的層層政治壁壘。
四年過去了，川普沒能兌現這一承諾，自己反被「華盛頓政治沼澤」吞沒。其謀求連任失敗在一定程度上是建制派反撲的結果，同時，川普任內各種反常規、反專業、逆全球化的操作，對內加劇政治極化，對外製造大國對立、清退國際責任、破壞全球規則，也將戰後國際秩序帶入「沼澤」，並對美國的「軟實力」造成二戰後罕有的反噬。
即將走入拜登時期的美國將以「治癒」、「回調」為今後兩年的主題詞。拜登政府將從疫情應對、經濟、社會、移民、能源等領域以及國際多邊議題方面全面清算川普的政策，力求實現「彌合美國國內創傷」和「恢復美國全球領導力」的競選承諾。
然而，美國國內的鴻溝是深刻的。民主黨推崇的多元自由主義價值觀和高稅率、大政府、強監管、高福利治理模式，與共和黨主張的盎格魯-撒克遜基本價值觀及低稅率、小政府、輕監管治理模式之間，有著難以調和的矛盾，甚至已經可以上升到階級矛盾的高度。拜登政府不可能用四年時間達到目標，四年之後必遭共和黨巨大反撲。
川普謀連任的努力在種種不利條件下仍贏得超預期的廣泛民眾支持，顯示美國的保守化趨勢已經固化，將主導今後二三十年的社會思潮，並對國家政策和對外關係產生深遠影響。拜登政府還未上任，就已鍍上了一層「進步主義」色彩，至少經濟上是部分民族主義的，外交上是相當機會主義的。而共和黨在此次大選中有望保住參院控制權並擴大眾院議席，將有能力對拜登施政構成明顯制衡，捍衛「沒有川普的川普主義」。
歐巴馬中後期開啟的美國全球戰略收縮，在川普任內以激進方式推進，拜登政府將予修正，主要是修復盟友關係，重返國際機制，重振氣候變化、清潔能源等全球議程。但拜登政府也將部分順承「川普遺產」：一是全球戰略目標向大國競爭的聚攏；二是全球戰略部署重心向印太地區的傾斜；三是為應對「中國戰略威脅」而進行的作戰概念創新和技戰術調整、武器裝備優化；四是對美日印澳「價值觀同盟」的發展和利用。所有這些，與川普時期不會有太大區別，將表現出較強延續性，還會吸收歐巴馬時期「亞太再平衡」戰略的部分思維和成果——包括對美日雙邊同盟的特別倚重，從而形成拜登政府自己的戰略。
川普的四年，在「美國優先」旗號下大肆推進攻擊性現實主義外交，給中美關係造成巨大損害。由於美方不斷升級和擴大挑釁，中方不得不採取對等反制措施，兩國關係陷入「行動-反應-再行動」的惡性循環，日益逼近「修昔底德陷阱」。
當戰略競爭取代互惠合作成為中美關係的主導面，當主導國和崛起國在現行多邊機制內的相互否決與排斥取代建設性協調成為全球體系的一大主要現象，當美國的禁用華為5G、TikTok等事件發出科技、經貿乃至系統性脫鉤的惡劣信號，當南海軍事對峙常態化，當美國在臺灣問題上的「戰略模糊」開始轉向「戰略清晰」，當制度之爭、意識形態之爭回歸乃至「文明之爭」都成為中美矛盾的潛臺詞，中美關係的質變已經完成，「再也回不到過去了」。
比科技、經貿脫鉤更危險的，是心理脫鉤。經過幾年折騰，維繫中美長期合作關係的社會基礎開始瓦解。面對兩國關係的高度不確定性，擺脫對對方供應鏈的過度依賴，搭建風險備份，在兩國國內成為從政界高層到企業界的普遍共識。同一全球體系內相互依存和互利共贏的意識似乎不再是經營中美關係的主流思維。美國應對疫情的失敗、族裔衝突的迭起、黨派對立的加劇、選舉政治的混亂，以及在國際上的不負責任，徹底顛覆了美國長期以來在中國民眾當中的道德和制度形象，中國在美國民眾心目中的「威脅」形象則反向升至冷戰後的最高點，對通過接觸交融改變中國的挫敗感主導了美國知識階層的對華判斷。也就是說，中美兩國的相互認知雙雙陷入「幻滅」，這種「幻滅」成為影響兩國對對方決策的主導性因素之一。
拜登上任後，將優先處理美國國內疫情，對外則是緩和國際關係，重返全球議程。這將為中美關係的趨穩和改善提供一個「時間窗口」。但川普時期造成的損害不是短時間內就可以消弭的，因為這背後並非只受美國國內的政治、經濟和社會因素驅動，更有強大的跨黨派共識基礎，這種共識認定美國面臨的首要挑戰來自中國，要求政府——無論是民主黨的還是共和黨的——以更加強硬的姿態和有效的手段加以應對，而中美結構性矛盾在過去幾年的關鍵期內已從局部性發展到全領域，白宮和國會各種反華遏華政策措施和法規議案的「槓桿」加得很高，破壞力大為增強，可控性顯著減小。
即將進入又一個新階段的中美關係，挑戰仍遠大於機會，面臨的首要任務是儘可能恢復穩定，進而在業已確定的強國戰略競爭格局中，通過理智的互動，找尋一個有目標、有底線、有規則、有邊界的共處範式，爭取把這場大博弈從激烈摩擦的第一階段，導入政策協調與勾兌的第二階段。
拜登執政第一年，不大可能出臺系統性的對華政策，但其謀求「競爭與合作並存」的目標是明確的，為過熱的中美摩擦降溫的需求是真實的，其側近人士處理涉外敏感事務的專業性和傾聽力也是可靠的。更重要的是，民主黨人不認為斷絕接觸、脫離交互、單邊施壓就可以遏制中國，不認為中美之間存在絕對的單贏，不認為中美不合作就有利於美國，也不認為多邊主義和經濟全球化在當今世界已經過時、失效。
中國有必要抓住正在打開的「時間窗口」和「政策空間」，優先做兩件事。一是與美國通過雙邊渠道和世界衛生組織（這很可能是拜登就職後首個宣布重返的國際機制）等多邊構架務實開展防疫合作，確立與美國新政府的首個有效合作點。二是重建高層直接溝通管道，以此為號令有序重啟各層級各領域對話磋商，為拜登時期中美關係設置議程框架，在競爭與合作之間規劃「緩衝帶」，並管控可能的衝突風險。在此過程中，中美雙方最好能就各自戰略目標相互做出更清晰的解釋，為此後四年的互動提供戰略備忘和保證，修補中美關係的可預期性。
當上述兩項工作推進到成果可視階段後，不妨借用一下川普的政治詞彙，中美雙方可能需要開啟一場「排乾沼澤」的行動，也就是給遭川普政府嚴重毒化的雙邊關係「清淤」。首先是重新談判，恢復正常關稅水平，建立基於公平、互惠、規則的貿易秩序。其次是「科技冷戰」休戰，將川普時期遺留的「懸案」在合適的政治氛圍下交給市場和法律去解決，然後尋求達成避免徹底、全面脫鉤的共識，爭取把「脫鉤」這個偽命題從中美議程清單上清除出去。第三是儘量恢復正常人文交流，特別是智庫、民航、留學往來。第四是開展金融政策協調，重建產業對接，確立「雙循環」經濟戰略與美國疫後經濟復甦和金融穩定之間的合理關係，重構全球化條件下相互依存的基礎。第五是重啟戰略安全對話，並探討升級為戰略穩定磋商，聚焦核導問題，中方在學習中實踐與美國等全球軍事強國構建新的戰略平衡。
應對全球性挑戰合作是中美雙方在美國政府換屆後為改善彼此關係、重振全球治理、各自發揮引領作用所必然要共同抓住的抓手。在拜登團隊開列的上任後四大優先任務中，氣候變化位列第四，重返《巴黎協定》是板上釘釘之事，美國地方州和能源企業也從未停止履行減排義務，中方則在「十四五」規劃中制定了雄心勃勃的碳中和目標，中美雙方有充分的合作動力和空間，想必中國智庫在響應王毅國務委員兼外長倡議開列合作、對話與管控三個清單的過程中也做足了政策建議準備。但中美在全球層面的協調畢竟要隨國際格局和全球治理結構的變化增添新的內容，雙方在恢復務實合作的同時，也要就氣變、深洋、外空、網絡、人工智慧等領域的國際規則演進展開溝通甚至談判。
熱點問題也是拜登上臺初期中美雙方可以對標的領域。在朝核問題上，不甘寂寞的朝鮮有每當美國新總統上任便採取措施試探美方對朝政策取向的「傳統」，這次估計也不會例外。半島局勢可能發生新的波動，但川普留下的美朝最高層直接接觸的「遺產」也將被歷史記住，中方對半島局勢有繼續施加管理和影響的責任，更有發揮更大作用的契機。在伊朗核問題上，拜登政府有望重返六方機制，美伊關係將在短暫緩和中醞釀更複雜的較量，中方如何站位需要預先盤算。中東格局在川普任內發生重大改變，沙特、阿聯等國推進「自我開明革命」，並開始同以色列和解，伊朗、土耳其、敘利亞等國影響力在一度擴張後受到抑制，這些都將成為拜登政府欣然接受的「饋贈」，而中國在中東的利益和影響也隨此進程及「一帶一路」建設的推進而悄然重置，中美圍繞中東戰略問題展開對話變得必要和可行。
「排乾沼澤」行動的本質是過渡期的戰略試探，如果雙方相互確認誠意，合作可以前行、擴大，中美關係有望用不長的時間找到適應新的實力對比和全球大勢的競合狀態。如果雙方不能擺脫敵意假設，處理具體事務最終被競爭和壓制與反制心理主導，中美關係仍可能重返惡性循環滑向「新冷戰」。
不必對「排乾沼澤」行動有過度期待，「沼澤」實際上無法排乾，但「水位」完全可以顯著下降。在「排乾沼澤」行動中，最起碼的互信比什麼都重要，這種互信應建立在坦率的溝通和專業的判斷基礎之上，同時要求雙方有在中國臺灣、南海等敏感問題上進入相對「靜默」狀態的默契。而從中長期看，雙方都應保持一個信念：中美關係固然已「回不到過去」，但仍可在對話、合作與管控方面有新的作為，仍可達致符合雙方和國際社會共同利益的某種程度的平衡，「回不到過去」不應成為放棄未來的理由。
Drain the China-U.S. Swamp
U.S. President Donald Trump, still refusing to concede the 2020 election as of this writing, has a penchant for the phrase 「drain the swamp.」 Four years ago, Trump campaigned to drain the swamp in Washington, vowing to eliminate the influence of special interests and lobbyists, fight political corruption and break down barriers the establishment had erected.
Unfortunately, Trump failed to fulfill his promise over the past four years; rather, he was devoured by the swamp in Washington. His failure to win reelection partly resulted from a counterattack of the establishment. At the same time, all unconventional, unprofessional and deglobalizing actions from the Trump administration — highlighting political polarization at home while building up hostility between major powers, dodging international responsibilities and destroying global rules abroad, swamped the postwar international order and dealt a rare blow to American soft power that had grown since World War II.
For President-elect Joseph Biden, 「heal」 and 「rectify」 will be the keywords of the next two years. The Biden administration will overhaul Trump’s policies on pandemic response, the economy, society, immigration and energy, as well as on international multilateral issues, in a bid to honor his pledges to heal the nation and 「restore American leadership.」
Divisions in the U.S., however, is sharp. With allegiance to pluralism and liberalism, the Democratic Party advocates higher taxes for the wealthy, bigger government, stronger supervision and higher welfare. The Republican Party, committed to Anglo-Saxon values, claims to back low tax rates, small government and moderate supervision. The divergence seems irreconcilable — so much that it may even intensify class conflicts. There is little possibility for the Biden administration to make good on its commitments within only four years, and so the Democrats may be trounced by the Republicans in the next election.
Despite his many disadvantages, Trump garnered stronger support than expected in his reelection bid, a testament to the country’s underlying trend of conservatism, which may well take the lead in the next two or three decades and have far-reaching influence on national policies and diplomacy. The Biden administration has already been painted as progressive — something that will certainly follow modest economic nationalism and considerable diplomatic opportunism. Nevertheless, the GOP is projected to hold onto its Senate majority and gain more House seats when the dust of the 2020 election finally settles. This will be enough to check the Biden administration and thus defend Trumpism without Trump.
Strategic retrenchment during the Barack Obama administration made strides during Trump’s presidency. The Biden administration will reverse these gains by reuniting with allies, returning to the international system and reasserting the U.S. presence in the global agenda, including on climate change and clean energy. It will, however, retain part of Trump’s legacy.First, Biden will reinforce major-power competition in U.S. global strategy; second, he will send more strategic forces toward the Indo-Pacific region; third, the U.S. will revamp its thinking, customizing technology and tactics and optimizing weapons in response to the strategic threat of China; and, fourth, the shared values of the U.S.-Japan-Australia-India alliance will be leveraged.
These moves will not differ much from those of the Trump administration, but they will borrow some thoughts from the Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy during Obama’s presidency, including special reliance on U.S. ally Japan. Then the Biden administration’s strategy will take shape.
Trump’s diplomatic realism, with aggressiveness in line with 「America first」 over the past four years has eviscerated China-U.S. relations. Confronted with escalating provocations from Washington, China was forced to take reciprocal countermeasures. Thus, the two countries were caught in a vicious circle of 「act-respond-react,」 dragging them ever closer to the Thucydides trap of inevitable war.
Today, strategic competition has gained the upper hand over win-win cooperation in China-U.S. relations. Instead of constructive coordination, leading powers and emerging countries are rejecting and excluding each other in the current multilateral system — cases of which abound throughout the world. The U.S. ban on Huawei in 5G networks and TikTok have sent a worrying signal of technological, economic and even structural decoupling with China. The South China Sea has seen military confrontation normalized, and the U.S. has transitioned from strategic ambiguity toward strategic clarity on the Taiwan question.
Ideological disputes and even a clash of civilizations loom ahead of the two powers. Taken together, all of these aspects of China-U.S. relations have fundamentally changed and cannot return to their previous state.
More dangerous than the tech and economic decoupling is psychological decoupling. After several years of push-pull, the social foundation maintaining long-term cooperation between China and the U.S. has begun to collapse.Given the high uncertainty about relations between the two countries, it has become a broad consensus for senior officials and the business community on both sides that they should reduce excessive reliance on each other’s supply chains and develop their own Plan B.
The idea of interdependence and mutual benefit within the global system seems to be no longer popular in managing China-U.S. relations. Uncle Sam’s disastrous coronavirus response, frequent racial conflicts, growing divide between political parties, presidential election fiascos and irresponsibility on global issues have upended the long-standing moral and institutional picture of the superpower for the Chinese people. At the same time, China has been labeled in the eyes of the American people as the greatest threat since the Cold War.
American intellectuals are generally frustrated at the failure to change China with a strategy of engagement. That is to say, both sides have been disillusioned by the other, and that has become one of the leading factors affecting their decision-making.
When Biden takes office, he will prioritize the fight against the coronavirus in his country and then turn to easing foreign relations and getting back to the global agenda. This may offer a window of opportunity for easing China-U.S. relations.Nonetheless, the damage caused by the Trump administration will not vanish quickly. Washington’s China policy was created not only out of political, economic and social considerations but out of a clear bipartisan consensus that China is a major threat.
The U.S. government, whether controlled by the Democrats or the Republicans, is thus required to take a harder line. The structural disputes between China and the U.S. have already spread to all areas over the past few years — a critical period for both sides. All the polices, executive orders and legislative bills that the White House and Congress have approved to contain China have been destructive and uncontrollable at an unprecedented level.
China-U.S. relations, which are about to step onto a new stage, will find far more challenges than opportunities. The top priority is to restore stability as much as possible.In other words, despite the fully-formed landscape of strategic competition, the two major powers should build up, through rational engagement, a paradigm of coexistence, with goals, bottom lines, rules and boundaries, with a view toward leading this big game from fierce clashes to policy coordination.
In Biden’s first year in the White House, it is unlikely that his administration will unveil any fully developed China policy.Nevertheless, it does have a clear goal for the coexistence of competition and cooperation, real demand for cooling overheated China-U.S. frictions and reliable and professional advisers around Biden who can maintain their composure to cope with thorny foreign affairs.
More important, the Democrats do not think disengagement and coercion can contain China or that there can be an absolute winner between the two powers. They don’t believe that zero cooperation will benefit their country or that multilateralism and economic globalization are outdated and ineffective in today’s world.
It is necessary, then, for China to take advantage of the window of opportunity and policy leeway to work on two things. First is pragmatic cooperation with the U.S. in containing the novel coronavirus through bilateral channels and multilateral frameworks such as the World Health Organization (which will probably be the first international organization to which Biden will announce the USA’s return) and to establish an effective point of cooperation with the new U.S. government.
Second is to rebuild high-level communication, which can help restart dialogues at all levels and in all fields in an orderly manner, thereby setting an agenda for China-U.S. relations during Biden’s presidency.
A buffer zone should be arranged between competition and cooperation to manage potential conflicts. In doing so, they must explain their strategic goals more clearly to each other to provide strategic memos for engagement over the next four years and rebuild predictability in the relationship.
After making progress in these two tasks, China and the U.S. may find it necessary (as Trump’s catchphrase goes) to 「drain the swamp」— that is, to detoxify the Trump administration’s actions.
Here, the first step will be to renegotiate tariffs and establish a trade order based on fairness, reciprocity and rules. If possible, it is also advisable to wake up the Bilateral Investment Treaty negotiations, which had achieved positive progress near the end of the Obama administration but was abandoned by Trump.
Second will be to seek a truce in the 「tech cold war,」 leaving unresolved issues from the Trump administration to the market and law for settlement against a favorable political environment. Then China should strive to reach agreement with the U.S. on gradually avoiding comprehensive decoupling, thereby removing this preposterous concept from the countries』 agenda.
Third will be to resume cultural and people-to-people exchanges as much as possible, especially between think tanks, civil aviation and study-abroad projects.
Fourth will be to coordinate financial policies, rebuild industrial alignments and establish a reasonable relationship between China’s 「dual circulation」 economic strategy and America’s post-pandemic policies for economic recovery and financial stability, thus intensifying their mutual dependence in a globalized world.
Fifth will be to restart the dialogue on strategic security. Specifically, China should turn the discussion into regular strategic consultation, with a focus on nuclear issues, and learn to strike a new strategic balance with the U.S. and other global military powers.
When responding to global challenges, cooperation is undoubtedly the starting point that China and the U.S. must grasp to improve bilateral relations, revitalize global governance and exercise their own leadership after the change in U.S. government.
Of the top four priorities on Biden’s to-do list, climate change is last, but returning to the Paris agreement is a certainty. State governments and energy companies in the U.S. have never turned away from their emission reduction obligations. As for China, the 14th Five-Year Plan has set ambitious carbon neutral goals. China and the U.S. have sufficient motivation and latitude for cooperation. Presumably, Chinese think tanks are well-prepared to advise on policies in response to the initiative of State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi that they provide three to-do-lists — for cooperation, for dialogue and for dispute management. Since coordination between China and the U.S. at the global level can be renewed through changes in the international landscape and global governance structure, apart from pragmatic cooperation they need to communicate and negotiate on the evolution of international rules regarding climate change, deep oceans, space, the internet and artificial intelligence.
There are also hot issues where China and the U.S. can set benchmarks at the beginning of Biden’s presidency. On the North Korea nuclear issue, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea — always keen to make its presence felt and test Washington’s resolve whenever a new U.S. president takes office — dis highly likely to repeat certain aggressive actions this year. The situation on the peninsula may see new fluctuations, but the legacy of direct contact between the top leaders of the U.S. and DPRK is marked in history. China has the responsibility to help manage and influence the issue on the peninsula, and it has a chance to play a greater role.
With regard to the Iranian nuclear issue, the Biden administration is expected to return to six-party talks. The U.S.-Iran relationship may harbor more complicated stress points after a brief period of easing, and where China will stand needs to be considered in advance.
The Middle East landscape has undergone major changes during Trump’s presidency. Countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates promoted liberal-leaning adjustments and began to reconcile with Israel. The influences of Iran, Turkey, and Syria were suppressed after a period of expansion. All these will be a gift that the Biden administration is ready to accept.
China’s interests and influence in the Middle East will be reshaped accordingly, as well as by the advancement of the Belt and Road Initiative. It will be necessary and feasible for China and the U.S. to engage in dialogue on strategic issues in the Middle East.
The nature of draining the swamp will present a strategic trial during the transition.If the two sides confirm their sincerity, cooperation can expand. China-U.S. relations are also expected to quickly find their coopetition sweet spot that adapts to the new power balance and global trends. If the two sides cannot get rid of their hostile assumptions and if the handling of specific affairs is ultimately dominated by competition, containment and countermeasures, relations may return to a vicious cycle and slide into a new cold war.
Expectations for 「draining the swamp」 between Beijing and Washington need not be overly high. The swamp, in fact, cannot be drained, but the water level can drop significantly. In the act of draining, even a small amount of mutual trust is more important than anything else and should be based on candid communication and professional judgment. At the same time, it’s necessary for both parties to reach a tacit agreement on the sensitive questions of Taiwan and the South China Sea.
In the medium and long term, both parties should understand that although the China-U.S. relations cannot return to the past, the two countries can still move forward in dialogue, cooperation and dispute management, and they can achieve a certain degree of balance in their common interest and that of the international community. No way to return does not mean they should give up on the future of the relationship.■
文章來源於「中美聚焦」
圖文編輯：徐仟慧
責任編輯：劉菁波