2020年的末尾，法言法語洞穴奇案專輯也迎來尾聲。今日，我們一起來看一下最後一位法官，邦德法官「利益衝突」的觀點。
I.
I must reduce myself from this case. When I was in private practice forty-five years ago, a partner in my firm argued unsuccessfully against the validity of a patent on a voltage meter used in the manufacture of the kind of batteries used in the radio by these spelunkers. A private investigator hired in part with my own funds confirms that batteries of the kind used by the spelunkers 50 years ago in their radio are routinely tested by the type of meter that was the subject of the patent controversy.
I would stop here and rest in silence, but more than one colleague has privately objected to my decision. They cite two grounds: first, that my connection to the patent litigation is too remote to warrant recusal, and second, that the batteries are not relevant to this case. I make no comment on the first ground. In our Common-wealth, judges may properly recuse themselves if in conscience they sense a real or apparent conflict of interest, even if other sensitive and informed people do not perceive it. The dictates of one man’s conscience need not be shared by another; if it were otherwise, exemptions on grounds of conscience would not play the role in our law that they do.
On the second ground, however, I take the unusual step of explaining my reasons for recusal in some detail. In a case of this legal significance, followed with such close attention by the media, it is imperative to satisfy the parties and the public that I am not simply retreating from a difficult decision. I will limit these comments to those strictly necessary to show the relevancy of the batteries, so that I may avoid abusing my recusal by abstaining from the decision while offering an opinion at the same time. Unfortunately, however, the only way I know to explain the relevancy of the batteries is, while compelling, not brief.
II.
My colleagues to a person are either sure that this killing was willful or sure that it was not willful. The warmth of this disagreement ought itself be a clue that perhaps they are arguing about policy, not words. The term 「willful」 as applied to killings has a certain canonical, standard meaning. The core of the settled, standard meaning of the term refers to premeditation,intent,and voluntariness.
But like every other adjective, such as 「bald」 or 「tall」, this term has an indeterminately large area of open texture where we cannot be sure that it does, or does not, properly apply. If a man’s hairline has receded just so far, then we may call him 「bald」 or 「not bald」, at our pleasure, and not expect to hear anyone accuse us of misusing the language.
This case falls into the open texture of the term「willful」.We may call this killing 「willful」 or 「not willful」 without missing the term.The disagreement of learned judges,all native speakers of the language, establishes this immediately. (How plain can the plain meaning of the word be if Burnham and Goad think 「willful」 accurately describes this killing and Springham and Hellen do not?) But if the killing may be called 「willful」 or 「not willful」 with equal fidelity to the language, then this shows that we may no longer expect guidance in our decision from the word 「willful.」
But if we can expect no further guidance from the term 「willful」, then we can expect no guidance from the murder statute, for it convicts or acquits defendants solely through the concept of willfulness (when, as here, the taking of life is conceded). This is a case, then, in which our laws are uncharacteristically silent and unhelpful. This, then, is a perfect example of what is often called a hard case.
The only way to decide a hard case, where the relevant laws are vague or inconsistent or silent, is to find a standard external to the law. This is not a cynical or incendiary statement; it simply spells out the consequences of hardness in the present sense. Hard cases mean that the law is unhelpful, and the unhelpfulness of the law means that discretion is unavoidable, and discretion means that extra-legal standards must come into play. Resort to a standard external to the law, however, frightens colleagues of a certain political bent, for it opens the door to judicial legislation-a professional sin in most nations, but also a cause of past revolution, bloodshed, and misery in our own.
But every hard case unavoidably opens this door. It is opened by the nature of things, for human legislators cannot capture the complexity of life in a net of rules. Even if legislators were not limited in their wisdom, they would be limited by their language. Legislators must express their rules in words, and words by their nature have settled meanings at the core and open texture at the periphery; and inevitably scenarios of life will arise that fall with the open texture. In this case the legislature failed to elaborate to a sufficiently fine level of detail the state of mind that the Commonwealth must prove before it convicts a defendant of murder. In other hard cases the insufficiency of articulation shows up at other points. But no conceivable finite addendum to our criminal code would suffice to cover without vagueness or open texture all the cases that actually arise in life.
My colleagues who fear judicial discretion, therefore, are like people who fear death. They fear the inevitable. The remedy is not to rail against the inevitable, a patently infantile response, but to quiet our fears, acknowledge the unavoidable role for discretion, and take pains to avoid abusing our discretion. Description does indeed contain the risk of judicial usurpation or abuse, but when exercised responsibly it need not rise to usurpation itself.
Justice Reckon’s opinion neatly but inadvertently embodies my thesis. He fears judicial discretion, under the name of judicial legislation, and criticizes Justice Hellen for turning to it. But he proves that it is unavoidable by turning to it himself. For if Hellen’s conclusions about poverty, social justice, and the responsibility of the state reflect her political ideology more than current law, then what we shall say of Reckon’s proposal to abolish mental excuses, his preference for an exceptionless rule of strict liability, and even the priority he gives to the social goal of crime reduction?
For Burnham and Reckon, discretion is objectionable because it does not tie a judge’s hands; on the contrary, it leaves judges free. But if Burnham and Reckon could have their way, and magically prevent judges from using any methods that left reasonable people free to disagree, then they would bring the administration of justice to a standstill, even if they could first replace all judges they regard as usurpers with judges more to their liking. In that regime, judges could only apply those laws that could be applied mechanically. But can anybody produce even one example of such a law? Judges could not apply any statute in which even one word required interpretation, and certainly could not adjudicate hard cases. Can this forced requirement be the 「proper role」 of judges they speak so much of? (See Burnham at p. 43, and Reckon at p. 97, above.)
Justice Springham argues that statutory interpretation, while not mechanical, is guided by standards, and that because the law already contains all the relevant standards, we need not resort to discretion or extra-legal norms in order to adjudicate even hard cases. This is to say that the law is never vague, silent, or inconsistent, but exceedingly vast and complex. But we are on the verge of quibbling about words. For if, on the one hand, the standards already in the law do not force a single decision mechanically, then the judge is free in a way that is well captured by the word 「discretion.」 And if, on the other hand, the standards already in the law do force a decision, entirely without the aid of any extra-legal norms, then the process is really mechanical. The process may not be mechanical in practice because finite human judges lack the time, capacity, erudition, and resources to bring together, and hold together, all the factors from the vastness of law whose vector is the one correct outcome. But if so, then it is pointless to insist that the law already contains all the relevant standards, even if true; for finite human judges will be unable to ascertain them all and must still creatively develop applicable standards as the law were vague, silent, or inconsistent. And this creative development of standards is, also, well captured by the word 「discretion.」
Although I have distinguished discretion from usurpation in order to console those who fear discretion, I believe it is more constructive to replace this fear with hope and hard work than to console it. I do not fear discretion at all, but welcome it. Discretion, and discretion alone, gives us a chance to find where justice lies in hard cases where (again, by definition) the law is vague, silent, or inconsistent. If a hard case is one that the legislature did not foresee or decide by its legislative language, then the hardness of the case means that judges will examine for the first time the issues the case raises, if anybody is to examine them. This makes discretion a precious opportunity to find justice, not a distressing risk of usurpation. Discretion allows us to face squarely the features that make a case difficult and to craft a resolution that fits those unique and difficult facts.
Someone might argue that this case was not entirely unforeseen by the legislature. In the wake of Spelunkers I, several proposals to amend the murder statute were raised in the legislature. In defeating them, the legislature was saying, in effect, that the present murder statute is adequate to deal with such unusual circumstances. By contrast, there was no basis to make this claim of legislative intent in Spelunkers I. While this position has a factual basis in legislative consciousness of the spelunking dilemma, it does not establish what the legislative intent is with the specificity required to make discretion unnecessary. Did the legislature intend that spelunkers in this situation be convicted of murder and be executed? We cannot say. It appears that a legislative majority was satisfied with the outcome of Spelunkers I. But the legislature’s non-action could be due to the fact that the bloc wishing to amend the statute to insure guilty verdicts in case of this kind was offset and neutralized by the bloc wishing to insure not-guilty verdicts. Moreover, the legislature knew that the language of the statute supported several reasonable theories of acquittal. Hence, even a clear majority satisfied with the outcome of Spelunkers I had a good reason to amend the statute to make its intention unmistakable in the future. Therefore, the legislature’s non-amendment of the statute either raises doubt about the majority’s position, or it throws ue back to the uncertainty faced by our colleagues in Spelunkers I. Either way, we must ignore the complexity introduced by explicit non-amendment and deliberate as if legislature had no intention for this case capable of guiding us.
If we try to minimize discretion, we end up relying on tenuous clues to the legislature’s intent, belabored and over-interpreted, or rules intended for other branches of law, refracted by analogy, all to support our wishful thinking that the legislature did in fact have an intention for cases of this kind. But what we know about the present case, once we know that it is hard, is that the actual historical legislature never dreamed of this case, and never examined the issues raised by this case, and never decided that the defendants in such cases were, or were not, to be punished as murderers. Therefore in hard cases legislative intent is nonexistent and judicial examination of the facts and issues is the only possible path to justice.
This view of direction has the virtue of answering an objection raised by Justice Keen. He believed that the statute requires us to convict the spelunkers, even if we have moral reservations about doing so. While he admitted to these moral reservation himself (at p. 24, above), he took a certain delight in finding the four defendants in Spelunkers I guilty. He even insisted that for judges to enforce the bad consequences of bad law has 「a certain moral value by bringing home to the people their own responsibilities toward the law that is ultimately their creation, and by reminding them that there is no principle of personal grace that can relieve the mistakes of their representatives」 (p. 24, above). In short, judges ought to lend their weight to the injustice of unjust legislation, for then the people will wake up and pressure the legislature to change the laws; this is better, he argued, than for the judges to change the laws themselves, as if these were the only alternatives.
The merit of direction, however, is that it does not 「change」 the law so much as render its indeterminate fringes determinate. How the law applies to one kind of unforeseen case is then settled rather than still unsettled. This is a proper job for the judiciary, because it requires the application of general norms to particular cases. If the legislature did perform the law, it would leave new areas of open texture, requiring future exercises of judicial discretion. Keen tried to live up to his abstract principle by executing four defendants. That did indeed wake up the public, which called for a change of law, although without success. But surely in a Commonwealth civilized enough to settle its disputes in a court of law, we do not bring about legal change through human sacrifice.
III.
Having found discretion unavoidable, and welcome, even if dangerous, I would then have undertaken a thorough investigation of the relevant moral and political principles that might inform the discretion of a good judge facing the present case. But to stick to those needed to show the relevancy of the radio batteries, I must detail only one small part of that investigation.
As more than one colleague has already found relevant to this case, the government of our Commonwealth was founded upon an explicit contract made by the survivors of the holocaust in the first period following the Great Spiral (see, e.g. ,pp. 12, 55, 81, above). But, as all contract philosophers observe, a government cannot originate in a social contract unless the original parties to that contract can withdraw from the nation or sovereign that previously held them, dissolving the bands of one government in order to forge new ones. But if our ancestors could withdraw from their former nation or sovereign, then modern Newgarthians may do likewise, for another principle of the contract view of law holds that the members of the founding generation shall not enjoy more liberty than their descendants
This leads me to pick up a theme first aired by Justice Foster, that these spelunkers drew up for themselves, in their cave, as it were, a new charter of government"(at p. 11, above). But I will be more direct and explicit: these spelunkers withdrew from the sovereignty of Newgarth and formed a new social contract inside the cave. A nation with a different history might scoff at our willingness to entertain such a theory. But to Newgarthians, the spectacle of men seceding from one nation to start another is not just a story of surpassing patriotic and mythopoeia power, but our most fundamental method of explaining to one another our obligation to obey the law through principles of consent and contract. For us, the obligation to obey is not eternal, deriving from reason or heaven. It turns on material events that arose at one point in our history, and might arise again. It is the rhythm of secession and establishment renunciation and reunion, revolution and restoration, that explains law and nationhood for us, and that we see in microcosm in the present case.
In short, the spelunkers performed a peaceful revolution inside the cave. Now in deciding what to make of this fact, I must be cautious not to exceed my mandate and give a full opinion for example, asserting that their peaceful revolution means that they were no longer subject to Newgarth' s criminal law.
Before the men made the pact that I am calling a new social contract, they asked by radio or a legal ruling on their lottery plan (see p 8, above). This indicates a willingness, even an eagerness, to follow Newgarthian law. But the silence of the Commonwealth in response to their query rings like a bell. In response to the sillence of the state, the men turned off their radio and decided for themselves whether to adopt a new covenant with one another different from the covenant under which they had previously lived in Newgarth. Three days after they voluntarily turned off their radio, they killed Roger Whetmore (see p. 8, above). During those three days, I contend, the men solemnized their secession from the laws of Newgarth and their establishment of an alternative code under which to live and die.
I can imagine three objections to this account:
1. The men could not have intended to secede and form a new nation if they sought by radio to know and obey the laws of Newgarth.
This objection ignores the order of events.Yes, the men did initially seek to follow our laws. But when they received no help from us in doing so, they made a new and different decision, and they never again showed any curiosity about the requirements of our laws. Not only was their initial willingness reversed by later events, the events that led them to change their minds are manifestly the responsibility of the Commonwealth. Speaking broadly for the judges and officials of our state, we must accept responsibility for turning these men away from the doors of our law. Our clergy are equally guilty of failing to respond to the spelunkers』 question (see p. 8, above). These two failures together left the spelunkers with no norms of church or state to guide their decisions, leaving later events, the events that led them to change their minds are manifestly the responsibility of the Commonwealth. Speaking broadly for the judges and officials of our state, we must accept responsibility for turning these men away from the doors of our law. Our clergy are equally guilty of failing to respond to the spelunker’s question (see p. 8, above). These two failures together left the spelunkers with no norms of church or state to guide their decisions, leaving them to rely on norms of their own devising -a new social contract.
2. The cost of the rescue was underwritten in part by a legislative grant of hundreds of thousands of frelars (see p 7, above).This shows the Commonwealth taking responsibility for the men as if they still belonged to our society.
This objection is easily answered. At best it shows the attitude of the Commonwealth not that of the men. The spelunkers might have made their revolution effective and complete without the consent of Newgarth; indeed, Newgarth's consent would make revolution unnecessary. Second, the Commonwealth funds were apparently not expended until the private funds of the Speluncean Society were exhausted (see p.7, above), showing our legislature anxious to avoid spending public moneys on the rescue until absolutely necessary. Third, the Commonwealth might well spend public moneys to rescue foreign citizens trapped inside a cave in our Central Plateau without conscripting the unlucky explorers to Newgarthian citizenship.
3. Finally it might be objected that a Newgarthian judge on the scene might not have been able to condense our law into a sentence suitable for transmitting as the answer to the spelunkers』 radio question. The spelunkers asked whether it would be advisable to throw dice in order to select a member of their party to kill and eat (at p 8, above). My own view of open texture and discretion, as well as our several disagreements, suggest that Newgarthian law has no easy or obvious answer to the spelunkers' question. So a judge on the scene could not have answered their question without misleading them on the state of our law. Hence the objection would go, we cannot blame Newgarth for its radio silence, which might have been more helpful and comforting than the disputations disquisitions of nine Supreme Court justices
This objection, while apparently strong, is beside the point and easily answered. First, no official of our government even tried to answer the spelunker’s question. We would have a very different case if an official had offered advice that the men followed but that the members of this Court found contrary to the actual dictates of our law, or if an official had given correct advice but the spelunkers had not followed it. In fact, however, no attempt was made. Second the issue here is not whether it would have been easy to give an accurate answer to the men’s question; it is whether the men had a reason to turn from Newgarthian law to laws of their own creation inside the cave. The state's radio silence, even if somehow justified or superior to the alternative, operated as just such a reason, throwing the men onto their own resources for coping with their situation
Justice Tatting attempted to reduce Justice Fosters incipient version of this thesis to absurdity by asking (at p. 15, above), 「If these men passed from the jurisdiction of our law…, at what moment did this occur? Was it when the entrance to the cave was blocked, or when the threat of starvation reached a certain undefined degree of intensity, or when the agreement for the throwing of the dice was made?Foster might have had difficulty answering this question, for in fact he wavered inconsistently between the views that this killing occurred in the state of nature (at p. 11, above)and that it occurred under a new charter of government (at p. 11, above).But as refined here his theory provides a most Clear and compelling answer: the men passed from the jurisdiction of our law when they agreed to throw the dice, for that was the moment they adopted the pact that formed their new and superseding social contract. Similarly, Tatting facetiously wondered (at p. 15, above) whether the men were beyond our jurisdiction" because of the thickness of the rock that imprisoned them, or because they were hungry, or because they had set up a 「new charter of government』 by which the usual rules of law were to be supplanted by a throw of the dice. Again the answer is clearly the third on Tatting's list. If Foster had lived up to the theory implicit in his phrase, 「new charter of government,」 instead of confusing that sort of revolution with a return to a state of nature or if Tatting had remembered the sufficiency of contract to establish a sovereign state which all good Newgarthians learn in elementary school,then Tatting would not have thought his weak rhetorical questions amounted to a reductio ad absurdum.
When the starving men could not learn what Newgarth law required of them, they decided what to require of themselves. This reading of the case shifts the focus from the spelunkers rights-for example, Springham s right of self- preservation or Trumpet’s right of equality -to their responsibility to create a code of conduct and live loyally and consistently up to its terms. It is a needed corrective to the one-sided view that rights trump all other considerations including responsibilities.It shows that rights and responsibilities are so intimately reciprocal that they can be established in the same act of consent and reflected in the same throw of dice
I need not reach many auxiliary questions here, such as whether their new code of conduct derived properly from the consent of those to be governed by it. If I were writing a full opinion, and not merely the fragment needed to show the relevancy of the batteries, I would fully explore the question whether Whetmore revoked his consent to the new pact; whether, if so, the spelunkers killed a citizen of Newgarth,thereby bringing their act within the jurisdiction of our laws; whether the very idea of revoking consent to a social contract evokes too much of the old individualism to be reconciled with the idea of a social contract itself (as if individuals constituted, rather than were constituted by, their societies); whether the spelunkers' acceptance of Newgarthian government services while in the cave-the subsidized portion of the rescue establishes their tacit consent to Newgarthian laws; and whether the rationality that drove them toward their new state of law is Justice Reckon's pitifully shrunken and technical sort, Goad's sentimental hybrid, or the more full-bodied kind exercised by our ancestors when they formed the contract that underlies our Commonwealth.
IV.
This argument turns critically on the change of mind that we infer must have taken place in the spelunkers after the Commonwealth met their radio question with silence. If there was no change of mind, then the spelunkers' initial willingness to know and obey Newgarthian law persisted and we would have little reason to suppose that the men turned from our law to form a new social contract.
Now we know that after the state refused to answer the spelunkers' question, the trapped men made no further radio broadcasts (Truepenny at p 8, above). Those in the rescue camp believed the radio batteries inside the cave must have gone dead, but this proved to be incorrect (p. 8, above). If the batteries had truly died, then we would not know what to infer from their radio silence; it could signify a change of mind or a failure of equipment. The men might have asserted at trial that they changed their mind inside the cave and created a new state, but we could always suspect that they were fabricating or the sake of tactical advantage. But because we know the batteries still held their charge, we know that the spelunkers' radio silence was deliberate and voluntary. This fact supports our view that they turned their backs on Newgarthian law, after it turned its back on them, and drew up their own code of conduct to deal with their plight. It supports the view that the men effected a peaceful revolution
This reading of the case puts uppermost our historic principle of deriving law from consent and contract, and yet depends essentially on the batteries in the spelunkers' radio. If the batteries had expired, our reading would be compatible with the known facts but entirely conjectural. Now I am careful not to say that this reading is the true one, and draw the consequence for the defendant’s guilt or innocence. For I have waived my right to rule on the facts of the case. I conclude only that the capacity of these batteries to hold their charge is relevant to the outcome of the case, and hence that my entanglement with past litigation concerning equipment to test and monitor that capacity forces me to recuse myself.
I regretfully abstain.
The Supreme Court, being evenly divided, the conviction and sentence of the Court of General Instances is affirmed. It is ordered that the execution of the sentence shall occur at 6 am.,Friday, April 3, 4350, at which time the Public Executioner is directed to proceed with all convenient dispatch to hang the defendant by the neck until he is dead.
案件疑難意味著法律幫不上忙，欠缺法律規定意味著自由裁量權無可避免，自由裁量權意味著超乎法律之外的道德標準必須納入到案件解決的過程中來。
我迴避的理由
這個案子我得迴避。四十五年前，當我還在做執業律師的時候，我的律師事務所的一位原合伙人代理了一件案子，主張一種電壓表的專利不能成立，這種電壓表被用於製造洞穴探險者的無限電設備所使用的電池，但是官司輸掉了。部分由我個人的資金聘請的一位私家偵探證實，有專利權爭議的這種電壓表，常被用來例行檢測五十年前探險者們的無限電設備裡使用的那種電池的電量。
我本可以就此打住，不再做聲。但是，不止一位我的同事私下裡反對過我的決定。他們基於兩個方面的理由：第一，我跟這個專利權訴訟的案子實在沒有什麼關聯，不應當迴避；第二，那種電池跟這個案子本身沒關係。對於第一個理由，我不做評論。在我們聯邦裡，法官憑自己的良心，只要覺得真是有或者明顯有利益衝突，自己就可以迴避，即便其他敏感人士或者知悉此事的人並不這麼看。來源於一個人良心的指令，不同的人並不必然相同。即便相同，憑良心去迴避也得不到我們法律的支持，我們的法律只支持有法律理由的迴避。
但是，在第二個方面，我非同尋常地詳細解釋了我迴避的理由。面對這樣一個媒體密切關注的具有重大法律意義的案件，我必須說清楚我不是害怕面對一個困難的判決。這樣，各政黨和公眾才會理解我。我只講那些非常必要的理由，把與電池的關係說清楚就行了。我不會濫用迴避權。否則，雖然名義上不插手判決，但實際上還是給出了我自己的意見。然而事與願違，關於與電池關聯度的說明，還是沒法做到簡短。
自由裁量權不可避免
這是一樁疑難案。
我的同事各有各的看法，有的認為這起殺人行為屬故意，有的認為這起殺人行為並非故意。不同觀點的截然對立本身也足以證明，他們爭論的是政策，而不是語詞。用來修飾限定謀殺的「故意」一詞有一種規範的，標準的含義。就既定和標準的含義而言，其核心意思在於有預謀、有意向和自願。但是正如其他每個形容詞一樣——比如，「禿頭的」或者「個高的」——這個詞的外延開放，使用範圍很寬，確定不下來。因此，我們不敢肯定這個詞是不是使用正確。如果一個人的發沿已經往後退了很多，我們可以稱他「禿頭」或者「不算禿頭」。我們愛怎麼就怎麼，不會去想有人指責我們說錯了話。
這個案子恰恰就涉及「故意」這個詞使用範圍的開放性。我們稱這起殺人行為是「故意」或者「非故意」，都不會導致誤用這個詞。法官們的歧見也充分證明了這一點。要知道，法官們都學問精深，使用的又是母語。（如果伯納姆和戈德法官認為「故意」一詞用來形容這起殺人行為很正確，而斯普林漢姆和海倫法官的看法相反，那麼這個詞清楚的含義究竟有多清楚呢？但是，如果在語言上把這起殺人行為稱為「故意」或者「非故意」都同樣忠實於事實的話，那麼這表明，我們不能再指望從「故意」這個詞當中獲得下判決的什麼指引了。
然而，我們關於謀殺的法律條文正是通過「故意」這個概念來認定有罪或者宣告無罪的（在應該剝奪生命的時候，正如這個案件）。如果我們不指望從「故意」這個詞中獲得進一步的指引，那麼我們也不能指望從立法當中獲得什麼指引。在這起案件中，我們的法律十分例外地插不上話，束手無策。這麼看來，這是我們稱為「疑難案件」的一個極好範例.
法律允許負責地適用自由裁量
給一個相關法律規定模糊、不一致或者法律沒有規定的疑難案件下判決，唯一的辦法就是找到法律之外的一個道德標準。這並不是嘲諷或者煽動的說法。眼下，它不過是清楚說明了案件疑難的後果。案件疑難意味著法律幫不上忙，欠缺法律規定意味著自由裁量權無可避免，自由裁量權意味著超乎法律之外的道德標準必須納入到案件解決的過程中來。然而，求助於一個法律之外的道德標準，把那些具有某種政治傾向性的同事給嚇壞了，因為這個方法打開了通向法官造法的大門——在很多國家裡，這是一個職業上的禁忌，也是我們過去革命、流血和痛苦的一個緣由。
但是每一個這樣的疑難案件都不可避免地打開了這扇門。這扇門其實是事情本身的性質決定的：立法者也是人，他不可能用一張法律之網將複雜多樣的生活盡數囊括其中。即便立法者匯海無邊，他們也會受到自身語言的限制。立法者必須用語詞來表述他們的規則，但是由於其質的規定性，語詞所蘊涵的語意無非包括其核心意思和周邊開放空間所包含的意思。生活的種種情節不可避免地會落入這種語詞周邊含義構成的開放空間中去。在本案遇到的情形當中，立法者沒有細緻充分地闡明紐卡斯國在判決被告人犯有謀殺罪時所必須證明的心理狀態。在另外一些疑難案件中，立法表述不夠精細的問題還有別的一些表現。但是，沒有任何一種可能的刑法典修正案可以充分涵蓋生活中的全部可能性，可以徹底修正原先立法中的語詞模糊和外延開放的問題。
因此，我的那些害怕司法自由裁量權的同事，就像那些怕死的人一樣。他們都在害怕無法避免的事情。解決的辦法不在於對不可避免的情勢嚴加防範——這是明顯幼稚的應對措施——而在於平息我們的恐懼，承認自由裁量權不可避免，竭盡全力去避免濫用自由裁量權。自由裁量權確實含有法官冒用或濫用的風險，但是負責任地運用它，並不會必然變成自由裁量權的冒用。
雷肯法官的意見恰巧無意中體現了我的觀點。他害怕以司法造法為名義的自由裁量權，並批評海倫法官求助於它。但是他自己又求助於它，說明了自由裁量權無法避免的。因為如果海倫有關貧窮、社會正義和國家責任的結論反映了她的政治意識形態而不是當下的法律，那麼雷肯關於廢除心理免責事由的建議、對於無例外嚴格責任規則的偏愛，乃至他賦予減少犯罪目標的優先性，又是什麼呢？
對於伯納姆和雷肯而言，自由裁量權是要不得的。不是因為它礙手礙腳，正相反，是因為它法官無拘無束。但是如果按照伯納姆和雷肯的意思辦，並不可思議地不讓法官採用一種允許通情達理的人自由提出異議的方法，司法的事業將會走向停滯，即便他們可能會拿更符合他們喜好的法官來替換掉他們認為是僭越者的法官。在這種情形下，法官們只會適用那些可以機械適用的法律。但是有人可以舉出這種法律的例子嗎？只要有一個字需要解釋便不能適用法律條文的法官們，當然也是判不了疑難案件的。這樣被迫退避三舍，難道就是他們津津樂道的法官們應當扮演的適當角色嗎？
斯普林漢姆法官辯解說，成文法的解釋，若不屬機械解釋，則是在一些標準的指引下進行的；因為法律已經包含了所有相關的標準，我們不需要求助於自由裁量權或者法律之外的別的規範來判決，即使是疑難案件亦復如是。這就是說，法律絕不會有模糊、缺位和不一致之處，相反它是無所不包、複雜精緻的。但是我們有點咬文嚼字。因為，一方面，當依已經存在於法律當中的標準，無需機械判斷時，法官是自由的，而這恰恰就是「自由裁量權」的題中應有之義。另一方面，當依已經存在於法律中的標準，需要做出判斷而無需法外規範襄助時，這個過程確實是機械的。但是，在司法實務中，這個過程不會是機械的，因為法官也是人，他們的時間、能力、學時和才略不足以將卷帙浩繁的法律中的所有相關因素聚合起來，並最終水到渠成地得到一個正確的結果。不過，如果真能這樣，堅持說法律已經包含了所有相關的標準——就算這些標準是對的——仍然毫無意義。因為法官是人，能力有限，他設法弄清所有這些標準，在法律模糊、有漏洞或者前後矛盾的情況下，法官們還必須創造地開發出一些可資適用的標準。新設創造性的標準，也恰恰是「自由裁量權」的題中應有之義。
儘管我已經將自由裁量權同僭越司法權區分開來以安撫那些害怕自由裁量權的人，我還是相信比起安撫恐懼感來說，更有建設性的是用信心和勤奮來消滅這種恐懼。我一點也不擔憂自由裁量權，相反我歡迎它。自由裁量權本身足以讓我們發現在法律模糊、缺位、不一致造成的疑難案件中（根據定義），恰當的判決存在於何處。如果一個疑難案件是由於立法者不曾預見或者不曾立法語言做出決斷造成的，那麼這個案子的疑難意味著法官將「第一次」檢視這個案件帶來的爭議焦點，如果確實必須要有人去檢視的話。這就使得自由裁量權成為一種發現恰當判決何在的寶貴機會，而不是一個令人沮喪的可能會僭越司法權的冒險行動。自由裁量權讓我們直接面對讓一個案件變得困難的特別之處，並針對個案和難點提出解決方案。
也許有人會反駁說，這種案件並非完全不為司法機關所預見。在探險者案I發生後，建議修改有關殺人罪的立法提案已經提給了立法機關。立法機關在反對意見中說，實質上，現行關於殺人罪的立法足以對付這些不尋常的情形。比較起來，在探險者案I中，沒有理由做出這種目的的聲明。儘管因為立法機關意識到了洞穴困境，所以這種觀點是有事實基礎的，但它並不意味著確切的立法目的要使得自由裁量權成為不必要。立法機關的本意是在這種情形下探險者有罪應當被處決？我們不敢下這個結論。看起來，立法者多數對探險者案I的結論是滿意的。但是，有遊說團體希望修改立法以確保對這類案件能做出有罪判決，也有遊說團體希望判決無罪；立法機關未修改法律可能是因為這兩種影響互相抵銷和中和掉了。另外，立法機關知道，法律條文的字面含義是支持應無罪開釋的幾種合理說法的。基於此，對探險者案I的結論滿意的多數派，有理由修改法律條文，以確保其立法意旨將來不會被誤解。因此，立法機關不修改法律要麼會讓人們懷疑多數派的立場到底是什麼，要麼讓我們又去面對探險者案中我的同事們所面對的不確定性。不管是哪一種，我們必須忽略這種明確沒有修改法律所造成的複雜問題，思考問題時假設立法者沒有表明任何可以指引我們的立法目的。如果要縮小自由裁量權，那麼我們無法依靠寥寥無幾的幾個被反覆討論過並被擴大解釋的表明立法者意圖的細節，也無法依靠有所歪曲的對其他法律部門的規則的類比——所有這一切都是為了支持我們一相情願的想法：認為立法機關事實上的確對這類案件有某種傾向性。但是，一旦我們確認這是一個「疑難案件」後，就眼下這個我們所知的，是立法機關事實上從未預想到此案，不曾研究過這個案子中的爭議焦點，也不曾就被告在這類案件中是不是殺人犯、應否受到懲罰下過結論。因此，在疑難案件中，立法機關的傾向性不存在，對於法官來說，針對事實和爭議焦點的司法考量才是唯一可行的出路。
關於自由裁量權的這個觀點可以很好地回答基恩法官提出來的質疑。他認為，成文法要求我們治探險者的罪，但即便這麼做，我們在道德上也對此有所保留。當他承認他自己在道德上有所保留的時候，他似乎因為治了探險者案I中四個被告的最而感到有點高興。他甚至堅持認為，對於法官而言，不問後果地執行惡法。「也許具有特定道德價值，因為它可以使人民認識到自己對最終意義上由自己創造的法律應承擔的責任，並提醒他們沒有任何個人的恩典能減輕他們的代表所犯的錯誤」。簡言之，法官應當盡力促成不公正立法所造成的非正義。只有這時人們才可能清醒，才會迫使立法機關改變所立之法。他辯解道，這樣做比法官自己來改變法律規定要好，好像這兩者是非此即彼的。
好在自由裁量權有個好處，它不會在很大程度上「改造」法律，讓不確定的邊緣地帶也變得確定。藉助自由裁量權，如何把法律適用於某種尚未預見的案件的方案，就可確定下來了，而不是相反。這是司法權幹的事兒，因為它是把一般性規範適用到具體的案件當中去。如果立法機關的確修訂了法律，這仍會留下新的開放性的解釋空間，還是需要運用司法自由裁量權才能解決問題。基恩力圖靠他那些抽象的原則來將四名被告正法。這樣做的確會喚起公眾的注意，並進而促使修訂法律，儘管修法不會成功。要知道，在一個文明進化已達相當程度、可以在法院之內解決爭議的國家裡，我們不會通過人的犧牲來換取法律的改進。
新「社會契約」源自被當前法律的拒絕
上面已經證實，儘管自由裁量權有危險性，但是它仍是不可避免且值得歡迎的。現在，我應該仔仔細細地研究些相關的道德和政治原則了。這些原則對審理本案的好法官的自由裁量權可能會有指引作用。但是，為了將論述的範圍僅限於無線電電池之於本案的相關性，我只能詳述這個研究當中的一小部分。
不止一個同事發現這一事實與本案有關聯，即從大螺旋之後第一階段之中的浩劫裡活過來的人訂立了明明白白的契約，建立了我們的聯邦政府。但是，正如所有的社會契約理論家認識到的那樣，除非原來訂立契約的各方有權退出他們所在的國家或者主權範圍，解除同原先政府的關係以同別的政府建立新關係，否則一張社會契約是不能造就一個政府的。但是，如果我們的先人可以從他們原先的國家或者主權國那裡脫離出來，那麼現在的紐卡斯國國民也可以這麼幹。因為，還有一種社會契約學說認為，建國的那一代人並不會擁有比他們的後代更多的自由。
說到這裡，我要引用福斯特法官宣揚的論調。他是第一個宣揚這種論調的人。他認為，這些探險者在他們的洞穴裡為他們自己擬定了一個所謂新的政府憲章。可我說得更直接、更明白：這些探險者脫離了紐卡斯國的統治並在洞穴裡建立了一個新的社會契約。一個擁有不同歷史的國家也許會嘲笑我們竟抱有這樣的理論。但是對於紐卡斯國人民來說，人們退出一個國家並建立一個新國家的場景，並非是一個愛國故事或者神話傳說，而是我們用來告訴大家我們遵守法律是因為合意和契約的最基本辦法。對於我們而言，我們遵守法律的義務並非絕對，並非源於理性理性或者上天。這個義務源於在某個時間點上發生的實實在在的歷史事件，這類事件可能還會再次發生。正是這種退出與重建、放棄和重聚、革命和復闢，說明著我們的法律和國籍，在眼下這個案件中我們也能看到其微觀體現。
簡而言之，探險者在洞穴裡展開了一場和平的革命。在決定這是什麼造成的時候。我必須小心謹慎，不能跨越我的許可權給出一個絕對的意見，比如，斷言這種不流血革命意味著他們不再歸紐卡斯國的刑法管轄。
在他們制定我稱為社會契約的那個章程時，他們通過無線電請求聽到對他們抽籤計劃的法律評價。這表明他們願意，甚至是渴望，遵循紐卡斯國的法律。他們提出要求的鈴聲響過了，但是聯邦沒有回應他們的詢問。他們見政府沒有沒有回音，就關掉了無線電，自主決定是否採納同他們原來所在的紐卡斯國的協定不同的新協定。在主動關掉無線電三天之後，他們殺死了威特莫爾。在那三天裡，我敢肯定，他們為脫離紐卡斯國的法律並制定了決定人們生死的替代的法典舉行了某種正式儀式。
我想，對此看法的反對的意見有三個。
一、如果他們通過無線電可以知道並遵守紐卡斯國的法律，那麼他們不會退出原來的國家組建新國家。
這個觀點忽略了事情發生的先後順序。是的，他們一開始是力圖遵守我們的法律。但是當他們這麼做卻不能從我們這裡得到幫助的時候，他們做出了新的不同以往的決定。他們再也沒有什麼興趣來詢問我們的法律。因為後來發生的事情，他們最初的意願來了個一百八十度的大轉彎，不僅如此，很明顯，是聯邦未盡到義務才讓他們改變看法的。大而言之，我們國家的法官和官員們，也就是我們，必須負起責任，是我們拒絕他們進入我們法律的大門。我們的牧師也沒有對探險者的要求做出回應，他們也一樣有責任。這兩次錯誤，造成探險者們既沒有宗教上的規範可依，也沒有國家的法律可詢，他們只好依靠自己制定的規則——一個新的社會契約。
二、立法機關的巨額撥款部分承擔了營救行動的費用。這表明聯邦對他們還是承擔責任的，視他們依然屬於這個社會。
這個反對意見很容易反駁。這頂多表明了聯邦的態度，而不是探險者們的態度。無需紐卡斯國的同意，探險者們本可以來場有效且徹底的革命；事實上，紐卡斯國若同意，革命就沒必要了。第二，很明顯，在洞穴探險者協會的資金用盡以後，聯邦的資金才會用於營救。這表明立法機關一心想的是，不要去動用公眾的錢，除非情非得已。第三，聯邦必定也會把大家的錢用去營救困在中央高原洞穴裡的外國公民，而不會為此要求這些倒黴的探險者加入紐卡斯國的國籍。
三、最後可能的反對意見，是紐卡斯國的法官在這種情形下無法恰當地將我們的法律濃縮為一個句子，來回答探險者們通過無線電提出的問題。探險者問，通過擲骰子決定把他們當中的某一位殺了吃掉合適不合適。基於我自己關於詞語開放性和自由裁量權的觀點和我們一些分歧之處，可以說，紐卡斯國的法律對探險者們的問題沒有簡單明易的答案。那麼，面對這一情勢的法官回答探險者們法律是如何規定時，肯定會誤導他們。因此，反對意見又會認為，我們不能責備紐卡斯國沒有做出回應，也許不做回應比最高法院九個大法官拿出充滿爭議的判決文書更管用，更能穩定人心。
儘管這個反對意見表面看來很有力，但是它還是沒說到點子上，很容易被駁倒。第一，我們政府裡沒有任何官員回答探險者們的問題，哪怕是嘗試一下都沒有。如果一位官員向他們提供了意見而他們也採納了，但是後來本法院的成員發現這與實際規定不符；或者是一位官員提供了正確的處理意見，但他們沒有聽，這樣的話這個案件就完全不同了。但是，事實上沒人打算去回答。第二，這裡的關鍵不在於做出一個正確的回答容易不容易，而在於他們是不是有理由放棄紐卡斯國的法律，轉向他們在洞穴裡自己創製的法律。紐卡斯國在無線電裡的沉默即使有一點正當性，或者優越於替代選擇，也實際上構成了這樣一個理由，使得那些人不得以不以依靠自己的能力來應對他們所處的情境。
唐丁法官問：「如果他們不受我們法律的管轄那麼在什麼情形下這種情況發生？是洞的進口被堵上了的時候，還是飢餓已經達到了某種十分嚴重的程度，抑或是當做出擲骰子的合意時？」這麼一問，就把福斯特法官最初的看法推到了一個荒謬的地步。也許福斯特回答這個問題有難度，因為事實上，他不斷地在謀殺是在自然狀態下發生的還是在一個新的政府憲章下發生的兩種觀點間搖擺不定。正如此處我們所概括的，這個理論提出了一個非常清晰和有說服力的觀點：當他們同意擲骰子的時候，他們不再受我們法律的管轄，因為這時就是他們採用他們制定的新的取代他法的社會契約的時候。唐丁法官又打趣地問：「如果這些人超出了我們法律的約束----那這種超越發生在什麼時候呢？是當洞口被封住的時候還是飢餓的威脅達到某種難以確定的程度，抑或是擲骰子的協定達成之時？」同樣，答案正是唐丁所列的第三項。如果福斯特遵照他自己所說的「新政府憲章」所暗含的理論，而不是把那種變革同向自然狀態的回歸混淆起來，或者是唐丁已經牢記制定契約就足以建立一個主權獨立的國家這一每個合格的紐卡斯人從小學就學到的道路，唐丁也許不會再認為他的那些頗具修辭性的提問會成為反證法。
當他們塊要餓死，還不知道紐卡斯國的法律提出什麼樣的要求時，他們就決定了他們就決定了他們自己要做的事情。通過閱讀這個案件，關注點從探險者們的權利——比如，斯普林漢姆自我保存的權利，特朗派特的要求平等的權利——轉到了他們創製一部行為法典並忠實且一貫地遵守法典的義務。這是給偏於極端的觀點的必要解藥，也就是權利勝過包括義務在內的所有其他考慮。它表明，權利義務相互交織，難解難分，可以由同一個同意確立，也可以通過同一個擲骰子的行為體現出來。
這裡，我不必再談一些輔助性的問題了，比如他們的新法典是不是不偏不倚地源於將受其管轄的人的合意。如果我是在寫一篇完整的法律意見，而不是僅就說明與電池聯度的部分做說明，我將深入探討威特莫爾是不是從新合約中撤回了自己的同意；如果是這樣，那麼探險者們就是殺了一個紐卡斯國的公民，他們的行為因此要受我們的法律的管轄；從一個社會契約的理念調和（好像是個人塑造了社會，而不是社會塑造了個人）；是不是探險者在洞裡接受紐卡斯國政府提供的幫助——指政府對營救提供部分補貼——足以說明他們對紐卡斯國法律的默認；促使他們制定一部新法的理由，是不是累肯法官所說的那種可以同情的讓步性和技術性的做法，或者是屬於戈德法官所說的複雜情感混合物，抑或是屬於內涵更豐富的、我們的先人藉以制定契約、建立聯邦的那一類。
電池在本案中不容忽視
嚴格來說，我的這一論點立基於探險者想法的改變。我們推斷，聯邦用默不作聲來回應探險者們通過無線電提出的問題時，探險者的想法一定發生了轉變。如果他們的想法沒變，他們最初想了解並遵守紐卡斯國法的願望得以堅持，那麼我們幾乎沒有理由說他們曾拋開我們的法律轉而去制定一部新的社會契約。
現在我們知道，在國家拒絕回答探險者的問題以後，困在洞裡的人們沒有再發出無線電信號。在營救團隊裡的人認為在山洞裡無線電電池一定是沒電了，但是這被證實並非實情。如果電池果真是沒電了，無線電信號沒了並不能說明什麼問題，我們很難做出什麼推測，它可能意味著探險者改變主意了，也可能意味著是設備壞了。在審判的時候，他們可能會咬定說是他們在洞裡改變了主意，創造了一個新的國家；但是我們也老是會懷疑他們為了秘不外宣的利益編造了假話。但是因為我們知道電池仍然可以供電，那麼我們也就知道探險者是故意且自願停用無線電設備。這個事實表明，在紐卡斯國的法律拒絕了他們以後，他們拒絕了紐卡斯國的法律，起草了他們自己行為規範的法典來對付困境。這支持了認為探險者搞了場和平革命的觀點。
法律源於合意和契約的歷史原理對研判這個案件最最重要。當然對此案的研判關鍵還在於探險者無線電中的電池。如果電池已經沒電了，我們的研判就只能繫於完全的推測。好了，我是很小心的，我不會說這種研判是對的，並繼而得出結論說被告是有罪的還是無辜的。畢竟我已經放棄了對這個案件的事實下結論的權利。我決定如下：電池保有電量的能力同這個案件的結果息息相關，由於我過去同那個有關測試和監控電量的設備的訴訟有牽連，我不得不全身而退。
很抱歉，我迴避。
因為邦德法官選擇迴避，本案在50年後的結果為維持原判，被告人被執行死刑。
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