許多經濟學家已經相信，美國的經濟衰退現在已經逾期，若非立即發生，那也肯定會在2020年總統選舉之前。但自二戰結束以來，美國經濟衰退通常是由三個原因造成的，目前還沒有一個原因顯現出來。
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美國經濟已進入不間斷擴張的第11個年頭，打破了美國歷史上一段沒有經濟衰退的最長增長期的紀錄。但許多經濟學家非但沒有慶祝，反而從這一前所未有的表現中得出結論：經濟衰退現在已經逾期，若非立即發生，那也肯定會在在2020年總統大選之前。然而，認為經濟擴張具有某種自然壽命，然後就會老死的觀點，既沒有經驗依據，也沒有理論依據。這對於美國經濟來說，是幸運的；但對於唐納德•川普(Donald Trump)總統的反對者來說，這是悲哀的。
The US economy has entered its 11th year of uninterrupted expansion, breaking the previous record for the longest period of growth in American history without a recession. But far from celebrating, many economists conclude from this unprecedented performance that a recession is now overdue, if not immediately then surely before the 2020 presidential election. Fortunately for the US economy, but sadly for President Donald Trump’s opponents, the idea that economic expansions have some kind of natural lifespan and then die of old age has neither empirical nor theoretical support.
歷史表明，自二戰結束以來，美國的經濟擴張在12個月到120個月的時間段內發生了變化，沒有任何均值回歸的跡象。此外，可以說，從1982年至2000年的18年期間實際上是一個持續的經濟增長，僅僅因伊拉克入侵科威特造成的的油價飆升而短暫中斷。
History shows that US expansions since the end of World War II have varied in length from 12 months to 120 months, with no sign of mean reversion. Moreover, it can be argued that the 18-year period from 1982 to 2000 was really one continuous economic upswing, interrupted only briefly by the spike in oil prices caused by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.
而且，發達經濟體避免經濟衰退的時間比美國剛剛超過的十年記錄要長得多，這種情況更為明顯。澳大利亞現在已經28年沒有衰退，英國從1992年到2008年經歷了17年的不間斷增長。與美國不同，澳大利亞和英國都更容易陷入衰退，因為它們依賴大宗商品、金融和房地產投機。
And there are clearer instances of advanced economies that have avoided recessions for much longer than the ten-year record the United States has just surpassed. Australia is now in its 28th year without a recession, and the United Kingdom experienced 17 years of uninterrupted growth from 1992 to 2008. Unlike the US, both Australia and the UK are more recession-prone because of their dependence on commodities, finance, and property speculation.
經濟原則對 「逾期衰退」理論的倡導者同樣無益。自20世紀40年代主動需求管理政策發明以來，任何管理良好的市場經濟的正常狀況都是以其趨勢增長率（在美國約為2%）繼續擴張。戰後時期，經濟衰退通常有三個原因：應對通脹壓力而採取的大量貨幣或財政緊縮；某種金融危機，如2008年的次級抵押貸款崩潰和2000年的技術破產；或是能源價格大幅上漲的巨大外部衝擊。在這些事件發生之前，我們可以相當有信心，美國的擴張將不僅僅是「老年死亡」。
Economic principles are equally unhelpful to advocates of the 「overdue recession」 theory. The normal condition of any reasonably well-managed market economy since the invention of active demand-management policies in the 1940s is to continue expanding at around its trend rate of growth (roughly 2% in the US). In the postwar period, recessions have generally resulted from three causes: substantial monetary or fiscal tightening in response to inflationary pressures; some kind of financial crisis, such as the subprime mortgage collapse of 2008 and the technology bust of 2000; or a massive external shock that vastly increased energy prices. Until one of these events occurs, we can be fairly confident that the US expansion will not just 「die of old age.」
那麼，為什麼現在有那麼多經濟學家擔心美國經濟衰退，並且相信金融市場低估了經濟增長的下行風險？主要原因是美中貿易戰和一個金融預警信號：「收益率曲線倒掛」，第一個風險明顯，第二個需要解釋。
Why, then, are so many economists now worried about a US recession and convinced that financial markets are underestimating the downside risks to economic growth? The main reasons are the US-China trade war and a financial warning signal: the 「inverted yield curve.」 The first risk is obvious; the second requires some explanation.
當長期債券收益率低於短期利率時，收益率曲線倒掛是一種相對不尋常的情況。在美國，隔夜聯邦基金利率約為2.4%，但十年期收益率最近跌至2%以下。
An inverted yield curve is a relatively unusual condition that occurs when long-term bond yields fall below short-term interest rates. In the US, the overnight federal funds rate is around 2.4%, but ten-year yields recently fell to below 2%.
這種倒掛的收益率曲線通常被認為是經濟衰退即將來臨的信號，但其實不應該如此。這一「信號」通常出現在它宣稱預測衰退的前幾年。更重要的是，自全球金融危機以來的十年裡，債券市場定價發生了巨大變化。債券收益率越來越脫離實際經濟狀況，部分原因是量化寬鬆和監管壓力迫使養老基金在不考慮經濟狀況的情況下購買債券，但主要原因是通脹似乎已與失業和增長脫鉤。
Such an inversion is often cited as a signal of imminent recession,but it shouldn’t be. The 「signal」 often comes years before the recession it claims to predict. More important, bond market pricing has drastically changed in the decade since the global financial crisis. Bond yields have become increasingly divorced from real economic conditions, partly because of quantitative easing and regulatory pressures on pension funds to buy bonds regardless of economic conditions, but mainly because inflation seems to have decoupled from unemployment and growth.
即使經濟增長與通脹的脫鉤最終被證明是虛假的，但美聯儲和其他央行認為，舊的增長與通脹的聯繫已被打破，這一事實意味著，它們將比以前的經濟周期保持的利率低得多。只要央行繼續這樣做，債券收益率將繼續反映投資者對央行將如何處理短期利率的預期，而不是他們對經濟前景或衰退風險的預期。正如我在四月份所說，金融市場的主要信息並不是美國即將陷入衰退，而是美聯儲正準備降息。如果這種情況發生，而且幾乎可以肯定，美國經濟衰退的可能性將降低，而不是增大。
Even if the decoupling of growth and inflation ultimately turns out to be illusory, the mere fact that the US Federal Reserve and other central banks believe that the old growth-inflation linkage is broken means that they will keep interest rates much lower for much longer than in previous economic cycles. As long as central bankers continue to behave like this, bond yields will continue to reflect investors』 expectations about what central banks will do with short-term interest rates, rather than their expectations about economic prospects or recession risks. The main message from financial markets, as I argued in April, is not that the US is near a recession; it is simply that the Fed is preparing to cut interest rates. If that happens – and it almost certainly will – a US recession will become less likely, not more so.
在中國也是如此。中國政府和中央銀行已經對川普的貿易戰作出了回應，儘管有些為時已晚，他們降低了利率和準備金率，降低了稅收，增加了公共支出，並放鬆了信貸限制。中國的刺激措施，就如美聯儲的預期寬鬆政策，將需要一段時間來輸入經濟數據，但這些措施實際上保證了美中貿易戰只會對兩國的增長前景造成有限的損害，至少在未來一兩年內是這樣的，這是宏觀經濟政策運行的時間範圍。
The same is true in China. The Chinese government and central bank have responded to Trump’s trade war, albeit somewhat belatedly, by cutting interest rates and reserve requirements, reducing taxes, ramping up public spending, and easing credit restraints. China’s stimulus measures, like the Fed’s expected easing, will take some time to feed through into economic data, but these measures virtually guarantee that the US-China trade war will cause only limited damage to growth prospects in both countries, at least in the next year or two, which is the time horizon over which macroeconomic policies operate.
一個對世界經濟更嚴重的威脅來自歐洲，一個在美中貿易戰中無辜的旁觀者所遭受的損害已經遠遠超過任何一個交戰者。當國際貨幣基金組織（IMF）考慮到2018年底出現的問題，在4月份修訂了其2019年增長預測時，中國和美國的預測基本上沒有變化，儘管它們面臨貿易戰（中國上升0.1個百分點，美國下降0.2個百分點）。但國際貨幣基金組織將德國的增長預測下調了1.1個百分點，義大利下調了0.9個百分點，歐元區整體下調了0.6個百分點。
A much more serious threat to the world economy comes from Europe, an innocent bystander in the US-China trade war that has already suffered far more than either of the belligerents. When the International Monetary Fund revised its 2019 growth projections in April to take account of the problems that emerged in late 2018, the forecasts for China and the US were essentially unchanged, despite their trade war (up 0.1 percentage point in China, down 0.2 in the US). But the IMF downgraded its growth forecast for Germany by 1.1 percentage points, by 0.9 for Italy, and by 0.6 for the eurozone as a whole.
歐洲一直是美中貿易戰的主要受害者，同樣也是2008年美國金融危機的主要受害者。儘管美國和中國正在刺激其經濟以抵消貿易放緩，但歐洲當局一如既往地以錯誤的政策作出回應。歐元區的反應不是放鬆貨幣、財政或信貸政策，而是「順周期」。歐盟委員會正試圖迫使義大利減少公共支出和提高稅收。德國財政部正利用低於預期的預算盈餘作為擠壓投資和推遲減稅的藉口。銀行監管者正迫使銀行收緊信貸標準，增加損失準備金，並削減貸款以保全資本。
Europe has been the main victim of the US-China trade war, for the same reason it was the main victim of the 2008 financial crisis, which also originated in the US. While the US and China are stimulating their economies to counteract the trade slowdown, the European authorities are, as usual, responding with exactly the wrong policies. Instead of easing monetary, fiscal, or credit policies, the eurozone response is 「pro-cyclical.」 The European Commission is trying to force Italy to reduce public spending and raise taxes. Germany’s finance ministry is using lower-than-expected budget surpluses as an excuse to squeeze investment and delay tax cuts. And bank supervisors are forcing banks to tighten their credit standards, increase loss provisions, and cut lending to preserve capital.
這些政策迫使歐洲在危機後的大部分時間都處於衰退或接近衰退的狀態，而美國和中國則享有長達十年的不間斷增長。如果維持同樣愚蠢的政策，那麼同樣的事情將再次發生。
Such policies condemned Europe to spend most of the post-crisis period in recession or near-recession, while the US and China enjoyed a decade of uninterrupted growth. If similarly foolish policies are maintained, the same thing will happen again.
作者：Anatole Kaletsky
Anatole Kaletsky是龍洲經訊的首席經濟學家和聯合主席。他曾是《倫敦時報》、《國際紐約時報》和《金融時報》的專欄作家，著有《資本主義4.0：危機後新經濟的誕生》，這本書預測了全球經濟在危機後的許多轉型。他的1985年著作《違約成本》成為拉丁美洲和亞洲各國政府與銀行和國際貨幣基金組織談判債務違約和重組的一本頗具影響力的入門讀物。
Anatole Kaletsky is Chief Economist and Co-Chairman of Gavekal Dragonomics. A former columnist at the Times of London, the International New York Times and the Financial Times, he is the author of Capitalism 4.0: The Birth of a New Economy in the Aftermath of Crisis, which anticipated many of the post-crisis transformations of the global economy. His 1985 book, Costs of Default, became an influential primer for Latin American and Asian governments negotiating debt defaults and restructurings with banks and the IMF.
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亞洲金融風險智庫（Asia Financial Risk Think Tank）是全球金融風險領域三大權威機構之一，由廣泛分布於金融、財經、非政府組織、大學、研究機構等業界專家領袖，所牽頭成立的非盈利性組織，是一個溝通官方組織、權威機構、高校、財經媒體和金融專家領袖，進行多方對話的專業溝通平臺。
智庫以香港國際金融中心為核心，自2011年成立以來，一直關注區域內及國際金融及財經領域的重點課題，致力於保持調研和報告的獨立、客觀、中立態度為宗旨；我們致力於為權威機構和金融決策提供高水平風險研究成果，為經濟增長、經濟創新提供可行性政策或商業建議；同時實踐金融為社會綜合服務的目標，提高公眾風險意識；為風險及利益方提供開放、互惠的對話機會。
智庫撰寫的金融風險領域研究報告、專業文章以及《亞洲金融與風險白皮書》等，已被亞洲及國際專業媒體和權威機構廣泛轉載、引用，並結集出版成套權威專業叢書系列。
智庫定期編制並發布風險指數與評級，為風險評估與防範提供專業參考，通過加強指數和評級成果共享，加強防範金融風險和協調經濟發展的功能。
智庫也和多個亞洲區域內及全球各大官方組織、權威機構、高校、財經媒體和專家領袖建立了長期合作機制，聯合舉辦的「亞洲金融與風險戰略對話」，是國際最有影響力的行業年度閉門峰會之一。