作者：羅納德-羅德裡格斯（RONALD A. RODRIGUEZ）
首發於光明觀察，轉載請註明譯者及出處；本譯文僅供參考，引用請查對原文。
檀香山（HONOLULU）
最近的事件證實南中國海的海上領土爭端仍是東亞各國政府所面臨的一個問題。汶萊、中國、馬來西亞、菲律、臺灣和越南都聲稱全部或部分擁有對斯普拉特利群島（即我南沙群島——譯者注）的所有權。
僅在2004年第一季度，宣稱擁有主權的各方就輪番製造不穩定局勢，這使人們更加關注對現狀的維持以及對2002年的《南中國海各方行動宣言》（ 2002 Delaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea ）
能否保證各方的自我約束。
首先，菲律賓在2月份宣布在南中國海與美國舉行巴裡卡丹（Balikatan）軍事演習。菲律賓的行動似乎受到下述因素驅使，即中國考查船隻和軍艦在斯普拉特利群島越來越多的探訪，還有去年年底在無人佔領的島礁上新的中國標記物的突然出現，這些事件讓馬尼拉更加不安。這種加劇的緊張狀態直到菲律賓總統格洛麗亞-馬卡帕加爾-阿羅約（Gloria Macapagal Arroyo）向該地區保證軍事演習與海上領土爭端沒有任何關係時才得以緩解。
然後輪到臺灣。3月23日，臺灣一艘快艇載著8人登陸Ban Than Reef小島，並在島上快速搭建一個臨時「觀鳥站」。越南強烈譴責了臺灣的行為，並要求臺灣方面停止搭建活動。越南外交部發言人黎勇（Le Dung）指責臺灣的行動為「一種搶奪土地的擴張行為，這種行為嚴重侵犯了越南的領土主權」，並警告臺灣要為其「冒險行為」承擔一切可能的後果。
臺灣的行動並非沒有遭到回應。Ban Than Reef事件過後兩天，越南宣布將把首批觀光團送往這一有爭議的島嶼，目的在於重申該國對東沙和西沙群島的主權。中國則決定4月12日在南中國海舉行一次海軍演習，給其它各方發出令其放棄的信號。
中國在南中國海海軍力量的展示未能阻止越南的行動。相反，河內4月19日給載有60名遊客和40名官員的白色海軍船隻HQ988發出了起程前往南沙群島的信號。很多人把這次引發爭議的8天往返旅行視為越南在這一地區更多旅遊活動的開始--它是效法幾年前馬來西亞的一次躍進。
有關國家為了獲得優勢而採取各種策略的做法暴露了這份不具約束力的宣言（《南中國海各方行動宣言》）的脆弱性。2002年11月，東協和中國在金邊（Phnom Penh）籤署了具有裡程碑意義的宣言。在宣言中，宣稱對斯普拉特利群島擁有主權的各方同意避免採取可能會加劇南中國海緊張局勢的行動。但這份宣言不具約束力的特性一直是令某些籤署國擔憂的問題。如今在宣言籤署近兩年之後，有關各方幾乎又回到了它們開始時的狀態。大多數國家，即使不是全部，似乎不準備允許地區性的利害關係替代它們的國家利益。至少在一些批評者看來，這就是為什麼宣言已經淪為一張「無價值的廢紙」的原因。
目前對這份宣言的價值有兩種觀點。總部設在檀香山的美國東西方中心的海洋政策專家馬克-瓦倫西亞（Mark Valencia）是懷疑論者的代表。他預言宣言註定要失敗，因為宣言在試圖減少南中國海領土爭端的烈度方面本身存在著缺陷。這一觀點認為，宣言並沒有給該地區的安全形勢帶來深刻的變化，只不過是一次滿足東協渴望政治成就的自欺欺人的演練。瓦倫西亞強調，任何鬆散的協定都不可能防止有關國家在這場久拖未決的爭端中採取策略性的立場。
另一種觀點更為謹慎。例如，菲律賓大學亞洲中心的艾琳-巴維耶拉（Aileen Baviera ）警告不要急於對宣言作出判斷並徹底地拋棄宣言，他主張各方要不斷地參考宣言，無論什麼時候出現問題，都建議各方要繼續根據宣言的精神發現其價值和目的。從這種意義上來說，宣言具有參考價值，可以使爭端各方的行動更加溫和。菲律賓和中國將各自的海軍演習低調處理為一種定期的安全常規演習或是與海上領土爭端無關的一種演習，這種做法與它們以往更加自信的立場相比就是一個明顯的轉變。
但是，臺灣和越南最近的行動不能被輕視。目前應當是重新估價宣言和留意怎樣避免類似事件發生的時候了。為此，各方應開始建立一系列指導原則，旨在減少宣言中的灰色地帶。宣言應該確定各方一致同意的10項要點，並且想辦法使它們得以儘快實施。對宣言日益增多的批評應當能夠推動人們對更具約束力的協議更大的興趣。
另外，各方應該在地區合作的前景上擬定協議，這種地區合作正如中國決定在2003年10月8日和東協籤署的《友好合作條約》一樣。這一條約不僅使東協和中國對一項互不侵犯條約作出承諾，而且它也增加了未來在南中國海達成更具約束力的協議的可能性。
持樂觀觀點的人和懷疑論者都認為，對話是解決南中國海爭端的最基本的需要。但任何新的倡議都應當強調推動合作的必要性，而不是僅僅停留在對違規行為的處理上。各方可以開始在宣言中提議的6個區域進行合作，這包括海上環保、海上科學研究、海上航行和通訊安全、搜尋和援救工作以及與跨國犯罪鬥爭。
臺灣將繼續是個問題。到目前為止，中國一直拒絕允許臺灣在關於南中國海的任何合法協議中充當籤約者。然而任何對臺灣利益的忽視將會使其扮演破壞者的角色。爭端的和平解決需要有效地處理臺灣問題。
從事後之見來看，缺少持久的對話很可能會削弱了宣言存在的基礎。各方忽視了這一事實，即連續的互動是和已籤署的宣言同等重要的因素。當一個非正式工作組仍然在召集各方的時候，像加拿大和印度尼西亞這樣起幫助作用的國家，以及象賈拉（Hasjim Djalal，印尼前駐德國大使——譯者注）這樣的關鍵人物逐漸退出，這已經產生了一定的影響。
各方可能不會欣然同意，但是南中國海似乎需要另一個調解者。那麼他會是誰呢？
羅納德-羅德裡格斯（RONALD A. RODRIGUEZ），菲律賓外交學院國際關係和戰略研究中心東北亞項目和安全與戰略研究項目的負責人，目前是太平洋論壇的法茲研究助理員（Vasey Fellow ）。太平洋論壇是戰略暨國際研究中心（CSIS）設在檀香山的美國智囊機構。以上是他的個人觀點。
附原文及網址：
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/geted.pl5?eo20040628a1.htm
SPRATLY ISLANDS DISPUTE
Deflate tension with dialogue
By RONALD A. RODRIGUEZ
Special to The Japan Times
HONOLULU -- Recent events confirm that maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea remain an issue for East Asian governments. Ownership of the Spratly Islands is claimed, in whole or in part, by Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam.
In the first quarter of 2004 alone, the claimants took turns building up anxiety, raising concerns about the sustainability of the status quo and whether the 2002 Delaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea could ensure the claimants' self-restraint.
First came the Philippines' announcement of the Balikatan exercises with the United States in the South China Sea in February. The Philippine action appeared to be driven by Manila's growing uneasiness over an increasing number of visits by Chinese research vessels and warships in the Spratly Islands, as well as the sudden appearance of new Chinese markers on the unoccupied reefs late last year. The mounting tension did not dissipate until Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo assured the region that the military exercises did not have anything to do with the maritime territorial disputes.
Then came Taiwan's turn. On March 23, a Taiwanese speedboat carrying eight individuals landed and carried out the swift construction of a makeshift "bird-watching stand" on the Ban Than Reef. Vietnam strongly condemned Taiwan's move and demanded an end to the construction activities. Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Le Dung branded Taiwan's handiwork "an act of land-grabbing expansion that seriously violated Vietnam's territorial sovereignty" and warned of possible consequences from Taiwan's "adventurism."
Taiwan's action didn't go unanswered. Two days after the Ban Than Reef incident, Vietnam reaffirmed its sovereignty over the Truong Sa (Spratly) and the Hoang Sa (Paracel) atolls by announcing that it would hold the inaugural tourist boat trip to the contested islands. China decided to conduct a Navy drill in the South China Sea on April 12, sending signals to the other claimants to back off.
The Chinese display of naval capability in the South China Sea didn't stop Vietnam. Unfazed, Hanoi gave its white navy ship HQ988 the go signal to sail for the atolls with about 60 tourists and 40 officials on April 19. Many saw the controversial eight-day round trip as the beginning of more Vietnamese tourism activities in the area -- a development that follows the Malaysian lead of a few years ago.
The maneuvering for advantage in the South China Sea reveals the frailty of the nonbinding declaration. In November 2002, the region celebrated the signing in Phnom Penh of the landmark declaration between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and China in which the claimants agreed to avoid actions that could raise tension in the South China Sea. The nonbinding nature of the declaration, however, has been a concern for some of the signatories. Two years after it was signed, the parties are almost back to where they started. Most, if not all, do not seem ready to allow regional concerns to supersede their national interests. This is why, at least for some critics, the declaration has been reduced to a "flimsy piece of paper."
There are two views on the value of the declaration. Mark Valencia, an ocean policies expert at the Honolulu-based East-West Center, typifies the skeptic's view. He anticipated that the declaration was doomed, considering it a flawed attempt to reduce the heat over territory in the South China Sea. This view sees the declaration to be a self-deceiving exercise that satisfied ASEAN's thirst for political accomplishment, but did not offer profound changes in the security situation in the South China Sea. Valencia emphasizes that no loose agreement would prevent claimants from positioning themselves strategically in the lingering dispute.
The other view takes a more cautious position. Aileen Baviera of the University of the Philippines' Asian Center, for instance, cautions against a rush to judgment and outright dismissal of the declaration, arguing the claimants' constant reference to it whenever there is a problem suggests that parties continue to find value and purpose in its spirit. In this sense, the declaration has value as a referent, and modifies the behavior of the parties to the dispute. The Philippines' and China's efforts to downplay their navy drills as either part of a regular security routine or unrelated to the maritime territorial disputes indicate a turnaround in their more self-assured positions of the past.
Recent moves by Taiwan and Vietnam cannot be downplayed, however. It's time to reassess the declaration and see how similar incidents can be avoided. For one, the parties should start molding a set of guidelines that will diminish the gray areas in the declaration. The declaration should define the 10 points that the parties have agreed on and seek strategies to put them into operation them as soon as possible. The mounting criticisms of the declaration should create momentum for greater interest in a more binding agreement.
In addition, the parties should build on the prospects for regional cooperation that emerged out of China's decision to sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN on Oct. 8, 2003. Not only does the treaty commit ASEAN and China to a nonaggression pact, but it also increases the possibility of a more binding agreement on the South China Sea in the future.
Optimists and skeptics share the view that dialogue is a basic need in the South China Sea. But any fresh initiative should emphasize the need for progress in cooperative endeavors, rather than dwell on infractions. The parties can begin with the six proposed areas of cooperation in the declaration, which include marine environmental protection, marine scientific research, safety of navigation and communications at sea, search and rescue operation and combating transnational crime.
Taiwan will continue to be a problem. To date, China has refused to allow Taiwan to become a signatory to any legal accord in the South China Sea. Yet any failure to consider Taiwan's interests will enable it to play spoiler. A peaceful resolution to the disputes requires effective management of the Taiwan problem.
In hindsight, it was probably the lack of sustained dialogue that has weakened the foundations of the declaration. The parties overlooked the fact that continuous interaction is an equally important element of the signed declaration. While an informal working group still convenes, the gradual retreat of catalysts like Canada and Indonesia, as well as key individuals like Hasjim Djalal, has had an impact.
The parties may not readily agree, but it appears that the South China Sea needs another intermediary. Takers anyone?
Ronald A. Rodriguez, head of the Northeast Asia program and officer in charge of the security and strategic studies program at the Center for International Relations and Strategic Studies, Foreign Service Institute of the Philippines, is currently a Vasey Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS, a U.S. think tank based in Honolulu. These are his personal views.
The Japan Times: June 28, 2004
文章來源：譯者賜稿