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Supply Chain and Operations Management

JunWua, Gang Dua, Roger J.Jiaob. Optimal Postponement Contracting Decisions in Crowdsourced Manufacturing: A Three-Level Game-Theoretic Model for Product Family Architecting Considering Subcontracting. European Journal of Operational Research.a.College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, Chinab.School of Mechanical Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA30332-0405, USAAvailable online 8 October 2020.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2020.09.049Get rights and contentAbstract:Crowdsourced manufacturing enables companies to outsource and share manufacturing resources based on demand and capacity across the value chain. A postponement strategy is well recognized as an effective means to deal with supply chain risks and uncertainties of producing customized products. However, coordinated decision-making among product design, postponement contracting and subcontracting is a challenging problem area that requires innovative modeling and decision support. This study develops a model that emphasizes interactive decisions within a three-level non-cooperative game that determines the optimal solutions for a single manufacturer, multiple distributors, and multiple subcontractors by maximizing their net profits. This study formulates a postponement contracting with subcontracting (PCS) problem for product family architecting to interact with postponement contracting and subcontracting decisions based on optimal planning of crowdsourced manufacturing activities. The PCS problem differs from traditional postponement design models that assume a (fixed) product architecture is given at the outset. In this study, interaction among different stakeholders is modeled as a non-linear, mixed-integer, three-level game-theoretic model based on the Stackelberg game theory. A novel virtual postponement structure is introduced to concretize optimization of the PCS problem and to justify which product module(s) should be postponed. Analytical solutions are developed incorporating a nested genetic algorithm. A practical case study of postponement contracting decisions in an electric vehicle company is reported to verify the feasibility and potential of the proposed approach for product family architecting. The optimal product family design, the types of postponed product modules, some parts in the postponed product modules that need to be further subcontracted, and other decision results are determined simultaneously in the case study. The sensitivity analyses on the proposed postponement cost and demand parameters indicate that the changes of their values greatly influence the decision makers』 net profit, and the net profit situation of each decision maker in different regions is obtained by the sensitivity analysis of the union of the two parameters. Thus, the PCS problem for product family architecting in crowdsourced manufacturing provides a more complete solution for the current implementation of the postponement strategy, and our proposed three-level game-theoretic model can handle well the coordination among the PCS problem.Keywords: Manufacturing, supply chain management, crowdsourced manufacturing, postponement, product family, Stackelberg game

Dong Lia, Nishant Mishrab. Engaging suppliers for reliability improvement under outcome-based compensations. Omega.
a.Lingnan College, Sun Yat-sen University, 135 Xingang Xi Road, Guangzhou, Chinab.Center for Operations Research and Econometrics, UCLouvain, Louvain-la-Neuve 1348, BelgiumAvailable online 5 October 2020.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.omega.2020.102343Get rights and contentAbstract:Many durable products are now servicized with outcome-based contracts under which customers pay for uptime. Outcome-based contracting poses challenges to product support management, because the customers』 losses due to system outages result in penalties for the OEM. Moreover, in many cases product failures are caused by defective subsystems or components that are manufactured by the OEM’s suppliers. Not involving suppliers in product support leads to a lack of incentives for product reliability improvement and thus higher failure rates, which increases product downtime risk. In this paper, we study how the OEM should incentivize its suppliers to improve product reliability under outcome-based contracts. We find that the more recent repair cost sharing contracts perform better than the traditional price-only contracts. However, in the presence of outcome-based contracting, sharing repair cost results in underinvestment in product reliability and overinvestment in repair capacity, which leads to lower system uptime. We then propose a downtime penalty sharing contract which can optimally incentivize the upstream suppliers to improve product reliability, regardless of the repair capacity structure or product separability into constituent parts.Keywords: Servicization; Outcome-based contract; Reliability; Supplier incentives; Principal-agent model

Sobhan Asian Seana, Jian Wangb,Geoff Dicksona. Trade disruptions, behavioral biases, and social influences: Can luxury sporting goods supply chains be immunized? Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review.

a.La Trobe Business School, La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia

b.School of Economics and Management, Jiangsu University of Science and Technology, Zhenjiang, PR China

Available online 25 September 2020.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tre.2020.102064

Abstract:This paper studies a luxury sporting goods supply chain (LSGSC) experiencing trade disruption and market volatility. We propose a flexible trade credit contract with minimum order quantity (MOQ) and design a coordination mechanism between a supplier and a loss-averse wholesaler. We extend our study to a multi-tiered product setting and examine the impacts of social influences and loss aversion on SC decisions and channel coordination. Given the gloomy post-Covid-19 economic prospects in an era of reglobalization, this study urges trade associations and business leaders to immunize their SCs by considering behavioral biases and social influences and revisiting their contractual obligations.

Keywords: Trade disruption; Trade credit contract; Supply chain coordination; Social influence; Behavioral bias; Luxury sporting goods; Reglobalization

Bin Shena, Stefan Minnerb, Hau-Ling Chanc, Alessandro Brund. Logistics and supply chain management in the luxury industry. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review.

a.Glorious Sun School of Business and Management, Donghua University, Shanghai 200051, China

b.Technical University of Munich, Germany

c.Division of Business and Hospitality Management, College of Professional and Continuing Education, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Kowloon, Hong Kong

d.Politecnico di Milano, Milan, Italy

Available online 30 September 2020.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tre.2020.102095

Abstract:This special issue explores new practices and applications in logistics and supply chain management for luxury goods. This editorial note summarizes the discussions on different important topics, including sustainability, sourcing, advertising, behavioral consideration, product sharing, and channel management among other aspects.

Zelin Zhang1, weishi Lim2, haitao Cui3, ze Wang4. Partial Refunds as a Strategic Price Commitment Device in Advance Selling in a Service Industry. European Journal of Operational Research.
1.Associate Professor, School of Business, Renmin University of China, Beijing, 100872, P. R. China2.Associate Professor, NUS Business School, National University of Singapore, Mochtar Riady Building 8‐13 15 Kent Ridge Drive, S 119248 Singapore3.Professor, Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota, Suite 3-150, 321-19th Avenue S., Minneapolis, MN 554554.Associate Professor, College of Business Administration, University of Central Florida, BA-II, 308T, 12744 Pegasus Dr., Orlando, FL 32816Available online 8 October 2020.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2020.10.001Get rights and contentAbstract:Over the past decade, consumers』 strategic waiting behavior in anticipation of a price markdown has become increasingly common when advance selling is used. Recently, studies in the durable goods industry show that a partial refund strategy can activate the price-commitment mechanism to counter consumers』 strategic waiting, which is primarily driven by both consumers』 and retailers』 behaviors that discount the future. In this research, we investigate the possibility of using this partial refund strategy in a service industry context in which demand uncertainty and consumption state uncertainty act as major influential factors.We study analytical models that consider the demand uncertainty of later arrivals and the consumption state uncertainty of early arrivals over two selling periods (advance and spot selling). Our results show a consistent pattern reflecting that a partial refund strategy in which the cancellation fee acts as a price-commitment mechanism is capable of emerging as the optimal strategy. Other than the strategic commitment mechanism, the cancellation fee paid by the advance buyers who choose to cancel their advance purchase also plays a profit-enhancer role. Combining these two mechanisms, a partial refund strategy dominates both a price-matching strategy and a dynamic pricing strategy, and they are only special cases of that type of strategy. Finally, comparative statistical analyses are conducted and reveal the impacts of demand-related parameters on the optimality of the partial refund strategy. These results provide instructive guidance for sellers when utilizing the partial refund strategy in their marketing practices.Keywords: Pricing; Partial Refunds; Service Industry; Commitment Mechanism

Danping Wena, Tiaojun Xiaoa, Mehdi Dastanib. Channel choice for an independent remanufacturer considering environmentally responsible consumers. International Journal of Production Economics.

a.Center for Behavioral Decision and Control, School of Management and Engineering, Nanjing University, Nanjing, 210093, China

b.Department of Information and Computing Sciences, Utrecht University, Utrecht, 3584CS, Netherlands

Available online 6 October 2020.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2020.107941

Abstract:This paper studies the channel choice of an independent remanufacturer who considers whether to add a direct channel to its retail channel in the presence of environmentally responsible consumers. Two scenarios, depending on whether there is competition between the remanufacturer and the manufacturer with new products, are explored. When there is no competition, we find that (i) adding a direct channel lowers the wholesale price; (ii) a higher proportion of green consumers, attention degree of the remanufacturer's green image, or cost savings per remanufactured product strengthens the remanufacturer's motivation to add a direct channel; (iii) the remanufacturer has a low incentive to add a direct channel if the total surplus of the retail channel or extra fixed cost of introducing direct channel is high; (iv) the direct channel addition hurts the retailer if the acceptance degree of direct channel is not low. However, when there exists a competition, we find that (i) the competition can influence how cost savings and acceptance degree of direct channel affect the remanufacturer's channel choice; (ii) the remanufacturer and the retailer can achieve a win-win situation under dual channels if the acceptance degree of remanufactured products or direct channel is low, or their standard deviations are high; and (iii) adding a direct channel increases the remanufacturer's ability to resist uncertainty of consumers' behaviors.

Keywords: Channel structure choice; Independent remanufacturer; Environmental responsibility behavior; Consumer behavior; Game theory

Yanyan Zheng,Yingxue Zhao, Xiaoge Meng. Market entrance and pricing strategies for a capital-constrained remanufacturing supply chain: effects of equity and bank financing on circular economy. International Journal of Production Research.

Published online: 06 Oct 2020

https://doi.org/10.1080/00207543.2020.1821926

Abstract: This paper examines market entrance and pricing strategies for a remanufacturer with capital constraint and competition from an original equipment manufacturer. In the study, the remanufacturer is divided into two types, namely the H-type and L-type, and is assumed to have access to bank loans and equity financing to ease the capital constraint. With the Nash game, it is found that (i) if remanufacturing is costly, the remanufacturer will choose partial remanufacturing and not enter into the remanufacturing market until the equity financing ratio excesses a certain threshold. (ii) A H-type remanufacturer is more flexible in term of market entrance than a L-type remanufacturer. (iii) The remanufacturer’s profit increases first and then decreases in the equity ratio. (iv) Equity ratio and interest rate have opposite effects on the pricing of the new and remanufactured products. Furthermore, with some research extensions, it is exhibited that the results and managerial implications developed in the paper hold well for different financing modes and the random demand setting, and hence are robust to a good extent.

Keywords:Remanufacturing supply chain, circular economy, capital constraint, equity financing, bank loans.

Yanyan Zheng

Yanyan Zheng received her PhD degree in Management Sciences and Engineering from Hunan University in 2018. She is currently an associate professor at the School of Management Engineering of Xi』an Polytechnic University and a postdoctoral researcher at the School of Industrial Engineering of Xi』an Jiaotong University. Her research interest mainly focuses on supply chain management, and her research papers have been published in journals including International Journal of Production Research, Applied Economics, Operational Research – An International Journal, and System Engineering Theory and Practice (in Chinese).

Yingxue Zhao

Yingxue Zhao received his PhD degree in Management Sciences and Engineering from the Institute of Systems Science, Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), in 2010. He is currently professor of Supply Chain Management at the School of International Trade and Economics of the University of International Business and Economics. He has received some important academic awards including the 『Outstanding Paper Award 』 awarded by IEEE Systems, Man and Cybernetics (SMC) and the 『 Excellent Research Award for Scientific Research of Universities (Humanities and Social Sciences) 』 awarded by the Ministry of Education of China. His research interest mainly focuses on supply chain management, and his research papers have been published in journals including Production and Operations Management, European Journal of Operational Research, Annals of Operations Research, International Journal of Production Research, Journal of the Operational Research Society, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, and International Journal of Production Economics.

Xiaoge Meng

Xiaoge Meng received her PhD degree in Management Sciences and Engineering from the School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Aeronautics & Astronautics, in 2018. She is currently assistant professor at the School of Economics and Management of the Institute of Disaster Prevention. She has received some important academic awards including the 『 Excellent Paper Award 』 awarded by the 10th Annual Meeting of the Chinese Logistics Society (CLS) and the 『 Excellent Research Award for Scientific Research of Universities (Humanities and Social Sciences) 』 awarded by the Ministry of Education of China. Her research interest mainly focuses on supply chain management, and her research papers have been published in journals including International Journal of Production Economics, International Journal of Production Research, Abstract and Applied Analysis, Applied Mathematics and Computation, and Journal of Systems Science and Complexity.

Liqun Wei, Jianxiong Zhang, Rui Dai. Green capacity and technology choice strategies with emission constraint setting. Computers & Industrial Engineering.

College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China

Available online 7 October 2020.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cie.2020.106887

Abstract:Under dual pressures of stringent environmental policies and upbeat green demand, manufacturers which used to apply traditional manufacturing technology are motivated to construct green capacity and revamp their production strategies. In this paper, we establish a Stackleberg game between a welfare-maximizing regulator who sets an emission cap and a profit-seeking manufacturer who makes technology choice consisting of green capacity construction and production strategies. The firm builds green capacity under uncertain green demand, but prices and produces until the demand is fully observable. Equilibrium emission cap for the regulator and the response of the firm are derived. We discover that equilibrium strategies adjustment is highly affected by two key correlations between two products: comparative emission performance and product substitutability. Specifically, if comparative emission performance of green production is greater (less) than product substitutability, the equilibrium green capacity decreases (increases) with the environmental damage degree, and the equilibrium emission cap tightens (levels down) with the investment cost of green capacity. Interestingly, as green manufacturing generates more unit emission, the equilibrium emission cap first increases, then declines and finally flattens. In response, the firm adopts the single-green technology firstly, after which it turns to a mixed production mode and eventually operates merely conventional production.

Keywords: Game theory; Emission constraint; Green capacity; Construction technology choice; Demand uncertainty

C.H.E.N. Xintong1, L.I. Bangyi1, L.I. Zonghuo2, Mark GOH3,W.E.I. Shanting1. Take-back Regulation Policy on Closed Loop Supply Chains: Single or Double Targets? Journal of Cleaner Production.

1.College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing, 210016, China

2.College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Nanjing, 210094, China

3.NUS Business School & the Logistics Institute-Asia Pacific, National University of Singapore, Singapore, 119245, Singapore

Available online 8 October 2020.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.124576

Abstract: Many countries have imposed product take-back conditions on their manufacturers, as part of the commitment to the extended product responsibility. This paper explores the feasibility of the take-back regulation operating under a collection target and a reuse target. Two models using different regulation setups are developed to show the effects of a take-back regulation on consumer surplus, the benefits to the supply chain, and social welfare. The results suggest that the optimal strategies of the manufacturer depend on the regulation model applied. Setting higher regulation targets decreases the manufacturer’s profit, but the chain benefits from the reuse target. To achieve a high collection rate and reuse efficiency, policy makers should set a high collection target and a high reuse target. To improve the social welfare, a low collection target and a high reuse target should be set. This study provides some suggestions for the manufacturer to cope with regulation targets and offers some guidelines for policy makers to set and implement the regulation targets.

Keywords: Take-back; Collection target; Reuse target; Remanufacturing; Closed loop supply chain

Logistics Management

Haitao Liu, Zhaoxia Guo, Zhengzhong Zhang. A hybrid multi-level optimisation framework for integrated production scheduling and vehicle routing with flexible departure time. International Journal of Production Research.

Published online: 04 Oct 2020

https://doi.org/10.1080/00207543.2020.1821927

Abstract:This paper investigates an integrated scheduling problem of production and outbound distribution with flexible vehicle departure time in a time-sensitive make-to-order supply chain. We develop a hybrid multi-level optimisation framework by decomposing the problem into three sub-problems, including vehicle assignment, parallel machines scheduling and distribution scheduling. In this framework, we propose an efficient procedure to obtain the optimal vehicle departure time and utilise metaheuristics and heuristics to obtain the values of other decision variables. Results from extensive numerical experiments indicate that the proposed framework can solve small-scale instances optimally, and for large-scale instances it also shows the better performance than the compared genetic algorithm in terms of convergence and solution quality. Besides, the distribution cost can be reduced by setting flexible vehicle departure time.

Keywords:Supply chain collaboration, flexible departure time, time window, hybrid multi-level optimisation, integrated optimisation

Haitao Liu

Haitao Liu received the B.E. and M.E. degrees in industrial engineering from Sichuan University, Sichuan, China, in 2015 and 2018, respectively. He is currently a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, National University of Singapore.

Zhaoxia Guo

Zhaoxia Guo received the B.S. and M.S. degrees in control theory and control engineering from Donghua University, Shanghai, China, in 2000 and 2003, respectively, and Ph.D. degree at the Institute of Textiles and Clothing, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong, in 2007. He is currently a Professor in Business School, Sichuan University, Sichuan, China.

Zhengzhong Zhang

Zhenzhong Zhang received the B.E. degree in industrial engineering from Henan University of Science and Technology, Henan, China, in 2015, and the M.E. degree in industrial engineering from Sichuan University, Sichuan, China, in 2018. He is currently a Ph.D. candidate in Management Science and Engineering, Sichuan University.

Feifeng Zheng, Yaxin Pang, Yinfeng Xu, Ming Liu.Heuristic algorithms for truck scheduling of cross-docking operations in cold-chain logistics. International Journal of Production Research.

Published online: 04 Oct 2020

https://doi.org/10.1080/00207543.2020.1821118

Abstract: Nowadays cross-docking operations play a significant role in the cold-chain logistics. This paper addresses the cold-chain cross-docking truck scheduling problem where two types of products, i.e. refrigerated and frozen ones, demand separate trucks and storage areas with distinct temperature settings during their storage and transportation. We present a mixed-integer linear programming model with the objective of minimising the total operational costs that consist of inbound truck arrival penalties for violating contracted time windows, product delivery tardiness penalties, inventory costs and outbound truck transportation costs. Due to the strong NP-hardness of the considered problem, we solve it in two phases where the inbound truck arrival schedule and the schedule of outbound truck departure together with product processing are produced, respectively. Four heuristic algorithms are proposed to generate complete solutions of the considered two-stage problem, which are the combinations of two solution frameworks for the first stage and two methods for the second stage. Computational experiments are carried out to verify the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed heuristic algorithms in terms of the solution quality and running time, respectively.

Keywords: Truck scheduling, cross-docking terminal, cold-chain logistics, heuristic algorithm, combinatorial optimization

Feifeng Zheng

Feifeng Zheng received the B.S. degree in information management, the M.S. degree in management science and engineering and the Ph.D. degree in management science and engineering from Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an, China, in 1998, 2003 and 2006. He is a Professor in Donghua University, Shanghai. His research interests include production scheduling and container terminal resource scheduling.

Yaxin Pang

Yaxin Pang received the B.S. degree in management science and engineering from Donghua University, Shanghai, China, in 2018. She is a master student at Donghua University, majoring in Management science and engineering. Her interests include production scheduling and logistics optimisation.

Yinfeng Xu

Yinfeng Xu received the B.S. degree in applied mathematics, the M.S. degree in computational mathematics and the Ph.D. degree in operational research and control from Jilin University of Technology, Xi'an Jiaotong and Chinese Academy of Sciences, respectively, in 1983, 1988 and 1992. He is a Professor in Donghua University, Shanghai. His research interests include production scheduling and combinatorial optimisation.

Ming Liu

Ming Liu received the B.S. degree in management science and engineering and the Ph.D. degree in management science and engineering from Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an, China, in 2005 and 2010. He is an Associate Professor in Tongji University, Shanghai. His research interests include logistics optimisation and production scheduling.

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