美國正試圖破壞全球的科技供應鏈，從而切斷華為的高端矽晶片供給，但是這項計劃有可能使美國自身後院失火。
A new $12 billion US chip plant sounds like a win for Trump. Not quite.
臺積電美國建廠是川普的勝利嗎？
On Friday, May 15, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. (TSMC), the world’s largest contract chipmaker, announced that it will build a $12 billion plant in Arizona, to open by 2024. It expects the facility to employ roughly 1,600 people and indirectly generate thousands of other jobs.
5月15日，全球最大的代工晶片製造商臺積電（臺灣積體電路製造商）宣布將在美國的亞利桑那州投資120億美元，用以修建一座晶片廠，並計劃於2024年之前啟用。預計這項設施將僱傭1600名員工，並且將衍生出數以千計的其他就業機會。
At first blush, the announcement looks like a victory for the Trump administration, which has been pushing to disentangle its technology supply chain from China—both by regaining its high-tech manufacturing capacity from Asia and by cutting off its own equipment and intellectual property from Chinese tech giants like Huawei. But the impact of the TSMC deal is far from clear cut and instead highlights just how intertwined the countries』 supply chains really are.
乍看之下，這項宣言看上去就像是川普政府在使科技供應鏈與中國脫鉤的戰場中所取得的一次勝利。在其作戰計劃中，美國左右開弓，一面從將高新科技的製造能力從亞洲收回到美國，一面限制來自中國的競爭對手取得美國的自有設備以及智慧財產權。在這場戰役中，首當其衝受限的即是中國科技巨頭華為。但是此番臺積電的交易所產生的影響很難稱得上是清晰明確的，相反其更加凸顯了兩國在供應鏈方面是多麼盤根錯節，緊密相纏。
TSMC is one of only three manufacturers in the world that produce the most advanced computing chips—those containing transistors 10 nanometers or smaller. The other two are South Korea–based Samsung Electronics and US-based Intel, which mostly reserves its advanced chips for its own products. For comparison, China’s largest domestic chipmaker, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp. (SMIC), can’t produce anything smaller than 14-nanometer chips. Because of this, TSMC has increasingly found itself at the center of US-Chinese competition for technological dominance.
臺積電是世界上僅有的能生產最為先進的10納米及以下級別計算機晶片的三家製造商之一，另外兩家則分別是韓國的三星和總部在美國的英特爾，但這兩家產出的先進晶片大多都用於自己生產的產品之中。反觀中國，其國內最大的晶片廠商——中芯國際能生產的最精細的晶片也僅為14納米級。正因如此，臺積電也愈加意識到，在中美爭奪科技主導權的戰爭中，它正處於戰場的中心位置。
Among TSMC’s largest customers are both Apple and Huawei, which the US Department of Commerce placed on its so-called entity list last year. Huawei’s inclusion on the list, along with 114 of its related affiliates, banned US companies from selling their technology to those firms without a special license. The department said the decision was made on the grounds of national security. It’s no coincidence that Huawei also plays a critical role in China’s technological development and expansion overseas, especially with the country’s AI and 5G strategies.
臺積電最大的客戶是蘋果和華為這兩家科技巨頭，後者在去年被美國商務部列入了其所謂的實體清單之列。由於此舉，在沒有特殊許可證的情況下，美國公司都被禁止向華為及與其相關的114家附屬機構出售技術。商務部稱，這項決策是出於對國內的安全考量的基礎之上作出的。並非巧合的是，華為同樣在中國的科技進步以及海外擴張當中扮演了關鍵性的角色，尤其是在中國的AI 和 5G戰略布局層面。
But the initial blacklist didn’t affect TSMC because it is not a US company. This offered Huawei a loophole to continue accessing the cutting-edge chips used to power its smartphones, AI projects, and 5G networks. On May 15, hours after TSMC’s plant announcement, the Department of Commerce sought to tighten that loophole by updating its export rules. Under the expanded regulations, any non-American chip producers that use American chipmaking equipment must also obtain a special license in order to sell to Huawei. Because the US is one of only a handful of countries dominating the design and production of such high-precision manufacturing equipment, which can often cost north of $100 million per machine, the rules thus bind TSMC as well as other advanced chipmakers that would be hard pressed to find alternatives. This effectively places Huawei’s supply of chips under the US Commerce Department’s control. As of May 18, TSMC had already stopped accepting Huawei’s orders, according to Nikkei Asian Review.
但這最初的黑名單並沒有對臺機電產生影響，因為它不是一家美國公司。這給華為提供了一個空檔，使其可以繼續購買最先進的晶片，用以賦能其生產的智慧型手機，AI 項目 以及 5G 網絡。在5月15日當天，臺積電宣布將在美國設廠的數小時後，美國商務部就擴大了其出口方面的禁令，以堵住這個空檔。新的出口規定之下，任何非美國公司只要使用了美國的晶片生產設備，就都需要獲得特殊許可，才能向華為出售自己的產品。高精度晶片的生產設備的造假動輒上億美元，而美國是壟斷了這種設備的設計和製造的少數幾個國家之一。因此，新的規定就遏制住了包括臺積電在內的一眾晶片廠商向華為銷售產品的商業行為，華為也很難找到不在限制範圍內的其他供應商。這些措施將華為的晶片供應牢固地掌控在了美國商務部的手裡。根據日經亞洲周刊的報導，就在5月18日，臺積電已經停止了接納來自華為的訂單。
「Semiconductor equipment is the weak link in China’s supply chain that America is really zooming in on,」 says Neil Thomas, a senior research associate at the think tank Macro Polo, who studies US-China relations and the semiconductor supply chain. 「Huawei can design state-of-the-art chips, just as good as perhaps chips that Apple can design. But what China can’t do is actually build those chips.」
「半導體設備是中國供應鏈當中的薄弱環節，也是美國正在瞄準的點。」馬可波羅智庫研究中美關係和半導體供應鏈的高級研究員Neil Thomas說。「華為可以自行設計最為先進的晶片，並且很可能達到美國蘋果公司的晶片設計水準。但是中國沒有真正生產出這些晶片的能力。」
Within this context, the planned plant takes on additional meaning. On Monday, the blow intended for Huawei inadvertently struck TSMC, which saw its stock price slip by 2.5% along with other Huawei suppliers. Some analysts now foresee the US Commerce Department granting it a license to continue selling to Huawei anyway, in order to keep the company on good terms to carry out its $12 billion deal. Whether TSMC made its announcement with knowledge of the upcoming change to the export ban is unclear, but Reuters reported that the decision to locate the plant in the US has already generated 「good will」 within the department all the same.
在這樣的背景之下，臺積電新的晶片工廠就被賦予了額外的意義。就在周一，這項針對華為的打擊出其不意地衝擊了臺積電，其股價股價下跌了2.5%，華為的其他供應商股價也隨之下跌。一些分析師們現在預計美國商務部很可能會向臺積電頒發可以給華為進行銷售的特殊許可，這樣可以保持與臺積電的和睦關係，從而繼續實施它價值120億美元的建廠計劃。目前還不清楚臺積電作出在美國設立工廠的決策的時候，是否已經知道了出口限制令將要收緊，但是路透社的報導稱，無論如何，這項決策已經在各方之間創造了「善意」。
The plant will do little to affect US reliance on Asia-based manufacturing. It is slated to produce 20,000 wafers a month once it opens—only a small fraction of the 12 million wafers that TSMC made last year alone. And by the time the plant opens, the 5-nanometer chips that it is designed to produce will no longer be the most cutting-edge chips available. The company already has plans to move to 3-nanometer chips and smaller in its Taiwan-based plants during the next few years. Given the capital costs and time it would take to transition the Arizona plant to the latest technology, this means the US would still need to maintain its supply of chips from overseas plants to access the newest advancements.
實際上，即將投產的新工廠對降低美國對亞洲生產基地的依賴性收效甚微。建成之後的臺積電美國工廠每月可生產2萬個晶圓——這只是臺積電去年一年所產出的1200萬晶圓的零頭。並且，到工廠正式投入運用之時，計劃生產的5納米晶片也將不再是市面上最為尖端的晶片了。該公司已經計劃在未來的數年以內將臺灣的生產產能投入於生產3納米甚至更精細的晶片當中。也就是說，美國雖然在亞利桑那州的工廠投入了大量資本和時間，但其未來仍然需要依賴於海外工廠才能獲得最新的技術成果。
In other words, the plant will do nothing to disentangle the two countries』 supply chains from each other. 「It’s probably too small to really have any huge impact on the global picture,」 Thomas says.
換句話說，新投產的工廠在使兩國的供應鏈相互脫鉤方面不能起到任何作用。Thomas 認為，「就國際產業全貌來講，新建工廠的能量很可能太過微弱，以至於無法造成任何重大影響。「
If the expanded export ban did in fact hold, it could also introduce unintended consequences. China accounts for a lion’s share of the revenue for a number of American semiconductor companies, such as Qualcomm, which relies on the country for two-thirds of its income. In the long term, the lost sales to Huawei and potentially the broader Chinese market could slow US innovation in chipmaking. 「Capital expenditure and research and development are really high in the semiconductor industry—about 30% of total revenue,」 Thomas says.
如果新的出口禁令實施到位，那也將會為美國帶來意料之外的後果。中國佔據了美國半導體公司們的最大收入份額，例如高通公司，其三分之二的收入都來源於中國。長期來看，失去了華為的銷售額以及潛在的更為廣闊的中國市場，很可能會減緩美國晶片製造業的創新發展。「研發部門的投入在半導體行業中的佔比非常之高，約佔據總收入的30％，」 Thomas介紹到。
In recent years, the trade war has spurred China to double down on investing in its semiconductor industry. On the same day as the US government’s updated export ban, the Chinese government announced a $2.2 billion injection into its largest domestic chipmaker, SMIC. The country’s hope is that Chinese chipmakers will catch up to the state of the art within a few years and complete its domestic supply chain for cutting-edge computing hardware. In the interim, Huawei would rely on the TSMC chips that it has been stockpiling for a year, in anticipation of further US restrictions.
近年來，中美之間的貿易戰刺激了中國，使其加倍了自身的半導體產業的投資力度。就在美國宣布將要升級其出口禁令的當天，中國政府就宣布對國內最大的晶片製造商中芯國際注資22億美元。中國希望自身的晶片製造業能夠在數年內追趕上國際最先進水平，並且能夠由此完善國內尖端水平計算機硬體的全產業鏈。在此期間，華為將會依靠已經積累的臺積電晶片庫存來維持一年的產能，用以應對將會到來的來自於美國的更多的限制策略。
Thomas says there are still a lot of unknowns as to how this will shake out. 「The uncertainty is to what extent China can innovate itself out of this dilemma,」 he says.
Thomas認為在這次的震蕩當中，仍然有非常多的不確定性，「尚不確切的是，中國將在何種程度上成功地運用其創新能力，以走出現在的兩難困境，」他如此說到。
Either way, TSMC’s Arizona plant isn’t so much a signal of the Trump administration’s success in reshoring high-tech manufacturing. Instead, its presence highlights a complicated network of relationships that may eventually be severed on China’s terms rather than the US’s.
無論如何，臺積電在亞利桑那州的建廠計劃，對於川普政府的使高科技製造業回流本國的戰略而言，都不是一個有充足份量的良好信號。相反的是，這步舉措更加曝光了高科技產業鏈當中的錯綜複雜的關係網絡，這可能使中國最終獲益，而不是美國。
The US is taking a 「gamble,」 Thomas says.
美國正在參與一場「賭博」，Thomas如此總結到。
作者：Karen Hao
原載：2020年5月19日 麻省理工科技評論