雖然中美兩國可以通過談判解決貿易問題，但他們無法解決處世之道這些更基本的問題。不同的處世方式影響著兩國領導人對政府、企業和個人之間關係的看法。這將是一場長期的觀念形態博弈。
瑞·達利歐 圖/法新不要再把中美兩國之間的衝突稱為「貿易戰」了，這是個具有誤導性的詞。這是旗鼓相當的兩個大國在一個狹小的世界裡進行的一場觀念形態博弈。換言之，這與貿易關係不大，而是事關兩個問題：由兩種不同的處世之道延伸出的不同的政府、企業、個人行為方式和全球地緣政治形態；與此同時中國正崛起為一個可與美國一較高下的大國，並且在不遠的將來還會進一步壯大，但世界並不大，在這樣的環境下，這兩個國家難免會以各種方式發生碰撞。雖然中美兩國可以通過談判解決貿易問題，但他們無法通過談判解決更基本的問題（例如，他們的處世之道，以及旗鼓相當的兩個大國之間的碰撞）。這些基本問題——比如企業與政府的關係——是貿易爭端的核心，也是癥結所在，而且將始終存在。
中國人數千年來的處世之道以儒家的、自上而下的家族式模式為核心，也就是他們所說的「中國特色」。美國人近250年來的處世之道則遵循個人主義的、自下而上的民主觀念。期望中國人改弦易轍的想法未免天真，指望美國人做出改變也沒有道理。這些不同的處世方式影響著兩國領導人對政府、企業和個人之間關係的看法。而正是因為這些邊界在「貿易戰」談判中被打破而導致了貿易談判破裂——至少暫時如此。
還有一個事實對談判非常重要——時間站在中國這一邊，因為他們變強大的速度比美國更快，所以任何「戰爭」或是「對抗」，更早發生對美國有利，而較晚發生則對中國有利。同樣值得注意的是，美國和中國對待「戰爭」或是「對抗」的方式不同。中國人的方法是試圖「不戰而屈人之兵」，韜光隱晦，再向對手展示肌肉，令其不戰而退；而西方人的戰鬥方式往往更像動物，你一拳、我一腳，鬥到兩敗俱傷，直到一方認輸——一些中國領導人認為這種方式是從地中海/歐洲文化演變而來。雖然中國人對這類「戰爭」很反感，因為它太有破壞性，但若迫不得已，他們也會奉陪。換句話說，中國人更喜歡的「戰爭」方式是以自上而下的儒家方式建立實力、進行競爭，但如果情非得已，他們也會以針鋒相對的方式以牙還牙。而我們現在正瀕臨陷入這一局面。
無論如何，這將是一場長期的觀念形態博弈，其結果主要取決於不同的觀念形態將如何作用於成為世界強國所必需的各方面的實力，譬如教育、經濟、社會、技術、財政和軍事。對於那些以「競爭」為主旋律的領域，我可以想像到兩種結果：如果兩國領導人對待這種競爭，就像對待其他使雙方變得更強大的重大競爭一樣，而且如果雙方意識到雙贏的競爭比雙輸的戰爭要好得多，那麼將得到有益的結果；但如果兩國領導人致力於讓對方改變生存方式，則會引發對抗，招致嚴重後果。再強調一次，就像我們的國內衝突一樣，最大的問題在於掌握權柄的人將如何相處。這將對我們生活的方方面面都有重大影響。
The Ideological War of Comparable Powers in a Small World
Ray Dalio
Co-Chief Investment Officer & Co-Chairman of Bridgewater Associates, L.P.
May 14, 2019
People need to stop calling the conflict between the U.S. and China a trade war because that term is misleading. It is an ideological war of comparable powers in a small world. In other words, it is not nearly as much about trade as it is about 1) two different approaches to life that extend to different approaches to government, business, individual behavior and global geopolitics, with 2) China emerging to be a comparable power to the U.S. now and in the not too distant future a greater power in a small world in which these two countries will be bumping into each other in all sorts of ways. While these two countries can negotiate their trade issues away they can’t negotiate these more fundamental issues (i.e., their approaches to life issues and the comparable powers bumping into each other issues). These fundamental issues - such as how companies relate to governments - are at the heart of the 「trade」 dispute and where the stumbling blocks lie and will remain.
One would be naive to expect the Chinese to approach life differently than they have approached life for thousands of years (which is what they refer to as 「with Chinese characteristics」 which is at its heart their Confucian, family-like top down way of being) one shouldn’t expect Americans to approach life differently from how they approached it for nearly 250 years (which is individualistic, bottom-up and democratic). These different ways of being affect the ways the leaders of these two countries believe relationships between governments, businesses and individuals should be. The boundaries of these were pushed in the 「trade war negotiations」 which is what led to the 「trade talks」 breaking down, at least temporarily.
Also relevant to these negotiations is the fact that time is on the Chinese side (because they are getting stronger faster than the U.S.) so it is in the interest of the U.S. to have any wars/confrontations that might happen earlier and it is in the interest of the Chinese to have them later. Also noteworthy, the U.S. and China have different approaches to wars/confrontations. The Chinese approach is to try win without fighting by quietly building one’s power and then showing it to one’s opponent so that the opponent will give up without fighting, while the Western approach to fighting (which some Chinese leaders believe has evolved from how Mediterranean/European cultures evolved) tends to be more like animals do via exchanging harmful blows, hurting both, until one submits to the other. While the Chinese have an aversion to this type of war because it’s so terrible, they will do it if pushed to do it. In other words the Chinese preferred approach to 「wars」 is to do them more as a competition to build strength which the Chinese do in a top-down Confucian sort of way, but they will fight in a tit-for-tat exchange of blows way if pushed. That is what we are now at the brink of.
In any case, this will be a long ideological war with the outcome being primarily dependent on how well these different ideological approaches produce the various types strengths — i.e, their educational, economic, social, technological, financial and military strengths— that are needed in order to be great world powers. Regarding where that competition will lead, I can envision either a) good outcomes if these two countries』 leaders treat this competition like other great competitions that make both sides stronger and if both sides realize that win-win competitions are much better than lose-lose wars, or b) terrible outcomes if these two countries』 leaders fight to make the others make existential changes that they will fight against. Once again, as with our domestic conflicts, the biggest question is how the people who have their hands on the levers of power will be with each other. That will significantly influence just about everything in our lives.
作者瑞•達利歐為橋水基金創始人、聯合首席執行兼聯合首席投資官。
翻譯：康娟
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本文英文版「The Ideological War of Comparable Powers in a Small World」5月14日首發於LinkedIn網站瑞•達利歐個人主頁。《巴倫》中國獲橋水基金授權發布中文版。