1. 投資和競爭性的匹配
Investment and Competitive Matching (pages 835–896)
Georg Nöldeke and Larry Samuelson
Abstract
We study markets in which agents first make investments and are then matched into potentially productive partnerships. Equilibrium investments and the equilibrium matching will be efficient if agents can simultaneously negotiate investments and matches, but we focus on markets in which agents must first sink their investments before matching. Additional equilibria may arise in this sunk-investment setting, even though our matching market is competitive. These equilibria exhibit inefficiencies that we can interpret as coordination failures. All allocations satisfying a constrained efficiency property are equilibria, and the converse holds if preferences satisfy a separability condition. We identify sufficient conditions (most notably, quasiconcave utilities) for the investments of matched agents to satisfy an exchange efficiency property as well as sufficient conditions (most notably, a single crossing property) for agents to be matched positive assortatively, with these conditions then forming the core of sufficient conditions for the efficiency of equilibrium allocations.
2. 當市場參與者數量變大時非轉移效用下的雙邊匹配市場
Large Matching Markets as Two-Sided Demand Systems (pages 897–941)
Konrad Menzel
Abstract
This paper studies two-sided matching markets with non-transferable utility when the number of market participants grows large. We consider a model in which each agent has a random preference ordering over individual potential matching partners, and agents' types are only partially observed by the econometrician. We show that in a large market, the inclusive value is a sufficient statistic for an agent's endogenous choice set with respect to the probability of being matched to a spouse of a given observable type. Furthermore, while the number of pairwise stable matchings for a typical realization of random utilities grows at a fast rate as the number of market participants increases, the inclusive values resulting from any stable matching converge to a unique deterministic limit. We can therefore characterize the limiting distribution of the matching market as the unique solution to a fixed-point condition on the inclusive values. Finally we analyze identification and estimation of payoff parameters from the asymptotic distribution of observable characteristics at the level of pairs resulting from a stable matching.
3. 站得住腳的策略阻礙和穩定的均衡
Tenable Strategy Blocks and Settled Equilibria (pages 943–976)
Roger Myerson and Jörgen Weibull
Abstract
When people interact in familiar settings, social conventions usually develop so that people tend to disregard alternatives outside the convention. For rational players to usually restrict attention to a block of conventional strategies, no player should prefer to deviate from the block when others are likely to act conventionally and rationally inside the block. We explore two set-valued concepts, coarsely and finely tenable blocks, that formalize this notion for finite normal-form games. We then identify settled equilibria, which are Nash equilibria with support in minimal tenable blocks. For a generic class of normal-form games, our coarse and fine concepts are equivalent, and yet they differ from standard solution concepts on open sets of games. We demonstrate the nature and power of the solutions by way of examples. Settled equilibria are closely related to persistent equilibria but are strictly more selective on an open set of games. With fine tenability, we obtain invariance under the insertion of a subgame with a unique totally mixed payoff-equivalent equilibrium, a property that other related concepts have not satisfied.
4. 有遠見的穩定集合
The Farsighted Stable Set (pages 977–1011)
Debraj Ray and Rajiv Vohra
Abstract
Harsanyi (1974) criticized the von Neumann–Morgenstern (vNM) stable set for its presumption that coalitions are myopic about their prospects. He proposed a new dominance relation incorporating farsightedness, but retained another feature of the stable set: that a coalitionS can impose any imputation as long as its restriction to S is feasible for it. This implicitly gives an objecting coalition complete power to arrange the payoffs of players elsewhere, which is clearly unsatisfactory. While this assumption is largely innocuous for myopic dominance, it is of crucial significance for its farsighted counterpart. Our modification of the Harsanyi set respects 「coalitional sovereignty.」 The resulting farsighted stable set is very different from both the Harsanyi and the vNM sets. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a farsighted stable set containing just a single-payoff allocation. This condition roughly establishes an equivalence between core allocations and the union of allocations over all single-payoff farsighted stable sets. We then conduct a comprehensive analysis of the existence and structure of farsighted stable sets in simple games. This last exercise throws light on both single-payoff and multi-payoff stable sets, and suggests that they do not coexist.
5. 對半非參數條件矩陣模型的Sieve Wald 和 QLR推斷
Inferences on Semi/Nonparametric Conditional Moment Models (pages 1013–1079)
Xiaohong Chen and Demian Pouzo
Abstract
This paper considers inference on functionals of semi/nonparametric conditional moment restrictions with possibly nonsmooth generalized residuals, which include all of the (nonlinear) nonparametric instrumental variables (IV) as special cases. These models are often ill-posed and hence it is difficult to verify whether a (possibly nonlinear) functional is root-n estimable or not. We provide computationally simple, unified inference procedures that are asymptotically valid regardless of whether a functional is root-n estimable or not. We establish the following new useful results: (1) the asymptotic normality of a plug-in penalized sieve minimum distance (PSMD) estimator of a (possibly nonlinear) functional; (2) the consistency of simple sieve variance estimators for the plug-in PSMD estimator, and hence the asymptotic chi-square distribution of the sieve Wald statistic; (3) the asymptotic chi-square distribution of an optimally weighted sieve quasi likelihood ratio (QLR) test under the null hypothesis; (4) the asymptotic tight distribution of a non-optimally weighted sieve QLR statistic under the null; (5) the consistency of generalized residual bootstrap sieve Wald and QLR tests; (6) local power properties of sieve Wald and QLR tests and of their bootstrap versions; (7) asymptotic properties of sieve Wald and SQLR for functionals of increasing dimension. Simulation studies and an empirical illustration of a nonparametric quantile IV regression are presented.
6. 參數推斷和來自選項面板的動態恢復
Parametric Inference and Dynamic State Recovery From Option Panels (pages 1081–1145)
Torben G. Andersen, Nicola Fusari and Viktor Todorov
Abstract
We develop a new parametric estimation procedure for option panels observed with error. We exploit asymptotic approximations assuming an ever increasing set of option prices in the moneyness (cross-sectional) dimension, but with a fixed time span. We develop consistent estimators for the parameters and the dynamic realization of the state vector governing the option price dynamics. The estimators converge stably to a mixed-Gaussian law and we develop feasible estimators for the limiting variance. We also provide semiparametric tests for the option price dynamics based on the distance between the spot volatility extracted from the options and one constructed nonparametrically from high-frequency data on the underlying asset. Furthermore, we develop new tests for the day-by-day model fit over specific regions of the volatility surface and for the stability of the risk-neutral dynamics over time. A comprehensive Monte Carlo study indicates that the inference procedures work well in empirically realistic settings. In an empirical application to S&P 500 index options, guided by the new diagnostic tests, we extend existing asset pricing models by allowing for a flexible dynamic relation between volatility and priced jump tail risk. Importantly, we document that the priced jump tail risk typically responds in a more pronounced and persistent manner than volatility to large negative market shocks.
Notes and Comments
1. 面板數據中異質性的分組模式
Grouped Patterns of Heterogeneity in Panel Data (pages 1147–1184)
Stéphane Bonhomme and Elena Manresa
Abstract
This paper introduces time-varying grouped patterns of heterogeneity in linear panel data models. A distinctive feature of our approach is that group membership is left unrestricted. We estimate the parameters of the model using a 「grouped fixed-effects」 estimator that minimizes a least squares criterion with respect to all possible groupings of the cross-sectional units. Recent advances in the clustering literature allow for fast and efficient computation. We provide conditions under which our estimator is consistent as both dimensions of the panel tend to infinity, and we develop inference methods. Finally, we allow for grouped patterns of unobserved heterogeneity in the study of the link between income and democracy across countries.
2. 使用很少支持工具的不可分離模型的識別
Identification of Nonseparable Models Using Instruments With Small Support(pages 1185–1197)
Alexander Torgovitsky
Abstract
We study the identification through instruments of a nonseparable function that relates a continuous outcome to a continuous endogenous variable. Using group and dynamical systems theories, we show that full identification can be achieved under strong exogeneity of the instrument and a dual monotonicity condition, even if the instrument is discrete. When identified, the model is also testable. Our results therefore highlight the identifying power of strong exogeneity when combined with monotonicity restrictions.
3. 帶有離散工具的不可分離三角模型的識別
Identification of Nonseparable Triangular Models With Discrete Instruments (pages 1199–1210)
Xavier D'Haultfœuille and Philippe Février
Abstract
We study the identification through instruments of a nonseparable function that relates a continuous outcome to a continuous endogenous variable. Using group and dynamical systems theories, we show that full identification can be achieved under strong exogeneity of the instrument and a dual monotonicity condition, even if the instrument is discrete. When identified, the model is also testable. Our results therefore highlight the identifying power of strong exogeneity when combined with monotonicity restrictions.
4. 假冒偽劣的經濟學分析
The Economics of Counterfeiting (pages 1211–1236)
Elena Quercioli and Lones Smith
Abstract
We develop a strategic theory of counterfeiting as a multi-market large game. Bad guys choose whether to counterfeit, and what quality to produce. Opposing them is a continuum of good guys who select a costly verification effort. In equilibrium, counterfeiters produce better quality at higher notes, but verifiers try sufficiently harder that verification still improves. We develop a graphical framework for deducing comparative statics. Passed and counterfeiting rates vanish for low and high notes. Our predictions are consistent with time series and cross-sectional patterns in a unique data set assembled largely from the Secret Service.
5. 「沒有固定的納什均衡的折現隨機博弈：兩個例子」的更正
Corrigendum to 「Discounted Stochastic Games With No Stationary Nash Equilibrium: Two Examples」 (pages 1237–1252)
Yehuda John Levy and Andrew McLennan
Abstract
Levy (2013) presented examples of discounted stochastic games that do not have stationary equilibria. The second named author has pointed out that one of these examples is incorrect. In addition to describing the details of this error, this note presents a new example by the first named author that succeeds in demonstrating that discounted stochastic games with absolutely continuous transitions can fail to have stationary equilibria.