In the weeks following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008, there was naturally concern about the security of deposits. Many judged cash was safer kept in hand than parked with a wobbly bank. Demand for banknotes surged. Discerning German hoarders were said to be stuffing their mattresses with euros with serial numbers prefixed by an 「x」, indicating they were printed in Germany. Numbers starting with a 「y」 (Greece) or an 「s」 (Italy) were shunned.
在2008年雷曼兄弟破產後的幾周裡，人們開始對存款的安全性感到擔憂。許多人認為把錢攥在手裡好過放在搖搖欲墜的銀行。所以紙幣的需求量開始激增。據說有些洞察力強的德國囤積者在他們的床墊裡塞滿了序列號以「X」開頭的歐元，表明這些錢是德國印刷的。以「y」(希臘)或「S」（義大利）開頭的數字則被排除在外。.
This made little sense. A euro banknote is a euro banknote, wherever it is printed. But in troubled times people look to strong states for security. 「Europe」 doesn’t cut it. Tellingly, in the present crisis, sovereign prerogatives—to close borders; to backstop businesses; to spend freely—have been asserted, regardless of the European Union’s rules. This has left Europe looking weak. Whenever that happens, a bout of anxiety about the euro can’t be far off.
這沒道理啊。無論在哪兒印刷的，歐元紙幣就是歐元紙幣啊。但是在動蕩時期，人們還是要指望強大的國家獲得安全感。單是「歐元」還不夠格。很顯然，在當前的危機下，堅持行使主權特權——封鎖邊境、支持商業、鼓勵自由貿易，無視歐盟規則。這些還是使歐洲看上去很脆弱。每當發生這樣的事，人們對歐元的擔憂就近在咫尺了。.
A widely held view is that a common currency cannot survive without a common budget. But the burden-sharing that would strengthen the euro always seems too big a step. Low-debt countries, notably Germany, do not fully trust high-debt ones, such as Italy, to play fair. Eurosceptics believe the lack of a fiscal centre will tear the currency zone apart. This downplays the pull of a monetary union. It has been sufficient in Europe to ensure that enough fiscal union follows—hesitantly, grudgingly, murkily—in its train. The euro is a lot more durable than it sometimes looks.
人們普遍認為，沒有預算就不可能有共同貨幣。但是通過債務強化歐元，這一步似乎總是跨的太大了。債務水平較低的國家，尤其是德國，並不完全相信像義大利等債務水平較高的國家會公平行事，疑歐派認為缺乏財政核心將會使歐元分崩離析。這低估了貨幣聯盟的吸引力。在歐洲，這足以確保有足夠的財政聯盟（猶豫地、勉強地、暗地裡）追隨而來。歐元比它有時看上去更持久耐用。
History says that political union is the essential glue of any currency union. This invariably entails a centralised system of taxation and public spending. It offers a way to deal with economic disruptions that have an uneven effect across the currency zone. A shared fiscal policy automatically directs support to where the economic hurt is greatest. The coronavirus is one such 「asymmetric shock」. It hit Italy and Spain first, and hardest, within Europe. A country with its own money could in principle absorb such shocks through a weaker currency or with a monetary policy tailored to its needs. This is not possible in a currency union.
歷史表明政治聯盟是任何貨幣聯盟不可或缺的粘合劑。這一定要建立一個有關稅收和公共支出的集權制體系。這種體系提供了一種應對經濟破壞的處理方式，這對整個歐元區產生不了什麼影響。共享的財政政策會自然而然地向經濟受損最嚴重的的一方提供支持。新冠病毒就是這樣一種「非對稱衝擊」。它首先侵襲了義大利和西班牙，在歐洲也屬於重災區。原則上，一個國家可以利用自有資金通過採用貨幣貶值或者根據自身需求而量身定製的貨幣政策來緩衝危機。這在貨幣聯盟中是不可能的。
The picture becomes fuzzier in today’s setting. A bond is a government liability; but so is money. In a world of near-zero interest rates, cash and bonds are indistinct. As central banks print money to buy ever more bonds the lines between fiscal and monetary policy become increasingly blurred. This is true even in the euro zone, which has tried hard to keep the lines clear. Quantitative easing by the European Central Bank (ecb) is, in effect, mutualisation: a shared liability (cash) has been swapped for the sovereign bonds of individual euro-zone countries. The ECB is a collective endeavour. An explicit fiscal union of some kind would of course be helpful. But some implicit burden-sharing already takes place.
在當前的大環境下，局面變得有點模糊不堪了。債券是政府的債務，但錢不也是麼。在一個利率接近於零的世界裡，現金還是債券都沒什麼分別了。隨著中央銀行印刷鈔票來購買更多的債券，財政和貨幣政策之間的界限也變得愈發模糊了。即便是歐元區也是如此，也都在努力嘗試劃清界限。歐洲央行的量化寬鬆政策實際上是一種互補：一種共同的債務（現金）已經被交換成個別歐元區國家的主權債務。這是歐洲央行共同努力的結果。一個明確的財政聯盟在某種形式意義上當然會有所幫助。但有一些不明確的債務已經出現了。
None of this makes the euro zone a powerhouse. Its bourses are laden with the stocks of seemingly doomed industries, such as carmaking and banking. But the euro itself is not obviously doomed. Indeed it is not too fanciful to imagine a future in which it survives even if the EU loses its sway.
這一切都不能使歐元區成為一個強權集團組織。它的那些交易所裡擔負著那些看似命中注定的行業股，像汽車製造業和銀行業。但是歐元本身顯然不是註定的。實際上，即使歐盟失去其影響力，也並非難以想像歐元能存活至未來。
The commitments of a shared currency are not easily shaken off. The complexity of the financial super-structure built upon the euro makes break-up a terrifying prospect. And the ECB, the institution at the heart of the euro, has muscle. It can swiftly bring to bear powerful tools in a crisis. The EU, by contrast, is a rule-setter. The exigencies of the present crisis led to the suspension of many of its strictures: on the free movement of labour; on state aid to industry, and spending limits. But people have not stopped using the euro. Its reach is a lot harder to reverse.
貨幣聯盟的承諾不是那麼容易擺脫的。建立在歐元基礎之上的金融產品超級架構的複雜多樣性，使歐元面臨折賣的可怕的前景。歐洲央行，歐盟的核心機構，是有影響力的。歐洲央行可以在危機中迅速地施加手段。相比之下，歐盟只是個規則製造者。當危機出現的緊急關頭，導致一些苛刻限制暫緩：勞動力的自由流動、國家對工業的援助以及支出限額。但是人們還是一直在使用歐元。還達到了無法逆轉的深程度。
The sight of politicians squabbling over who should bear the budgetary cost of coronavirus is not a great advertisement for Europe. But for once the euro zone is ahead of the game. Who bears the fiscal burden incurred by the recession is a question that all economies must answer eventually. Some combination of taxpayers, consumers and bondholders will have to foot the bill in the end.
政客們為誰應該承擔冠狀病毒的預算成本而互相爭吵的景象，對歐洲來說並不盡如人意。但是這一次歐元區脫穎而出。誰來承擔由經濟衰退引發的財政負擔這個問題，所有的經濟體最終都要給出答案。像是納稅者、消費者、債券持有者這樣的組合，最終不得不買單。
In most places, this reckoning will take place within a country’s borders. In the euro zone, by contrast, the burden-sharing would ideally be across borders. Some countries will lose; others will win. That is what makes the argument so bitter. For all the bickering, the euro zone has become good at lasting another day. It never quite does enough to resolve all its contradictions. But they have never quite proved fatal.
在大多數地區，由此判斷將會發生在一國境內。相反的，在歐盟國家，債務肯定跨境了。這些國家會有得有失。這也是為何使得大國間激烈爭執的原因。對於所有的爭吵，歐盟國家已變得更加擅長於論持久戰。他們真的永遠也不會滿足去解決所有矛盾。但他們從來沒有被證明是致命的。
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